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BRAGUE, KIRK ALAN, Ed. D. The Legal Aspects of Disciplinary Suspension 
and Expulsion Practice and Policy at Major Tax-Supported Colleges and 
Universities in South Carolina. (1988). 
Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson, 276 pp. 
The administration of discipline at tax-supported colleges and 
universities has seen great change and evolution during the past thirty 
years, with significant case law and authoritative literature emerging 
from the landmark Dixon case of 1961. The major purpose of this study 
was the assessment of disciplinary procedures and policies used by the 
11 major tax-supported colleges and universities in South Carolina, and 
an analysis of those procedures and policies in light of prevailing case 
law and authoritative opinion. 
The study was developed through descriptive and historical analyses 
of case law, legal trends, and authoritative legal and educational 
opinion regarding disciplinary due process and related issues at tax-
supported institutions. Descriptive data and information concerning 
disciplinary practices at the eleven colleges and universities were 
collected and analyzed in terms of consensus findings resulting from the 
analysis of case law and expert opinion. The resulting analysis 
provides institutional disciplinary administrators with an assessment of 
their institutions' disciplinary policies and procedures, and guidelines 
for the retention, modification, and addition to their practices. 
The study results showed that all eleven institutions, with a few 
procedural exceptions, observed minimally mandated due process 
procedures when conducting disciplinary suspension/expulsion 
proceedings. Most institutions expanded certain procedures beyond 
minimal due process mandates, although none met all prevailing judicial 
and educational standards. Two schools offered procedures consistent 
with espoused judicial and educational opinion. 
Issues involving interim suspension, overlapping jurisdiction and 
mandatory psychiatric withdrawals were inadequately covered or ignored 
by a number of institutions, both in written policy and established 
practice. A lack of experience with some of these issues appeared to be 
a major cause for corresponding inadequate policies and procedures. The 
institutions generally treated academic dishonesty in a manner similar 
to disciplinary misconduct, a practice consistent with prevailing 
thought. The individual nature of each institution's campus climate was 
reflected in the distinct, varied nature of its disciplinary practices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Discipline in higher education is a concept which has seen great 
change and development since the founding of higher education insti­
tutions in America. Major changes in philosophy and role of discipline 
have often reflected gradual changes in the nature of the relationship 
between an institution and students. However, the thirty years which 
followed the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka^" 
decision have encompassed many judicial decisions directly addressing 
the administration of discipline on college campuses. These judicial 
decisions and subsequent scholarly attention have significantly affected 
disciplinary policies and procedures, requiring awareness of their 
implications among college and university disciplinarians and tribunals. 
Higher education has witnessed a major shift from the initial rigid 
behavioral control of the Colonial period to the current stance of less 
behavioral control and greater reliance on students' self-discipline. 
The evolution has developed from an external control, which denotes 
punishments, restrictions, and institutional control over violations of 
laws and mores, to internal control, emphasizing self-discipline and 
2 
personal responsibility. 
'"Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 
686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). 
2 William T. Packwood, ed., College Student Personnel Services 
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), p. 235. 
2 
Court decisions at the state and federal level have had a signifi­
cant impact on the evolution of campus discipline. Prior to the Fifth 
Circuit Court's acceptance of federal jurisdiction over college disci­
plinary appeals in the celebrated case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
3 
of Education, the few challenges to college disciplinary action were 
heard primarily in state courts. These decisions helped define the 
legal relationship between the student and higher education institution, 
which in turn has had important implications for the administration of 
campus discipline. The relationship theories utilized by various courts 
in settling disciplinary litigation have usually influenced courts1 
decisions regarding proper and improper disciplinary policy and 
procedure. 
One significant question which has underscored the development of 
legal relationship theories has been that of higher education 
opportunity and enrollment as a right versus a privilege. Early case 
law reflected a societal perspective which suggested that education, 
especially higher education, was not a necessity, or right of the 
4 aspiring student. The distinction between right and privilege eroded 
slowly during the first half of the twentieth century due to several 
factors including the mass public education movement, the civil rights 
movements, and continuing judicial decisions. 
3 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S. Ct. 368, 7 L. Ed. 2d 193 
(1961). 
4 
Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec.537 
(1844).; Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357, 35 Am. Rep. 547 (1880).;Cory v. 
Cook, 24 R.I. 421, 53 Atl. 315 (1902). 
3 
The 1961 Dixon case is prominently cited for the court's specifi­
cation of minimal due process procedural rights to be observed in 
disciplinary proceedings involving separation from the institution. 
However, the significance of the case also rests upon the Fifth Circuit 
Court's implicit rejection of the privilege theory. Judge Rives, 
writing the majority opinion, insisted " the State cannot condition 
the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the consti­
tutional right of due process.""' Justice Rives did invoke the 
property right in judica by declaring that the right to remain at the 
g 
public institution was a private interest. 
The landmark Dixon decision established precedence for federal 
courts in maintaining jurisdiction over litigation involving due process 
rights of students threatened with dismissal from tax-supported insti­
tutions of higher education. Some writers have suggested that the 
right/privilege distinction is one no longer worthy of significant 
discussion.^ Mills contends that "the courts are trying to avoid the 
argument of contractual versus constitutional rights and that no clear 
g 
definition has yet been drawn on the right-privilege dichotomy." He 
further suggests that "if a college education is a right, the due 
"*Dixon, p. 156. 
6Ibid, p. 157. 
^see William Van Alstyne, "The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law," 81 Harvard Law Review 1439 (1968).; 
Richard E. O'Leary, "The College Student and Due Process in Discipli­
nary Proceedings," University of Illinois Law Forum 438, 462 (1962). 
g 
Joseph L. Mills, The Legal Rights of College Students and Admin­
istrators (Washington: Lerner Law Book, 1971), p. 33. 
4 
9 process clause serves to protect the rights of college students." 
Federal court jurisdiction over higher education disciplinary cases 
since Dixon has established a constitutional rights connection between 
student and institution. The result of this judicial evolution has been 
the replacement of the in loco parentis doctrine with contractual theory 
and the constitutional rights concept. 
The authority of federal courts to adjudicate issues related to 
disciplinary suspensions and dismissals at tax-supported colleges and 
universities clearly rests upon a constitutional rights basis guaranteed 
by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The many federal cases 
which have followed Dixon have generally dealt with questions regarding 
the specification of appropriate procedural due process requirements. 
In addition, many of the decisions rendered in these cases have sug­
gested that fundamentals of fairness and reasonableness are solid 
foundations upon which to rest broad, flexible procedures of due 
process.^ In the 1963 Due v. Florida A & M University^ case the court 
maintained that: 
More specific routines of notice and advisement may be indicated in 
this regard, but a foisted system of rigid procedure can become 
ritualistic, dogmatic, and impractical as to itself be a denial of 
due process. jT^ie touchstones in this area are fairness and 
reasonableness. 
^Ibid., p. 34. 
*"^For a comprehensive discussion, see Frank P. Ardiaolo, "What 
Process is Due?," in Student Affairs and the Law, ed. Margaret J. Barr, 
New Directions for Student Affairs series, no. 22 (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1983), pp. 13-25. 
^Due v. Florida A & M University, 233 F. Supp. 396 (1963). 
5 
Ardaiolo suggests that a review of significant federal court cases will 
illustrate the federal Constitution's legal mandate that fundamental 
13 
fairness govern all student disciplinary procedures. 
The Dixon case and subsequent decisions have defined procedural due 
process. Entities such as the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri, the American Association of University-
Professors (AAUP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have 
authored statements which have had an impact on the definition of 
14 acceptable procedural due process. Educators such as Ardaiolo, 
Pavela, and Young have proposed codes of conduct and disciplinary 
15 
policies and procedures to govern campus disciplinary activities. 
Despite these efforts and continued judicial refinement, definitive 
procedures have yet to be agreed upon by all educators, legal scholars, 
and jurists. The United States Supreme Court has not yet issued a 
landmark decision which would set precedent regarding constitutional due 
12 
Ibid., 
13 
Ardaiolo, p. 18. 
14 United States District Court for Western District of Missouri, 
"General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in 
Review of Student Discipline in Tax-Supported Institutions of Higher 
Education," en banc, 1968; American Association of University 
Professors, " Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students," AAUP 
Bulletin 54 (2), (Summer, 1968).; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and 
Universities (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1965). 
^Ardaiolo, pp. 22-24.; Gary Pavela, " Limiting the 'Pursuit of 
Perfect Justice' on Campus: A Proposed Code of Student Conduct," Journal 
of College and University Law 6, pp. 139-151 (1979-80).; D. Parker 
Young, The Legal Aspects of Student Discipline in Higher Education 
(Athens, Ga.: Institute of Higher Education, 1969), pp. 24-25. 
6 
process procedures applicable to college and university disciplinary 
proceedings, yet the Court has rendered decisions which have had 
16 
substantial impact on these issues. 
Now is an appropriate time to assess the evolution of procedural 
due process on the college and university campus. The surge of 
litigation following Dixon that delineated minimally acceptable due 
process procedures has given way to decisions which have more sharply 
defined procedural points. The judicial warning has been sounded that 
administrators should not develop conduct policies and due process 
procedures analogous to criminal law proceedings and judiciaries.^ 
Rather, procedures and codes of conduct should satisfy both judicially 
mandated constitutional guarantees and the educational needs to which 
the disciplinary process serves. 
The purpose of this study is the review and analysis of major court 
cases and administrative disciplinary policies and procedures which have 
an effect on disciplinary proceedings at the eleven major tax-supported, 
four-year institutions (excluding the Medical University) in South 
Carolina. Those institutions are: 
The Citadel 
Clemson University 
College of Charleston 
Francis Marion College 
Lander College 
South Carolina State College 
University of South Carolina at Aiken (USC-Aiken) 
University of South Carolina at Columbia (USC-Columbia) 
University of South Carolina at Conway (USC-Coastal) 
1 6 
see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 U.S. 948 (1978). 
^Ardaiolo, p. 18; Pavela, p. 137; Young, p. 1. 
7 
University of South Carolina at Spartanburg (USC-Spartanburg) 
Winthrop College 
Cases are reported which address the issues of: (a) concepts of due 
process; (b) specifications of procedural due process; (c) suspension 
and dismissal of students; (d) the relationship between the institution 
and its students regarding the exercise of discipline; and (e) the 
dichotomy of academic versus disciplinary suspension and dismissal. 
There is a need for current analysis of both judicial decisions and 
administrative practice regarding these issues. The results of such an 
analysis will assist college and university administrators in designing 
policy, modifying disciplinary processes and rendering decisions which 
comply with current and precedential court rulings and contemporary 
educational standards. 
Overall, the purpose of this study is to provide college and uni­
versity administrators with appropriate information and recommendations 
so that they can arrive at decisions which lead to the implementation 
and utilization of fair and reasonable disciplinary procedures which 
will meet critical judicial and educational examination. 
Statement of the Problem 
College and university administrators need administrative guide­
lines which will ensure fairness in disciplinary proceedings while 
simultaneously meeting judicial standards of procedural due process. 
Judicial decisions, authoritative opinion, and existing guidelines must 
be reviewed to derive practices and legal precedents which have 
standing. This is the focus of the study which is described in the 
following pages. 
8 
Questions to be Answered 
This is a historical study of the legal aspects of administrative 
disciplinary policies, procedures and practices at the eleven major, 
four-year, tax-supported higher education institutions in South 
Carolina. The research describes the extent to which administrative 
practices have addressed due process, suspension, and dismissal of 
students; exercise of the discipline decision; and the dichotomy of the 
academic versus disciplinary suspension and dismissal. 
One of the major purposes of this study is the development of 
practical, legal guidelines for college and university decision makers 
to have at their disposal when faced with rendering decisions concerning 
due process and suspension and dismissal of students in South Carolina 
higher educational institutions. Answers are needed for the following 
questions in order to develop and establish guidelines for college and 
university administrators. 
1. What educational and legal opinion has been expressed to 
define the status and future direction of the legal relation­
ship between students and tax-supported institutions of higher 
education? 
2. What decisions have been held by both federal and state courts 
which speak to the legal relationship between students and 
institutions, particularly in reference to disciplinary 
procedures? 
3. What procedural due process guidelines have been held by these 
same courts and legal and educational scholars to be required 
for disciplinary suspension and dismissal? 
4. What legal, educational, and judicial distinctions have been 
drawn between the issue of suspension and dismissal for 
academic misconduct versus disciplinary misconduct? 
5. What policies and administrative practices dictate estab­
lished, acceptable due process procedures for disciplinary 
9 
activities at each of the major, senior tax-supported colleges 
and universities in South Carolina? 
6. What conclusions and recommendations may be given in response 
to a comparison between due process procedures utilized at 
these institutions and educational opinion and legal decisions 
specifying acceptable procedural due process guidelines? 
Scope of the Study 
This is an examination and analysis of court decisions and opinion 
given by jurists, educators and legal scholars to define reasonable, 
acceptable procedural due process guidelines applicable to higher edu­
cational disciplinary proceedings at tax-supported institutions. The 
research describes reasons for litigation, the results of such liti­
gation, and the implications these cases have for administrators, 
particularly those at the major, senior tax-supported institutions in 
South Carolina. 
The primary focus of this research is the reporting and examination 
of relevant cases and authoritative opinion dealing with:(l) the legal 
relationship between the student and the higher education institution; 
(2) minimal, acceptable procedural due process requirements for 
disciplinary proceedings; and (3) the dichotomy of due process dis­
tinctions and requirements for academic versus disciplinary suspensions 
and dismissals. 
Legal precedents and trends were identified, as were disciplinary 
guidelines and procedures utilized by administrators and tribunals at 
the major, four-year, tax-supported colleges and universities in South 
Carolina. A qualitative comparison between legal precedents and trends, 
and authoritative opinion and these institutional guidelines and pro­
cedures was made. Recommendations for the maintenance, revision, or 
10 
elimination of guidelines and procedures currently utilized at these 
institutions are provided as dictated by the comparative analysis. 
Methods, Procedures and Sources of Information 
Two basic research techniques are appropriate for this study. The 
first technique requires a historical research study to examine and 
analyze available references pertaining to legal aspects of procedural 
due process in higher education disciplinary proceedings. The second 
technique involves an analysis and assessment of current disciplinary 
procedures and practices at the major tax-supported colleges and univer­
sities in South Carolina. 
A search was made of Dissertation Abstracts to determine whether a 
need existed for this research, as indicated by related topics. Related 
journal articles were located by using sources such as the Index to 
Legal Periodicals, Education Index, College Student Personnel Abstracts, 
and the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. 
The Encyclopedia of Educational Research provided general research 
summaries. A number of books pertaining to legal issues in higher 
education were reviewed. A review of related material was generated by 
a computer search of the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) 
system. 
Court decisions related to the topic were located through use of 
the Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence, the American Digest 
System and the National Reporter System. Recent court cases were found 
by examining case summaries in The College Student and the Courts and 
The College Administrator and the Courts. 
\ 11 
A survey was sent to the chief student affairs officer at each 
institution requesting information concerning disciplinary policies and 
procedures in use. The responses to the survey were analyzed in light 
of findings from the review of literature and review of applicable court 
decisions. Supplemental documents such as disciplinary policy state­
ments and judicial codes were solicited along with the completed survey. 
/ 
Definition of Terms 
Selected judicial terms and other vocabulary which are interspersed 
throughout the study are defined below. Terms which are used only in 
isolated instances or in specific sections of the study are defined 
within the text. All definitions, unless otherwise noted, are given in 
the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary. 
Adjudicate: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. 
Affirmance: The confirmation and ratification by an appellate of 
a judgement, order, or decree of a lower court brought before it 
for review. 
Appeal: The complaint to a superior court of an injustice done or 
error committed by an inferior one, whose judgement or decision the 
court above is called upon to correct or reverse. 
Appellant: The party who takes an appeal from one court or 
jurisdiction to another. 
Appellate court: A court having jurisdiction of appeal and 
review; a court to which causes are removable by appeal, 
certiorari, or error; a reviewing court, and, except in special 
cases where original jurisdiction is conferred, not a "trial court" 
or court of first instance. 
Circuit courts: Courts whose jurisdiction extends over several 
counties or districts, and of which terms are held in the various 
counties or districts in which their jurisdiction extends. 
Defendant: The person defending or denying; the party against 
whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit. 
12 
Dicta: Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or 
determination of the court. 
Dismissal: An order or judgement finally disposing of an action, 
suit, motion, etc., by sending it out of court, though without a 
trial of the issues involved. 
Error: A mistaken judgement or incorrect belief as to the 
existence or effect of matters of fact, or a false or mistaken 
conception or application of the law. 
Expulsion: The act of depriving a member of a corporation, 
legislative body, assembly, society, commercial organization, etc., 
of his membership in the same by a legal vote of the body itself, 
for breach of duty, improper conduct, or other sufficient cause. 
Finding: The result of the deliberations of a jury or a court. 
In loco parentis: In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; 
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
Infra: Below, under, beneath, underneath. The opposite of supra 
above. 
Injunction: A prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity, at 
the suit of a party complainant, directed to a party defendant in 
the action, or to a party made a defendant for that purpose, 
forbidding the latter to do some act,or to permit his servants or 
agents to do some act, which he is threatening or attempting to 
commit, or restraining him in the continuance thereof, such an act 
being unjust and inequitable, injurious to the plaintiff, and not 
such as can be adequately redressed by an action at law. 
Judgement: The official and authentic decision of a court of 
justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an 
action or suit therein litigated and submitted to its determi­
nation. 
Jurisdiction: The authority by which courts and judicial officers 
take cognizance of and decide cases. 
Opinion: The statement by a judge or court of the decision 
reached in regard to a cause tried or argued before them, 
expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing the 
reasons upon which the judgement is based. 
Plaintiff: A person who brings action; the party who complains 
or sues in a personal action and is so named on the record. 
13 
Procedural due process: Those safeguards to one's liberty and 
property mandated by the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution, such as 
the right to counsel appointed for one who is indigent, the right 
to a copy of a transcript, the right of confrontation; all of which 
are specifically provided for in the 6th Amendment and made 
applicable to the states' procedure by the 14th Amendment. 
Substantive due process: Such may be broadly defined as the con­
stitutional guarantee that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life, liberty, or property; the essence of substantive due 
process is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action. 
Supra: Above, upon. 
Suspension: Suspension of a right: The act by which a party 
is deprived of the exercise of his right for a time. 
Writ of Certiorari: An order by the appellate court which is 
used when the court has discretion on whether to hear an appeal. 
If the writ is denied, the court refuses to hear the appeal and, 
in effect, the judgement below stands unchanged. If the writ is 
granted, then it has the effect of ordering the lower court to 
certify the record and send it up to the higher court which has 
used its discretion to hear the appeal. 
Significance of Study 
College and university administrators are frequently required to 
adjudicate or process actions involving violations of student codes of 
conduct. These disciplinary cases may involve violations which carry 
applicable sanctions of suspension and/or expulsion. When such viola­
tions occur it is incumbent upon the disciplinary officer or tribunal to 
act in a manner which affords the defendant a fair, reasonable discipli­
nary proceeding. Judicial decisions also dictate the adequacy of 
procedural due process to be observed in these proceedings. This study 
will assist administrators and tribunals in understanding legal deci­
sions as they relate to the design, modification, and implementation of 
procedural due process guidelines and practices. 
Disciplinary officials at the major tax-supported institutions in 
14 
South Carolina should find this study useful in examining the adequacy 
of their own campuses' disciplinary procedures and practices. The study 
is designed to provide these administrators with useful comparative data 
which will reveal an overall perspective of the administration of 
discipline at these institutions as a whole. The focus is upon current 
legal and educational issues and court decisions, with older cases 
discussed where they have precedential value. 
This study makes recommendations which will benefit the administra­
tor of campus discipline. A greater understanding of legal decisions 
and authoritative opinion should result in" higher quality decisions 
system of campus discipline. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of this study is divided into five parts. Chapter II 
consists of a review of literature describing the evolution of the 
concerning disciplinary procedures, guidelines, and systems. The 
significance of this study is that it analyzes and elaborates on court 
decisions and authoritative opinion which will be beneficial to the 
administrator who desires to oversee a fundamentally fair, legally sound 
student/institutional relationship theories, and the corresponding 
evolution of the concept and practice of disciplinary due process in 
higher education. A brief review of literature regarding related issues 
of academic misconduct and mandatory withdrawal for students with mental 
disorders is also included. 
Chapter III contains a general listing and discussion of signifi­
cant cases which have had precedential value to the issues of procedural 
due process, student suspension and expulsion and the legal relationship 
15 
between student and higher education institution. 
Chapter IV includes a description and analysis of due process 
procedures and practices currently in place at each of the major, 
four-year, tax-supported colleges and universities in South Carolina. 
The concluding chapter of .the study reviews and summarizes the 
literature and litigation research, as well as the analysis imposed upon 
institutional procedures and practices. Research questions asked in the 
introduction are reviewed and answered in this chapter. Recommendations 
are made to assist college and university administrators in the evalua­
tion and modification of existing due process procedures and practices. 
Recommendations for future research related to this study are also made. 
In general, the review of literature and the review of judicial 
decisions are treated chronologically under each subheading in order to 
show the judicial evolution of due process concepts and relationship 
theories. 
16 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED. LITERATURE 
Overview 
The policies and practices which govern the administration of 
discipline at tax-supported colleges and universities in the United 
States today bear scant resemblance to the administration of discipline 
practiced from the founding of Harvard until the middle of this century. 
Underlying this fundamental evolution of disciplinary practice is the 
evolution of the relationship between the student and his college or 
university. That relationship, influenced greatly by the social and 
economic conditions of the time, has also been subjected to scholarly 
and judicial scrutiny. 
The history of higher education in America started with the 
founding of church-affiliated schools such as Harvard, Yale, William and 
Mary College, Princeton and others. These schools looked upon disci­
pline as integral to the moral and ethical training of their students, 
many who were preparing for the ministry.''' Faculty members were 
required to assume both teaching and proctoring roles, a dichotomy which 
2 placed faculty in the guise of students' enemies. The Colonial period 
in higher education, dominated by religious influences, saw 
^William T. Packwood, ed., College Student Personnel Services 
(Springfield, II.: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), p. 232. 
2 
John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transi­
tion, 3d ed., rev. and eln. (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 42. 
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colleges take a strict, rigid stance regarding the disciplining of 
students. Strict discipline provided "a controlled environment for the 
3 production of the morally and religiously upright." 
The time between the colonial period and the Civil War found 
colleges and universities continuing to exercise discipline within the 
4 traditional authoritarian model supported by religious concepts. Few 
schools tolerated student self-governance, the most notable exception 
being the University of Virginia, under the direction of Thomas 
Jefferson. There a university court made up of student representatives 
and a proctor to administer discipline were proposed. The plan did not 
succeed for a variety of reasons including legislative unwillingness to 
approve the proposed court and proctor. 
This period was also characterized by open rebellion against the 
rigid systems of rules of conduct operating at most colleges and univer­
sities. Brubacher and Rudy have noted that open and violent rebellions 
occurred at almost every institution, regardless of geographical 
location or state or private status. Student rebellion reflected the 
social fabric of a young nation in conflict between overly repressive 
g 
morality and a violent, exuberant frontier attitude. 
The post-Civil War period in higher education marked important 
changes which altered the authoritarian role institutions assumed 
3Ibid., p. 51. 
4Ibid., p. 52. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., p. 55. 
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regarding student discipline. Curriculum changes, the dissolving of 
rigid discipline systems, coeducation, and the diminished role of 
faculty in the administration of discipline all created a greater 
emphasis on self-discipline by students.7 
The first part of the Twentieth Century ushered in the widespread 
designation of deans of men and women to relieve presidents and faculty 
g 
of their disciplinary duties. The dean was charged with the conduct of 
students and chosen for his or her personal qualities and rapport with 
9 
students. Many of the early deans espoused ideals of personal develop­
ment and self-discipline coupled with more individualized, personalized 
attention to the "whole" student.*^ 
The end of World War II and other societal forces created a mass 
consumer movement for higher education in the 1950's that has continued 
through the present. Ratliff has identified six social pressures 
affecting the student-institution relationship and discipline which 
increased during the early and middle parts of the century: 1) the civil 
rights movement; 2) the increasing value and importance of the college 
degree and student status in good standing; 3) the rapid growth of 
enrollments; 4) the court-enforced expansion of civil liberties across 
the board; 5) the increased maturity of college students; and 6) the 
pressures of the military draft and the subsequent value of student 
7Ibid. 
Q 
Packwood, p. 233. 
9 
George P. Smith and Henry P. Kirk, "Student Discipline in 
Transition," NASPA Journal 9 (April 1971): 277. 
^Packwood, p. 234. 
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exemptions.** The lowering of the age of legal majority, a societal 
shift toward attitudes and mores more permissive than in the past, and 
an increased awareness of student power arising from student activism 
are also developments affecting the student-institution relationship and 
1 2  
the administration of discipline. 
The purpose of this review of the literature is to examine the 
development of thought pertaining to the student-institution relation­
ship, the administration of discipline at tax-supported colleges and 
universities, and procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings. 
The chapter will be developed under the following topic headings: 
1. The Student-Institution Relationship Prior to Dixon 
2. The Constitutional Right to Due Process: Dixon Mandate 
3. After Dixon: Defining Disciplinary Due Process 
4. Other Due Process Considerations: Academic Misconduct and 
Withdrawal for Mental Disorders. 
The Student-Institution Relationship 
Prior to Dixon 
Numerous writers and scholars have examined the subject of college 
and university discipline by focusing attention on the underlying 
relationship which exists between the student and the institution. 
Relationship "theories" have been advanced to classify and explain the 
relationship. Some of these theories have been given judicial standing 
by courts examining the disciplinary relationship, as well as other 
relationships which exist between students and colleges. Generally, 
those theories advanced to explain the disciplinary relationship have 
some foundation in constitutional, civil, or common law. 
*^Richard C. Ratliff, Constitutional Rights of College Students 
(Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1972), p. 23. 
12 
Packwood, p. 234. 
20 
Several theories of the student-institution relationship have been 
discussed enough to warrant examination. They are: 
IS Loco Parentis theory 
2. Contractual theory 
3. Fiduciary theory 
4. Privilege theory 
5. Status theory 
6. Constitutional Rights theory (examined in next section) 
In Loco Parentis theory was given judicial standing in the 1913 
case, Gott v, Berea College, and the subsequent 1924 case, John B. 
13 
Stetson University v. Hunt. The college under in loco parentis was 
presumed to stand "in place of the parents."^ Mills noted that courts 
developed this theory during the nineteenth century when college 
students were considerably younger than the majority of today's 
students.^ This theory allowed colleges to exercise virtually the same 
control over their students that parents exerted over their children. 
Changing societal influences and certain court decisions led to the 
decline of in loco parentis as a suitable theory for use to explain the 
student-institutional rielationship. William Van Alstyne, Associate 
Professor of Law at Ohio State University, found in loco parentis 
wanting as a legitimate basis for explaining the disciplinary relation-
16 
ship between students and their colleges. Specifically, he 
13 
Gott v. Berea College, 161 S. W. 204 (Ky. 1913), John B. Stetson 
University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924). 
14 
Joseph L. Mills, The Legal Rights of College Students and 
Administrators (Washington, D.C.: Lerner Law Book Publishing, 1971), 
p. 39. 
*^William W. Van Alstyne, "Procedural Due Process and State 
University Students," UCLA Law Review 10 (January 1963): 375-377. 
21 
observed that parental power is often more restricted than a uni­
versity's power to suspend or expel, with the probable consequence of 
denial of future admission to both education and a profession, as well 
as stigmatization.^ Van Alstyne also noted that parental demands or 
expectations that universities closely supervise their children were 
difficult to imagine, and parents would be expected to fully support due 
process in the event their children were threatened with suspension or 
, . 18 expulsion. 
Limitations on the applicability of in loco parentis to the college 
campus have been noted by others. The family context of in loco 
parentis is strained by the fact that legal adult college students 
attend a modern, impersonal university incapable of acting in the 
19 
personal fashion of a parent. It has been observed that expulsion is 
20 
an act foreign to the parental function. 
Alvin Goldman, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of 
Kentucky, addressed relationship theories in a 1966 article widely cited 
in later writings. He wrote: 
The loco parentis characterization of the. studentuniversity 
affiliation is very questionable and has fallen into disuse. It 
does not explain the school's power to regulate student conduct 
when the student acts with his parent's consent, nor does it 
explain the basis of authority over an emancipated pupil or one who 
has reached majority. Finally, it has been noted that a parent may 
not lawfully do the very act which the university frequently 
17Ibid., p. 375. 
18Ibid., p. 376. 
19 
Notes and Comments, "Private Government on the Campus-Judicial 
Review of University Expulsions," Yale Law Journal 72 (1963): 1380. 
22 
tries to accomplish in averting its purported loco parentis 
authority - sever all ties. 
Beaney, in an article contained in the special edition of the 1968 
Denver Law Journal, observed that "this legal relic [in loco parentis] 
of an earlier and simpler era provides an inadequate foundation for 
describing the rights and duties of participants in increasingly complex 
22 
university affairs." He noted the caution used by courts in 
redefining the status of students, but asserted that reliance on in loco 
23 parentis as a doctrine was no longer defensible. 
Two years later Lucas took in loco parentis theory to task, 
pointing out that in loco parentis powers exercised by colleges were 
often unnecessarily authoritarian and not conducive to students' 
24 
development. He noted both societal and individual need for higher 
education as a powerful force working against the arbitrariness of in 
25 loco parentis as a base for disciplinary action. 
In loco parentis accorded students second-class citizenship rights, 
according to Kenneth Gordon, and in tandem with contract theory, were 
primary ideas used to justify disciplinary action without due 
21 Alvin L. Goldman, "The University and the Liberty of Its Students 
- A Fiduciary Theory," Kentucky Law Journal 54 (Summer 1966): 650. 
22 
William M. Beaney, "Students, Higher Education, and the Law," 
Denver Law Journal 45 (Special Issue): 515. 
23Ibid., p. 524. 
24 
Roy Lucas, "The Right to Higher Education," Journal of Higher 
Education 41 (January 1970): 57. 
25Ibid., p. 59. 
23 
26 
process. He noted that in loco parentis placed the burden of proof of 
innocence on the student in disciplinary action that lent support to the 
view of the student as a second-class citizen of the college 
27 
community. He ended his article by observing that "the pendulum has 
finally begun to swing and that the student as a first-class citizen is 
28 
fast becoming the trend." 
Ratliff-, examining the different relationship theories, observed 
the incongruity of courts finding value in both in loco parentis and 
contract theories, with their respective presumption of the student as 
both a legal infant and a party entering into a legally binding agree-
29 ment through enrollment. He went on to write: 
In loco parentis would at least have something to be said for it if 
it were consistently applied. The fact that it has not been con­
sistently applied is well known. In such instances as it has been 
applied it has scarcely reflected the degree of familial attachment 
which might be expected of a parent. Like the contract theory it 
would seem to have been utilized in a unilateral application 
scarcely characteristic of filial relationships. The "parent" |gs 
been more stern than loving, more vindictive than understanding. 
It has been noted that in loco parentis was a "convenient fiction" 
used to support sometimes questionable authoritarian control by the 
31 
institution. The demands of students to participate in all aspects of 
26 
Kenneth W. Gordon, "Due Process: A Swing Toward Student Rights," 
Journal of College Student Personnel 12 (March 1971): 95. 
^Ibid., p. 96. 
OO 
Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
29Ratliff, pp. 37-38. 
"^Ibid., p. 44. 
31 
Robert Laudicina and Joseph L. Tramutola, A Legal Perspective for 
Student Personnel Administrators (Springfield, II.: Charles C. Thomas, 
1974): 7. 
24 
community decision-making, both campus and civic, was a force which 
32 
diminished the role of in loco parentis. 
Most writers and scholars have dismissed in loco parentis as a 
viable theory to explain the disciplinary relationship between the 
modern college student and his or her college or university. At the 
same time, many are unwilling to proclaim any other theory as providing 
33 comprehensive protection to student rights. However, contract theory 
has been advocated by many as a better doctrine to replace in loco 
parentis. 
Contract theory places the student-institution relationship within 
the framework of a contract, express or implicit, which is entered into 
upon enrollment by the student. The act of enrollment, with the signing 
of admission and registration forms, binds the student to abide by 
institutional rules and regulations. Some institutions explicitly state 
that enrollment constitutes a contract obligating the student to observe 
all college rules and regulations."^ 
Contract theory has been cited in a number of cases to accurately 
describe the legal relationship between the student and the college, 
although the preponderance of such cases involve private institutions. 
33 
Laura Krugman Ray, "Toward Contractual Rights for College 
Students," Journal of Law and Education 10 (April 1981): 166., Gerald A. 
Fowler, "The Legal Relationship Between the American College Student and 
the College: An Historical Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal," 
Journal of Law and Education 13 (July 1984): 416., Richard L. Morrill 
and Eric C. Mount, Jr., "In Loco Parentis Revisited?", Change 18 
(Jan./Feb. 1986): 36. 
34Mills, p. 43. 
25 
Scholarly opinion concerning contract theory is divided, with some 
writers viewing it as the most logical basis for describing the private 
school relationship. Others see critical flaws in it, regardless of its 
application setting. 
Warren Seavey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School, 
addressed one of the key criticisms of contract theory in his 1957 
indictment of lack of due process in college disciplinary dismissal 
proceedings. He noted that courts depart from the usual rules of 
contracts, which require justification for terminating a contract for 
breach, when allowing colleges to dismiss students without showing cause 
for breach. 
In 1966 the Yale Law Journal observed that "once the court has 
seized upon the contract analogy, it acts as if it were driven to 
36 
finding for the college." The authors, noting the disparate nature of 
the power between the two parties in the contract, wrote: 
The university's reservation of power to discipline and the 
student's waiver give the university power to terminate the 
school-student relationship despite partial performance by the 
student. This power may be characterized as power to perform or not 
at its own will, as power to determine finally whether breach 
occurred, or as an ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts to 
review claims arising out of expulsion. The clauses are standard­
ized terms of a complex printed document. They are proposed in a 
manner which brooks no negotiation and by a party which, by virtue 
of its experience and its strong seller's posi- tion, is clearly 
able to impose conditions. The student is in an unusually weak 
bargaining position. Most often he is of an age such that only 
limited competency to contract is imputed to him; his promises are 
35 
Warren A. Seavey, "Dismissal of Students: 'Due Process'," Harvard 
Law Review 70 (1957): 1409. 
36 
Notes and Comments, p. 1377. 
26 
ordinarilycompetency to contract is impuj^d to him; his promises 
are ordinarily unenforceable against him. 
Admission and registration forms, catalogs, and student handbooks 
are documents which have been cited as sources for terms of the student-
school contract. One of the terms frequently contained in these 
documents was a statement allowing the school to dismiss a student 
without showing cause. These statements have been criticized because 
they have been used by colleges to arbitrarily expel students without 
A 38 due process. 
The application of contract theory in higher education has been 
viewed by some as inappropriate because the university is "far removed 
from the marketplace, and it is unwise, therefore, to judge student-
39 university conflicts by the law of the market." In a similar vein, 
the scope of the contract for an entire academic degree pursuit is not 
40 
analogous to the narrow, specific focus of most contracts. However, 
contracts might be suitable means for defining certain aspects of the 
relationship, such as business and academic-administrative functions and 
support services. 
37Ibid., p. 1378. 
38 
Alvin L. Goldman, "The University and the Liberty of Its 
StudentsA Fiduciary Theory," Kentucky Law Journal 54 (Summer 1966): 
652.; Moneypenny, p. 652. 
39 
Goldman, p. 653. 
40 
Thomas C. Fischer, "Challenge from the Courts," in Substantial 
Justice on Campus, William R. Bracewell, ed. (Athens, Ga.: University of 
Georgia Center for Continuing Education, 1973), p. 8. 
41 
Ibid.; Virginia Davis Nordin, "The Contract to Educate: Toward a 
More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship," Journal of 
College and University Law 8 (1981-82): 150. 
27 
Contract theory has been repeatedly challenged because of its 
unilateral nature, with the institution as sole designer of the contract 
terms. As such, the contract is presented to students as non-negotiable 
42 
and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Such a basis is far 
removed from the negotiability and give-and-take basis which character­
izes most contractual actions and is recognized by contract law. 
Some writers have observed that contract theory can be interpreted 
to protect student interests, although courts have been reluctant to 
challenge university action as a breach of the student-institution 
43 contract. However, despite changes which have created more specific, 
fairer rules and regulations, contract theory has still been considered 
44 
an inappropriate analogy for the student-institution relationship. 
Two of the more recent aspects of contract theory which have been 
examined by scholars include the increasing attitude of consumerism 
found among college students in the 1980's, and the relative lack of 
judicial decisions applying state action to the private college in 
disciplinary cases. The student, as a consumer of educational services, 
may be positioned to seek redress for failure of the school to provide 
45 
numerous services implied in the educational contract between the two. 
42M111S,  p .  43, Packwood, p. 243. 
43 
David M. Rabban, Notes: "Judicial Review of the University-
Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance," Stanford Law Review 26 
(November 1973): 104-105. 
44 
Ibid., p. 105. 
^Fowler, p. 413; Jon Charles Rogers, "The Evolution of a 
Contractual Right for the American College Student" (Ph. D. 
dissertation, Florida State University, 1986): 196. 
28 
Contract theory is still touted as a viable avenue by which the 
private college student can be guaranteed fair and reasonable due 
process. Scholars have observed that court cases finding "state action" 
sufficient to apply constitutional due process protections to the 
private college student are almost non-existent. Ray, noting the 
unlikelihood that future courts will endorse the public function theory 
of private education, contends that state courts can apply basic 
contract principles to the student-institution relationship to protect 
46 student rights in private colleges. She writes: 
Under contract doctrine, sympathetic courts can offer students some 
measure of protection for their rights without holding colleges to 
a level of performance beyond the scope of their original agreement 
to educate and graduate their matriculants. There is an additional 
challenge for the courts in the vigilance and analytic skill needed 
to distinguish among the disparate elements that compose such an 
agreement; some areas of academic life are admittedly and properly 
beyond judicial reach. For many student claims, however, courts are 
well equipped to determine if a college has in fact breached its 
contract in dismissing or otherwise disadvantaging a student. Far 
from intruding on academic freedom by reading such contracts 
carefully, courts would do no more than hold institutions of higher 
education to their voluntary promises, a practice as appropriate to 
the courts as it is fair to students and colleges alike. 
Contract theory has proponents who find it to be a reasonable and 
adequate basis to explain and govern the student-private institution 
relationship. They point to numerous cases that characterize various 
aspects of the relationship in contractual terms. Others, while unable 
to fully embrace contract theory as a comprehensive foundation for the 
relationship, nonetheless support its application for specific services. 
46 
Ray, p. 189. 
47 
Ibid. 
29 
The critics of contract theory point out the inequality of the 
parties and the coercive nature of the enrollment contract as funda­
mental flaws of the theory. They point to court cases that have seem­
ingly upheld the right of the institution to define breach of the 
contract while placing the burden of proof of innocence on the student. 
They also note the lack of judicial application of contract theory to 
court cases challenging disciplinary suspensions and expulsions at 
tax-supported schools. The point that analogies between commercial 
contracts and the student-university contract are distorted is a major 
criticism lodged against contract theory. Finally, most critics believe 
that other theories have greater, sounder applicability to the student 
at tax-supported colleges and universities. 
Warren Seavey broke new conceptual ground in his seminal Harvard 
Law Review article of 1957, by advancing the concept of a fiduciary 
48 relationship between a student and his or her college. He proposed 
that faculty and administrators had a duty to act for the benefit of 
students concerning matters relevant to their mutual relationship, thus 
creating a fiduciary relationship. He also suggested that such a 
relationship placed a duty on the fiduciaries to "afford their students 
49 every protection." The fiduciary was required to disclose all facts 
involving transactions between parties, with dismissal to be applicable 
to such disclosure. 
^Seavey, p. 1407. 
49 
Ibid. 
50_ .. 
Ibid. 
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Nine years later Goldman gave support to and expanded the concept 
of fiduciary theory as a basis for the disciplinary student-institution 
relationship. Goldman, noting the student-institution relationship to 
be a status relationship with unique characteristics, pointed out that a 
fiduciary relationship exists where one party dominates another."^ After 
surmising that all elements of a fiduciary relationship are present in 
52 
the student-institution relationship, Goldman placed the burden on 
schools to show that disciplinary action "was imposed in a manner 
53 consistent with scholarly integrity and fair process." 
Moneypenny, while not denying the obligations that fiduciary theory 
places on the institution, noted that no court as of 1968 had yet 
affirmed the theory as a relationship basis.However, it has been 
suggested that fiduciary theory offers courts substantial reason for 
55 
intervening in matters between students and colleges. 
Fischer, Administrative Dean of the Antioch School of Law, found 
fiduciary theory to have limited applicability to the student-
institution relationship. Among the legal limitations he identified 
were the problems of identification of the fiduciary principal, the 
definition of the "property" held by the fiduciary, and the manner in 
"^Goldman, pp. 667-669. 
52Ibid., p. 671. 
53Ibid., p. 674. 
54 
Moneypenny, p. 650. 
"'"'Donald J. Mash, "Student Discipline in Higher Education: A 
Collision Course with the Courts?", NASPA Journal 8 (January 1971): 151. 
31 
5 6 which the beneficiary (student) receives the benefits. 
Mills, characterizing fiduciary theory as a "benevolent in loco 
parentis," drew analogies between student-institution relationships and 
those of the lawyer-client, doctor-patient, and minister-confessor."^ He 
suggested a weakness of fiduciary theory is it bestows many rights on 
the student with few responsibilities, placing most of the responsibil-
58 ity for breaking the fiduciary bond on the institution. 
Beach, in a 1974 article, suggested that claims could be made that 
colleges are not only trustees to students under fiduciary theory, but 
59 also trustees to the public, and maybe even alumni. He further 
suggested that each party had conflicting claims of the fiduciary that 
often were the substance of disciplinary cases, thus minimizing the 
60 usefulness of the fiduciary concept. 
Fiduciary theory has been compared to constitutional rights theory 
in extending greater procedural rights for students in disciplinary 
hearings than those offered by other theories. Ratliff wrote: 
Since the constitutional and fiduciary concepts of student rights 
in disciplinary proceedings seemingly are aimed at the same general 
objective, it would seem that the basic pragmatic difference would 
be that the fiduciary concept could seemingly be made applicable to 
private schools sooner than ̂ tjie constitutional theory is likely to 
be stretched to that extent. 
56 
Fischer, p. 9. 
^Mills, p. 46. 
58Ibid. 
59 
John A. Beach, "Fundamental Fairness in Search of a Legal 
Rationale in Private College Student Discipline and Expulsions," Journal 
of College and University Law 2 (Fall 1974): 67. 
60T, . , Ibid. 
6Ratliff, p. 54. 
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Fowler, supporting the similarity of protection offered by both, 
suggested that equal applicability of the theory to both public and 
private institutions would help clarify the ambiguous nature imposed on 
f i  7  
the student-institution relationship by the various theories. 
In summary, advocates suggest fiduciary theory focuses attention to 
procedures related to actions taken by the institution on behalf of the 
student beneficiary, and it offers fairness and procedural rights to 
private institution students not adequately protected by constitutional 
rights concepts. Critics have noted the lack of court decisions 
deferring to fiduciary theory to explain the student-institution 
relationship. It has been suggested that legal application of the 
theory is impractical, and puts the burden of responsibility on the 
college or university. 
Another student-institution relationship theory defines 
matriculation and enrollment as a privilege, not a right, extended by 
63 
the institution and subject to institutional withdrawal. Court until 
1961 followed the lead of the 1928 case, Anthony v. Syracuse University, 
in which the state court clearly recognized the distinction, writing: 
Attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right. In 
order to safeguard its scholarship and its moral atmosphere, the 
University reserves the right to request the withdrawal of any 
student whose presence is deemed detrimental. -Specific charges may 
or may not accompany a request for withdrawal. 
^Fowler, p. 416. 
63 
Van Alstyne, p. 370. 
64 
Anthony v. Syracuse University, 231 N. Y. S. 435, 438 (1928). 
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The argument for this view is that even if attendance at a college 
or university is viewed as a privilege rather than a right, it remains a 
valuable privilege.^ As such, the privilege has almost the status of a 
f l f l  
property right, and is subject to reasonable, not arbitrary decisions. 
6 7 The 1961 case, Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, has 
been cited as the case which changed the judicial attitude that 
68 enrollment at tax-supported institutions was a privilege, not a right. 
Most scholars following the deterioration of the privilege distinction 
in post-Dixon court decisions have concluded that regardless of the 
privilege or "right" label placed on enrollment at the tax-supported 
institution, courts have guaranteed that enrollment is protected by due 
process in disciplinary proceedings.^ 
One other theory which has received some attention by those 
examining the student-institution relationship is status theory. Status 
theory proposes that students and institutions have rights and duties 
inherent in their respective statuses, developed through custom, tradi-
j 70 tion, and usage. 
Moneypenny, p. 651. 
66Ibid. 
67 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961). 
68 
John P. Holloway, "The Student in Court," in Student Protest and 
the Law, Grace W. Holmes, ec. (Ann Arbor: The Institute of Continuing 
Legal Education, 1969), p. 89. 
69 
see pp. 2-3; Lucas, p. 57; Mash, p. 151; Kern Alexander and Erwin 
Solomon, College and University Law (Charlottesville: Michie Co., 1972), 
pp. 411-12; Mills, pp. 32-34. 
70Ratliff, p. 48. 
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Status theory has been linked to both contract theory and common 
law regarding private associations. Knapp noted that both status and 
contract theory generate the same conclusion, but status theory "seems 
to do so more comfortably, because it does not have to recognize express 
provisions which attempt to modify the requirement of reasonableness 
Ray has suggested that since student status has both economic and social 
value to the student, it is analogous to private association membership. 
Therefore, the common law extension of judicial protection to members of 
72 private associations should also extend to students. 
Status theory, like the fiduciary theory, has a few proponents who 
support it philosophically, but who are forced to conclude that judicial 
deference has been paid primarily to contract and constitutional rights 
theories regarding the disciplinary relationship between schools and 
students. Status and fiduciary theories offer interesting, insightful 
philosophical views of the relationship, but are not supported by case 
law as a legal basis for viewing relationships. While it has been 
suggested that student-institution relationships defy legal class-
73 ification, the proposal has been put forth that "the realities of 
student-institutional relations worked out within the academic community 
will greatly influence the attitude of the judges.It appears that 
71S. R. Knapp, "The Nature of 'Procedural Due Process' as Between 
the University and the Student," College Counsel 3 (1968): 27. 
^^Ray, p. 168. 
73 
William M. Beaney and Jonathan C. S. Cox, "Fairness in University 
Disciplinary Proceedings," Case Western Reserve Law Review 22 (April 
1971): 397. 
^Beaney, p. 517. 
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both judiciaries and educators have found a common theory to explain and 
understand the disciplinary relationship between the student and the 
tax-supported college and university. That theory or concept is the 
constitutional rights concept. 
The Constitutional Right to Due Process: 
Dixon and Beyond 
The 1961 Dixon case marked a water shed for the development of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process for 
students at tax-supported colleges and universities. This landmark 
decision, while representing a one hundred eighty degree change in 
judicial philosophy,^ was rendered during a period when the United 
States was under both judicial and social pressure to enlarge and 
protect the civil rights and liberties of its citizens. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals followed that trend in thrusting constitutional 
protections upon the public university campus. 
The Dixon decision was widely analyzed during the early years which 
followed it, both for its findings as well as its implications for the 
future development of the constitutional rights theory of the student-
institution disciplinary relationship. It is difficult, even today, to 
find any article of substance dealing with disciplinary due process and 
student-institutional relationship theories which does not pay homage to 
the Dixon decision. Van Alstyne, writing two years after Dixon was 
handed down, said "there is every indication that it will not only 
^Charles Alan Wright, "The Constitution on the Campus," Vanderbilt 
Law Review 22 (October 1969): 1031. 
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7 6 
endure, but that it will be substantially expanded." Binder devoted 
a 1973 article, "Dixon After a Decade: Ramifications and Interpre­
tations," to an examination of the Dixon legacy on due process and 
student-institution relationship.''' The numerous articles examining 
various specific aspects of procedural due process invariably cite Dixon 
as the major starting point. The absence of a Supreme Court case to 
reverse, repudiate, or substantially modify Dixon has also contributed 
to its continued interest as the most significant constitutional frame-
78 work for student due process. 
The Dixon decision has been noted for the specific ground which it 
broke in addressing disciplinary dismissals from tax-supported insti­
tutions. It has been cited as the first case to substantially limit 
79 
discretionary discipline authority. The Dixon decision did not 
clearly distinguish college attendance as a right or privilege, but it 
suggested that it was a necessity, a point maintained by both educators 
80 and a higher education-conscious society. Dixon has been lauded for 
81 
changing the concept of discipline from inquisitorial to adversarial. 
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Millington noted, "But by far the most important consequence was the 
fact that Dixon was the first case in which constitutional rights were 
82 expressly extended to students in public colleges and universities." 
Ratliff reinforced these points in indicating Dixon was most noted for 
declaring a property right to students in their status at tax-supported 
colleges and extending Fourteenth Amendment protections to these 
students.^ 
The Dixon case has not been without its detractors, most who have 
criticized its inapplicability, its narrow focus, and its lack of reso­
lution regarding a number of due process issues. Many of the criticisms 
have acknowledged the rudimentary values of Dixon while critiquing it on 
extended grounds. Dixon drew sharp distinctions between its application 
to public, rather than private institutions, and to disciplinary, not 
84 academic, dismissals. As a result, it is suggested that: 
The two distinctions between public and private colleges, between 
discipline and academic matters raise two different sets of issues 
which should be treated separately. They have in common, however, a 
tendency to categorize neatly where developments in higher educa­
tion have been working to blur some traditional lines of division. 
They also have in common the effect of an all-or-nothing juris­
prudence: the student^ j*ho falls on the wrong side of the line has 
no judicial recourse. 
Dixon has been charged with generating more due process questions 
than it answered in its decision. Among those issues left unresolved 
were: the right to cross-examination, the right to counsel, the right to 
®^William G. Millington, The Law and the College Student (St. Paul: 
West Publishing, 1979), p. 19. 
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appellate review with provision of a transcript to expedite the review, 
86 
and the right to require an open hearing. Dixon was also cited as 
failing to address other procedural issues, and more important, interim 
suspension and the severity of the sanction required to trigger Dixon's 
87 
due process notice and hearing mandate. Millington noted that Dixon 
also avoided issuing guidelines concerning substantive due process 
questions raised in the case. This criticism has been repeated by 
88 
others looking for a broader due process mandate from the case. 
Despite its limitations, Dixon has been lauded as an agent of 
89 
change. The influential cases which followed Dixon in the early and 
middle 1960's have invariably been linked to Dixon by both courts and 
the legal and educational scholars of the time. Twelve years after 
Dixon was rendered it was hailed as having "an impact on student disci­
pline of the same dimension as the Brown decision on school desegre-
..90 
gation. 
In summary, Dixon represented a decision commensurate with social 
and legal movements of the day, most notably, the civil rights movement 
and greater judicial recognition of the rights of citizenship. What 
86 
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distinguished Dixon from its predecessors was a federal court claim of 
constitutional jurisdiction over the expulsion proceedings of a student 
at a tax-supported institution where an allegation of denial of due 
process was raised. What further gave Dixon its lofty judicial stature 
was its assertion that enrollment at a tax-supported college was not a 
privilege subject to arbitrary withdrawal, but an interest protected by 
minimal due process notice and hearing where the interest was threatened 
by dismissal. 
After Dixon: Defining Disciplinary Due Process 
An examination of Chapter III of this study will reveal that Dixon 
unleashed a torrent of litigation centered on disciplinary suspensions 
and dismissals from colleges and universities. Issues which Dixon 
ignored or casually addressed were significant points of contention in 
many of the post-Dixon cases. Like other landmark cases, Dixon served 
as the catalyst for a movement shaped by its successors. 
Educators and legal scholars also increased their attention and 
writings to the issues generated by Dixon and those cases which 
followed. Ratliff suggested that legal journals published as many 
articles featuring student rights issues in the seven years following 
91 
Dixon as they published in the preceding four decades. 
Dixon and its early successor cases established and reinforced the 
right to minimal due process procedures in suspension and dismissal 
cases at tax-supported institution. Later case decisions gave greater 
definition to the increasingly litigated question to how much process 
^Ratliff, p. 2. 
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was due in suspension and dismissal proceedings. Simultaneously, 
educators and legal scholars attempted to interpret the flow of judicial 
decisions, writing about the definition and philosophy of expanded 
disciplinary due process. 
This section will categorize scholarly attention in terms of 
particular due process features. Those features are: 
1. Specific hearing procedures and rights 
2. The right to counsel 
3. Overlapping jurisdiction and double jeopardy 
4. Appeals procedures 
5. Interim suspension 
It did not take long for the scholarly examination of Dixon and 
those disciplinary cases following it to start regarding the definition 
of due process procedures. Just two years after Dixon, Professor Van 
Alstyne offered his view on the specifics of procedural due process in 
the state university context. He prefaced his observations by noting 
"the measure of required due process is closely connected with the 
measure of harm to the student involved in the infraction of which he is 
92 
accused." This thought has been embraced by others as justification 
for a wide range of due process procedural rights for students facing 
suspension or expulsion. 
Specifically, Van Alstyne proposed that a faculty Hearing Board 
should be utilized to hear appeals of sanctions imposing suspension or 
expulsion, with strict separation of Hearing Board members from other 
aspects of the case. Further, the hearing process should allow the 
student opportunity to testify, present evidence and witnesses, and 
92 
Van Alstyne, p. 383. 
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receive a transcript of the proceedings. Cross-examination was to be 
93 offered whenever possible. 
The same year the Yale Law Journal suggested minimal due process 
procedures including a decision by an impartial tribunal, the ability of 
the student to summon students and staff as witnesses, and the right to 
94 
cross-examination by the student. In addition, the student was 
95 allowed the right to request a private hearing. These were procedures 
that had not yet been embraced by courts, let alone stated as minimally 
required in disciplinary proceedings. 
In 1964 the Texas Law Review published an article which reviewed 
procedural due process rights, with reference to the University of Texas 
96 
Disciplinary Code. The article suggested that it was desirable to 
separate adjudicative roles from those of the investigator and prose-
97 
cutor, although not mandated by the courts. While noting that Dixon 
did not mandate cross-examination, the author asserted that there was no 
98 
reason to deny this right to the accused student. The author noted 
the Texas Code provided for indefinite suspension for failure to testi­
fy, a rule which could be used to compel self-incriminating evidence. 
93Ibid., p. 386. 
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The author continued to point out that protection against self-
incrimination, while not directly applied to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, was a powerful protection, particularly in those 
99 disciplinary cases where criminal charges were also possible. 
During this same period of time in which due process procedures and 
rights were being defined, some writers were reminding college and 
university authorities that due process required more than informal 
processes and guidelines. Arthur Sherry, Professor of Law at the 
University of California, wrote: 
In short, procedural fairness must not be left to chance or to ad 
hoc extemporization but must be considered as a fundamental part of 
the exercise of the university's disciplinary authority and receive 
the same careful consideration tha|gjs required in the enactment of 
substantive rules and regulations. 
Professor Beaney also urged careful use of procedures, writing: 
Obviously, the spirit with which these procedures used are of vital 
importance; a mere formal observance is insufficient. An institu­
tion, large or small, which insists on using highly truncated and 
informal methods in dealing with serious disciplinary problems is 
inviting judicial intervention. The obvious thrust of legal develop­
ments in recent decades has been toward increased judicial scrutiny 
of procedures used in reaching decisions that adversely affect 
vital interests of individuals and groups. Government and its 
instrumentalities, and, in ever greater degree, private associa­
tions as well, are compelled to observe the^gY ês reasonableness 
and fairness in the procedures they employ. 
Ira Heyman, writing in the same issue of the California Law Review 
as his colleague Professor Sherry, specified a number of procedural 
"ibid., p. 356-357. 
* ̂Arthur H. Sherry, "Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, 
and Responsibilities," California Law Review 54 (March 1966): 38. 
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points required in formal proceedings. He wrote that hearings should 
be public unless the student requests a closed hearing, in order to 
102 establish a perception of impartiality. He strongly stated that 
determination of guilt should not be made based on evidence unavailable 
103 
to the accused student. Additional points recommended were the 
student's right against forced self-incrimination and the maintenance of 
104 
a written or taped copy of the hearing proceedings. 
Van Alstyne, in a contribution to the 1968 special issue of the 
Denver Law Journal, reinforced his 1963 contention that suspension and 
dismissal proceedings deserved broad procedural considerations. Review­
ing necessary due process procedures similar to those already noted, he 
wrote: 
These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the standards 
required by criminal courts in their disposition of offenses 
punishable by fine or short term imprisonment. The comparison is 
not fortuitous because it is now evident that expulsion or 
exclusion from college may, in the long run, disadvantage an 
individual at least as much as a single infraction of a criminal 
statute. There should be no surprise, therefore, that students are 
entitled at^J^ast to a similar degree of due process as a suspected 
pickpocket. 
Several scholars writing about due process mandates remarked about 
fears of educators that court decisions had removed administrative 
decision-making from disciplinary dismissal proceedings. One writer, 
Ira Michael Heyman, "Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary 
Proceedings," California Law Review 54 (March 1966): 79. 
103Ibid., p. 81. 
104Ibid., pp. 82-85. 
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noting a lack of uniformity among institutions regarding disciplinary 
procedures, suggested a hearing model based on a format used by the 
National Labor Relations Board.After spelling out the procedural 
components of the model he suggested methods of implementation, includ­
ing: 1) incorporation in state statutory law, 2) a binding Supreme Court 
ruling requiring all colleges and universities to adopt the hearing 
model, 3) federal legislation to implement the model in tax-supported 
institutions, and 4) extension of the model through application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to private institutions.^^ Although this proposal 
got no serious attention, it points out the degree to which some 
scholars were intent upon mandating due process procedures in the 
college environment. 
The year 1968 saw a remarkable document emerge from the United 
108 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, en banc. 
The venue for several major cases reviewing discipline at tax-supported 
institutions, this court issued an unusual order and accompanying 
memorandum describing judicial standards applicable to the disciplinary 
actions of tax-supported colleges and universities litigated in the 
109 court. The memorandum noted: "A court should never intervene in the 
processes of education without understanding the nature of 
^^Greene, p. 506. 
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108 
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1968). 
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education.^ This theme of cautious judicial intervention was further 
expanded, the court writing, "Only where the erroneous and unwise 
actions in the field of education deprive students of federally pro­
tected rights or privileges does a federal court have power to intervene 
in the educational process. 
The court's memorandum went on to address the comparison between 
student discipline and criminal law. The court wrote: 
The discipline of students in the educational community is, in all 
but the case of irrevocable expulsion, a part of the teaching 
process. In the case of irrevocable expulsion for misconduct, the 
process is not punitive or deterrent in the criminal law sense, but 
the process is rather the determination that the student is unquali­
fied to continue as a member of the educational community. Even 
then, the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the criminal 
law processes of federal and state criminal law. For, while the 
expelled student may suffer damaging effects, sometimes irrepar­
able, to his educations, social, and economic future, he or she may 
not be imprisoned, fined, disenfranchised, or subjected to probation­
ary supervision. The attempted analogy of student discipline, ̂to 
criminal proceedings against adults and juveniles is not sound. 
The memorandum specifically addressed due process procedural issues 
after recognizing the right to notice, hearing, and the necessity for 
113 
action to be taken only on grounds supported by substantial evidence. 
The court wrote: 
There is no general requirement that procedural due process in 
student disciplinary cases provide for legal representation, a 
public hearing, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 
warnings about privileges, self-incrimination, application of 
principles of former or double jeopardy, compulsory production of 
110Ibid., p. 136. 
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witnesses, or any of the remaining features of federal criminal 
jurisprudence. Rare exceptional circumstances, however, may 
require one or more of these features in a ^jrticular case to 
guarantee the fundamental concepts of fair play. 
This document was widely hailed and assailed by legal scholars and 
cited by most as an extraordinary document which would carry great 
weight in discussions on disciplinary due process procedures. Ratliff 
noted that the document had been cited at least twice in federal courts 
as of 1972, with one of the courts citing it disapprovingly.^"' 
Another well-publicized, widely cited document dealing with 
disciplinary issues was issued in 1968. A joint committee representing 
five professional associations drafted the "Joint Statement on Rights 
and Freedoms of Students," which was subsequently endorsed by numerous 
other professional associations.***' The preamble of the document spoke 
of its purpose: 
The responsibility to secure and to respect general conditions 
conducive to the freedom to learn is shared by all members of the 
academic community. Each college and university has a duty to 
develop policies and procedures which provide and safeguard this 
freedom. 
The statement went on to address due process in disciplinary 
proceedings. Under the heading, "Procedural Standards in Disciplinary 
114 t v ,  Ibid. 
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Proceedings," the authors stated: 
In developing responsible student conduct, disciplinary proceedings 
play a role substantially secondary to example, counseling, 
guidance, and admonition. At the same time, educational institu­
tions have a duty and the corollary disciplinary powers to protect 
their educational purpose through the settling of standards of 
scholarship and conduct for the students who attend them and 
through the regulation of the use of institutional facilities. In 
the exceptional circumstances when the preferred means fail to 
resolve problems of student conduct, proper procedural safeguards 
should be observed to pro^^t the student from the unfair imposi­
tion of serious penalties. 
The authors of the statement then outlined hearing committee procedures 
including: 1) impartial committee membership; 2) the student's opportun­
ity to testify and present evidence and witnesses, and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses; 3) the denial of improperly introduced evidence, and 
a decision based only on evidence properly introduced in the hearing; 4) 
a digest and verbatim record made available in the absence of a tran­
script; and 5) the right to appeal to the president or ultimately to the 
119 
governing board of the institution. 
This powerful statement was supported by many influential educa­
tional associations, and recognized by scholars and jurists, including 
the authors of the General Order. Like the General Order, it placed the 
administration of discipline in the hands of educators, but recognized 
that dismissal issues were subject to greater procedural care. In that 
regard, the "Joint Statement" went a great deal farther in specifying 
necessary due process procedures. 
118Ibid., pp. 260-61. 
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Wright's 1969 review of procedural due process reviewed the most 
prominent procedural due process issues emanating from the Dixon and 
post-Dixon decisions. Among the issues he wrote about were open hear­
ings and the right to an impartial tribunal. He concluded that "fairness 
and reasonableness do not require that a disciplinary proceeding be 
120 
open, and the cases so hold." While claiming the student's right to 
an impartial tribunal, he noted the impracticality of requiring a 
complete lack of knowledge or prior involvement with a case as a requi­
site of participation on the tribunal. He noted that criminal case 
juries are not held to an absolute standard, and suggested that 
121 
universities need not be as well. Wright went on to propose future 
due process issues to be resolved including right to discovery, the 
right to be tried jointly with or apart from others accused of the same 
incident, and the ability of authorities to increase sanctions assessed 
122 by the hearing tribunal. He concluded that courts were capable of 
deciding these issues, writing: 
I have no doubt that the courts will reach right results if they do 
not allow themselves to be distracted by analogies from criminal 
law or administrative law or elsewhere and keep their gaze fastened 
on the twin requirements of fairness and reasonableness^^ these 
apply in that unique institution, and academic community. 
The 1970's were marked by a great deal of scholarly inquiry devoted 
to procedural due process issues affecting colleges and universities. 
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This abundance of research and writing mirrored the proliferation of 
court challenges to disciplinary proceedings. One of the developing 
trends in scholarly writings was attention given to a single significant 
aspect of due process, as opposed to the panalopy of due process 
procedures. Another trend, often intertwined with the first, was 
research focused on a single court decision. These two approaches 
produced an intense look at part of the procedural due process picture. 
The Cornell Law Review contained an article which focused on the 
admissibility of coerced testimony in a criminal trial subsequent to the 
124 
disciplinary proceeding, citing Furutani v. Ewigleben. The article 
concluded that admission of any coerced statement obtained in a disci­
plinary hearing, if admitted into a criminal court proceeding, denied 
125 
the accused his right to a fair trial. 
Another 1970 article focused specifically on exclusionary rules of 
evidence used in disciplinary hearings in tax-supported institu-
126 
tions. The exclusionary rules examined included: 1) hearsay rule; 2) 
127 
opinion rule; 3) best evidence rule; and 4) rules of privilege. The 
author concluded the trend of both case and administrative law was to 
128 
replace exclusionary rules of evidence with discretion. 
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1970 was also a year in which D. Parker Young, a noted educational 
law authority, reviewed the status of procedural due process. He 
pointed out that court decisions revealed students had no absolute right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and no right against 
129 
self-incrimination. Young said schools were free to determine their 
one rules of evidence, but rules applicable in criminal action, such as 
130 hearsay, were not applicable to disciplinary proceedings. He also 
stated that there was no requirement that a disciplinary hearing be made 
vi• 131 public. 
In 1971, Beaney and Cox pointed out that courts had not considered 
132 
all the aspects of a disciplinary hearing. Specifically, they noted 
undefined issues such as the composition, number, and neutrality of the 
hearing tribunal; the student's right to discovery of facts against him 
prior to the hearing; and the fairness and consistency of an 
133 institution's decision to initiate a hearing. 
An important research project in the field of student discipline 
was conducted and the results published in 1971 by the Duke Law 
134 
Journal. The project surveyed the disciplinary procedures at over 
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500 American colleges and universities. Their results revealed a great 
deal about the status of due process on college campuses nationwide. 
Among their results were: 
1. Seventy-nine percent of respondents provided written notice of 
charges; only twenty-four percent gave seven days notice, but 
fifty-five percent gave at least two days notice. Fifty-two 
percent gave names of adverse witnesses and fifty-seven 
percent permitted examination of supporting documents prior to 
hearing. 
2. Only seventy percent indicated having a formal hearing 
procedure. 
3. Forty-nine percent of schools responding either required 
closed hearings or left the decision to the accused student. 
4. Forty-seven percent of respondents allowed joint proceedings, 
twenty percent rejected them. 
5. Many schools had cross-sectional representation on hearing 
boards, with eighty-four percent including at least one 
student. Only seventeen percent were totally homogenous among 
administrative, faculty, or student makeup. 
6. A majority of schools prohibited both a testifying school 
official and a prosecutorial witness to participate at hearing 
board members. 
7. Eighty-one percent of respondents allowed students to hear 
adverse witnesses. Only eight percent did not allow either the 
student or his counsel the right to cross-examine witnesses. 
Only twenty-four percent compelled witnesses to appear at 
hearings. 
8. Eighty-one percent of respondents recognized the student's 
right to testify and call witnesses on his behalf. 
9. Seventy-one percent of respondent schools recognized the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
10. Only seventeen percent followed no rules of evidence during 
the hearing. Ten percent followed evidentiary rules such as 
hearsay, relevancy, and materiality. Seventy-three percent 
reported only using evidence presented at the hearing in order 
to determine guilt or innocence. 
11. Fifty-three percent of the schools allowed the student to make 
a transcript; twenty percent denied that activity. Forty-nine 
percent provided the transcript on a financial basis. 
52 
12. Thirty-six percent of schools wrote and made available to the 
student the findings of the proceeding. Only fifty-eight 
perc|i|j: prepared specific findings; nineteen percent did 
not. 
The study concluded: 
Though many schools have kept pace with legal developments in the 
student disorder area or even advanced ahead of such developments, 
results of the questionnaire reveal that many existing procedures 
fail to satisfy even the minimal current requirements of due 
process. The survey justifies the initial evaluation that most 
schools desire to treat students fairly within the law and to ' 
protect life and pi^erty through the application of reasonable 
judicial procedures. 
While the definition of due process continued to receive substan-
137 
tial review, some writers in 1971 were again expressing caution about 
the development of an overly legalistic system of discipline. It was 
observed that court decisions which raised issues of due process in 
disciplinary proceedings resulted in a more formal and legalistic system 
138 with hearings resembling quasi trials. The "escalation of legalism 
in the university discipline area" was found to be a continuing, but not 
139 
totally positive result of the evolution of discipline. Universities 
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were admonished not to be "so intimidated by advocates of strict adher­
ence to the concept of due process as to debilitate university efforts 
to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of student rights to 
140 
participate in the educational process." 
Alexander and Solomon, noting the prevailing judicial view that 
broad procedural requirements sufficiently protected constitutional 
interests, presented a list of recommended procedural steps that no one 
court had entirely required or proposed. Among their non-mandated 
recommendations included the need for student representation on hearing 
panels, the student's choice of open or private hearing, and the right 
of the accused to remain silent. 
Two years later, an article compared the recommendations of 
Alexander and Solomon with those proposed in the "Joint Statement" of 
143 
1968. The authors noted differences between the two statements on 
some questions of procedural refinement. Using the Alexander and 
Solomon recommendations as an outline, the authors surveyed ninety-eight 
public and private universities regarding campus procedural rights 
afforded students in disciplinary proceedings. Their results indicated 
a majority of public and private institutions provided basic elements of 
140 
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fairness in their procedures, with private institutions offering similar 
protections to public schools, but slightly below them in degree of 
144 
application. The authors also noted that greater attention was paid 
to the finer details of due process than was the case a decade before 
when a similar survey was conducted. 
A survey conducted in 1972 addressed a specific question: the 
146 
subpoena power in university disciplinary proceedings. The author 
noted that administrative procedure acts being enacted in various 
states, with their potential applicability to disciplinary proceedings 
at tax-supported universities, authorized the power of subpoena to state 
147 
agencies. The author concluded that survey responses indicated a 
greater likelihood that more institutions would utilize subpoena power 
148 in tandem with other disciplinary procedures. Another aspect of the 
study revealed little institutional use of witness' oath, and limiting 
149 sanction for perjury as part of the formal disciplinary process. 
Five years later, .in 1977, an article was published which also 
related institutional disciplinary proceedings with proceedings governed 
144 
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150 
by administrative procedures acts. Specifically, the study compared 
the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, with its provisions 
binding upon state agencies, to case law regarding due process in public 
school disciplinary proceedings. The author concluded the act's provi­
sions, "which necessitate formalistic, trial-type adversary proceedings, 
are ill-suited to the great majority of public college and university 
disciplinary proceedings..."1"'1 The author noted that other states 
excluded public universities from the "state agency" application of 
152 their administrative procedures acts. 
The same year another writer, reviewing applicable disciplinary 
cases involving public institutions, wrote that cross-examination, if 
not considered essential to due process, is inevitably a factor con-
153 sidered by the court in determining overall fairness of a proceeding. 
The author also suggested that wholesale application of rules of evi­
dence to the disciplinary process were unnecessarily burdensome and 
154 expensive. 
A substantial monograph was published in 1978 by the American 
College Personnel Association entitled, The Legal Foundations of Student 
David C. Porteous, "College and University Disciplinary 
Proceedings Under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act: 
Undue Process?" Memphis University Law Review 7 (Spring 1977): 345-365. 
151Ibid., p. 364. 
152^., 
Ibid. 
153 
M. Michele Fournet, Notes — "Due Process and the University 
Student: The Academic/Disciplinary Dichotomy," Louisiana Law Review 37 
(Spring 1977): 944. 
154Ibid., p. 945. 
56 
Personnel Services in Higher Education.This work, edited by Edward 
Hammond and Robert Shaffer, two noted educators and scholars, was 
written for the student personnel professional, the campus lay person in 
156 
the field of law. Chapter VII of the monograph was a review of 
procedural due process requirements in colleges and universities, by 
157 E. T. Buchanan, a dean of students, noted educator, and lawyer. 
Buchanan devoted most of the chapter to the definition of due 
process procedural requirements. He stated that notice should include a 
cover letter, notice of charges, notice of hearing, and witness state-
158 
ments. The right of the student to examine certain evidence prior to 
the hearing, including witness statements, photographs, or video or 
159 
audio tapes, was upheld. He also noted that students had no right to 
decide on either joint or separate hearings, or open or closed 
hearings. Protection against self-incrimination was not offered as a 
due process right, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
Edward H. Hammond and Robert H. Shaffer, eds., The Legal 
Foundations of Student Personnel Services in Higher Education 
(Washington, D.C.: American College Personnel Association, 1978). 
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161 witnesses was recommended, but not found established by case law. 
The student could present witnesses and testimony or affidavits during 
the hearing, and institutions were recommended to adopt a process to 
162 compel attendance of students, faculty, or staff as witnesses. H& 
also recommended that a combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and 
adjudicatory roles be avoided in order to prevent the potential for bias 
in the proceeding. 
The publishing of Legal Foundations marked a new trend in educa­
tional scholarship which devoted attention to legal issues for the 
benefit of the educational practitioners who were dealing with discipli­
nary and other issues on their respective campuses. Other publications 
which followed were directed at student personnel services profession-
164 
als, faculty, and lawyers in higher education. These publications 
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usually gave readers prescriptions and reviews of past and current 
thinking regarding due process procedures. 
William Buss, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of 
Law, wrote a thought-provoking article in 1979 which suggested that cost 
considerations had been used by courts and scholars in balancing the 
consideration of traditional due process procedures of governmental 
165 
agencies. He suggested that jurists had viewed the expensive admin­
istrative costs of elements such as right to counsel and cross-
examination as necessary only where the interest was substantial enough 
to justify the expense. He went on to write: 
There is very little doubt that the costs of providing extensive 
procedural protection are very real, and it is likely that these 
costs were not sufficiently counted when the heady breezes of due 
process revolution were blowing freshly. This heightened cost 
consciousness has led to a healthy skepticism ab<j^g the actual 
value of particular procedures in specific contexts. 
Buss's article echoed the writings of others who considered the cost and 
burden of institutional provision of extensive due process procedures. 
The results of a study involving a survey of disciplinary and 
academic dismissal procedures at public universities were published in 
167 
1982. A total of sixty-two schools provided responses to a number of 
due process questions including the right to twenty-four different 
168 
hearing procedures. The study concluded that, among other findings, 
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most institutions provided written notice with specific accusations, and 
time, place, and date of hearing, but not necessarily the violated 
169 
regulations or specification of time for preparation of defense. Over 
ninety percent published some type of formal disciplinary procedures, 
with some variation in hearing procedures offered. Few institutions 
took a legalistic approach to evidence or level of proof. In all 
procedures the level of use in academic proceedings was significantly 
lower than use in disciplinary proceedings. 
Gary Pavela, recognized educational law authority, defined the 
state of procedural due process in disciplinary hearings in a 1983 
172 
publication. Among the points he made were: 
1. Students do not have to be appointed to disciplinary hearing 
panels, but many schools do so as a matter of policy. 
2. Superficial knowledge of the case background does not require 
disqualification, but hearing panelists should not participate 
in the investigation and prosecution of the case. 
3. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof used in 
criminal cases may be supplanted by guilt established by 
"clear and convincing evidence." 
4. Circumstantial evidence may be used, and hearsay is not 
excluded, but should not be grounds for dismissal. Technical 
rules of evidence are inapplicable. 
5. Students who choose to invoke Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination should be advised that the panel 
could draw negative inferences from such silence. However, 
subsequent responses would not be admissible in a concurrent 
or future criminal proceeding. 
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6. Confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses 
should be allowed if the case is to be decided on questions of 
credibility. 
7. Hearing proceedings should be tape recorded or transcribed. 
Students found guilty should receive a written statement of 
findings. 
8. Institutions are expected to follow their own regulations. The 
burden will be on institution^^o show that deviations did not 
deny students a fair hearing. 
The same year another review of due process procedures was 
published as part of a volume written to highlight legal issues in 
174 higher education for reading by student affairs professionals. The 
author, upon conclusion of his review of significant federal court 
cases, stated that "what the federal Constitution legally requires in 
student discipline cases is a policy of fundamental fairness that 
governs all procedures.He went on to propose legal and policy 
guidelines for a fundamentally fair discipline process which included: 
1) the right of the student to choose between an administrative or board 
hearing; 2) the opportunity to hear all information presented and to 
question all who present information; and 3) the right to challenge the 
objectivity of judges.In summary, the author wrote: 
In dealing with student, the constitutional parameters of due 
process have been defined so that administrators faced with a 
disciplinary encounter who ask, "What process is due?" can answer 
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that the institution must ji^vide procedures governing students 
that are fundamentally fair. 
One year later, in another publication directed toward student 
affairs professional, D„ Parker Young reviewed the development or proce-
178 
dural due process. He addressed the nature of the disciplinary 
hearing, writing: 
Student disciplinary proceedings have been held to be civil and not 
criminal proceedings and therefore do not necessarily require all 
of the judicial safeguards and rights accorded to criminal proceed­
ings. The hearing itself should provide the student an opportunity 
to present his defense and present witnesses in support of his 
case. There is no general absolute requirement at this time that 
the student be warned against self-incrimination or be permitted to 
cross-examine witnesses. Also, rules of evidence that apply in 
criminal proceedings, such as the hearsay rule, are not applicable. 
There is also no requirement that the hearing be open to the public 
or members of the college community. In fact, an open hearing would 
violate the Buckley Amendment unless the student approved that the 
hearing be made public. The student is entitled to appeal the 
decision. The hearing is not intended to be a full-blown proceed­
ing, but simply a^^air and ample opportunity for both sides to 
present the facts. 
D. Parker Young's observations provide a reasonable summary of the 
state of due process disciplinary hearing procedures and issues present­
ly recognized by most courts and educators. The expansion of the 
minimal hearing procedures dictated by Dixon has not led to the full­
blown criminal-like proceedings that scholars and educators since the 
early 1960's feared might result. Yet, most writers feel that rights 
which have been expanded and recognized have been generally consistent 
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178 
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with dictates of fairness and reasonableness and the educational 
philosophy inherent in discipline in higher education. 
The Right to Counsel 
The right of an accused student to receive either advice or repre­
sentation by counsel, particularly legal counsel, in disciplinary 
hearings, was one of the procedural issues which received considerable 
attention. Several court cases examined this right as a crucial con­
tention of due process denial cases. Similarly, educational and legal 
experts closely scrutinized this procedural issue, particularly as an 
element of the evolution of formal due process in disciplinary hearings. 
Although the Dixon decision did not address this issue, it did not 
stop others from suggesting that minimal due process required a right to 
counsel. Only two years after Dixon, the Yale Law Journal defined the 
right to counsel-parent, friend, lawyer, or faculty member of choice, as 
a minimal right necessary because of the unequal position in which the 
student stands to the institution.*^ 
Two years later, in a 1965 publication, the authors contended that 
the student's right to counsel was inappropriately advanced by those who 
181 
"confuse the disciplinary approach with law enforcement..." This 
contention was consistent with their views that legalism presented a 
182 
significant threat to the educational process. 
180 
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This view was generally not supported by others who viewed the 
right to counsel as another fundamental due process right worthy of 
consideration in the disciplinary context. Sherry supported the accused 
student's right to counsel, and expected schools to give a request for 
183 
right to legal assistance "ungrudging recognition." The right to 
counsel of choice was declared a mandatory procedure which the uni­
versity was required to provide at its expense if the student could not 
184 
afford counsel. While others have not held the university responsi­
ble for providing counsel for the student at institutional expense, 
Professor Wright did offer some support for the right to assistance by 
185 counsel, saying it was "a matter of grace rather than compulsion." 
The authors of the "Joint Statement" supported the student's right to be 
186 
assisted in his defense by an advisor of choice. 
In a 1970 publication, D. Parker Young cited the 1969 case, French 
187 
v. Bashful as setting a precedent for students to receive assistance 
of counsel where the school used counsel in its disciplinary 
188 
proceeding. The Duke Law Journal, also citing French v. Bashful and 
other cases, suggested that right to counsel was a procedure which 
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helped assure fair treatment of students. Their article reported that 
fifty-seven percent of schools which responded to its survey extended 
the right to assistance of counsel at hearings, with only three percent 
providing funds for an attorney upon request. Further, the study showed 
fifty-four percent of respondent schools asserting a right to be repre-
190 
sented by counsel. They noted that a substantial number of institu­
tions preferred an absence of counsel by both parties, possibly 
reflecting lack of legal training and a fear of the complexity for such 
adversial proceedings.*9* 
Martin Frey, Associate Professor of Law at Texas Tech University, 
wrote an insightful article concerning the right to counsel in discipli-
192 
nary hearing in 1970. He proposed that right to counsel was de­
pendent upon the scope of inquiry of the panel, the nature of the 
193 
allegations, and possible consequences of the proceedings. Noting 
the inapplicability of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to 
counsel because of the civil nature of disciplinary proceedings, Frey 
pointed out that right to counsel was dependent upon state law, admin­
istrative rule, or the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
194 Amendment. He went on to write: 
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Courts have indicated that, in order to determine in a given case 
whether the requirement of counsel is an ingredient of fairness 
required by procedural due process, the student's interests must be 
balanced against the university's interests. The theoretical polar 
positions on the balance would be as follows. At one end would be 
the case where the maximum possible penalty could be reprimand 
handled solely by a non-legally trained administrator and where the 
student knew and understood the charge against him and his avail­
able defenses. At the other end would be the case where the maximum 
possible penalty could be expulsion, the university proceeded 
through counsel, the issues were beyond the comprehension of the 
student untrained in law and there existed evidence that the 
university would not^fike available to the student in order for him 
to prepare his case. 
Frey also noted that criminal and juvenile case law, while not guides to 
administrative due process, did support provision of counsel by the 
institution where the student was financially unable to obtain 
assistance.He pointed out other tangential issues concerning 
counsel, including the lack of authority requiring university officials 
to advise the student of his right to have counsel assigned to him where 
. 197 
permitted. 
Leslie and Satryb's 1974 study of due process procedures at public 
and private institutions indicated thirty-five percent of the public 
schools surveyed documented a student's right to representation by an 
attorney, but sixty-seven percent accorded the student the right to 
advisor representation. Nearly seventy-five percent of the public 
schools allowed the student assistance by either an attorney or 
195 
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198 
advisor. They concluded students were at an unfair disadvantage when 
prosecuted within an unfamiliar setting without competent assistance. 
They suggested the requirement of essential fairness was that "the 
student should not be placed under the double handicap of having to 
prepare a substantive defense while having to learn the procedural 
199 system under which he is to be prosecuted." 
Porteous's 1977 comparison of administrative procedures act 
provisions and disciplinary proceedings addressed the issue of right to 
counsel in both situations. He observed that restrictions on the right 
to counsel in disciplinary proceedings were inconsistent with the 
Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, which could require 
representation and advisement by counsel in all proceedings at state 
colleges and universities.As a practical matter, he offered the 
opinion that no student could effectively take advantage of the Act's 
201 
hearing provisions without being represented by counsel. 
202 The 1978 case, Gabrilowitz v. Newman revolved around the due 
process claim of right to counsel at a university disciplinary hearing. 
An examination of that case and other pertinent case law concluded that 
Gabrilowitz would have a substantial effect on the right to counsel 
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203 
issue in college disciplinary hearings. The author wrote: 
In Gabrilowitz, the First Circuit utilized the due process balanc­
ing test to conclude that a student has the right to have counsel 
present at a university disciplinary proceeding where the conduct 
subject to the disciplinary hearing is also the object of a pending 
criminal proceeding. It is questionable, however, whether the court 
fully realized the possible impact its decision could have on the 
broader question of whether an accused in a criminal proceeding has 
the right 2^ have his attorney present at a parallel civil 
proceeding. 
In this regard, the author had hopes that a university due process case 
might further expand due process considerations in a non-university 
judicial proceeding. 
The Gabrilowitz case was prominently cited in other discussions of 
right to counsel in 1979. One writer dismissed an assertion by a 
dissenting judge in Gabrilowitz, who feared the decision would extend 
the right of counsel to all disciplinary proceedings because of the mere 
205 
possibility of concurrent criminal charges. The writer suggested 
courts would not expand the decision to offer right to counsel in 
206 
disciplinary proceedings not Involving pending criminal charges. 
Other areas indicated for future expansion of right to counsel included 
the right of indigent student to have counsel appointed and the extent 
207 
of counsel participation in disciplinary proceedings. 
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A review of decisions involving college disciplinary issues led 
two writers to report the pros and cons of the right to counsel debate. 
Among the arguments cited against inclusion of counsel: 
1. Most attorneys are ill-equipped to enhance the education and 
counseling functions of college discipline. 
2. A purely legal defense presents the student from experiencing 
the healthy introspection of preparing his/her own account for 
the hearing. 
3. The cost of retaining legal counsel, or the unequal ability of 
students to afford private representation was onerous. 
4. There is no need for this right; campus proceedings are 
fundamentally fair without it. 
The points which were given to support counsel included: 
1. The right to counsel is the one element which would allow 
campus disciplinary proceedings to offer all the procedural 
protections of a criminal proceeding; a denial thus becomes an 
arbitrary restriction. 
2. The appearance of fairness requires the right to counsel. No 
other extended rights can substitute for this denied right. 
3. Where the institution proceeds with legal assistance, the 
student's right to counsel representati^ maintains the 
hearing as balanced and fundamentally fair. 
The start of the decade of the 1980's found writers viewing the 
right to counsel as a procedural right still in the process of early 
evolution, moving away from past prohibitions against any role for 
209 
counsel. Weisinger, updating his 1979 review of right to counsel, 
observed areas of expansion for due process right to counsel in a 1981 
210 
article. Among the areas he explored was the preparation needed by 
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both the institution and the student's legal counsel when counsel was 
permitted to be present at a disciplinary hearing. He noted that 
students who planned to bring counsel to the hearing should notify the 
at least two days in advance to allow the school to inform the student 
of the permissible role of counsel and to review hearing ground 
211 
rules. He also advised institutions to prepare their hearing boards 
for the unusual circumstances surrounding inclusion of legal counsel to 
remove anxiety which might interfere with the board's role as an 
212 
adjudicatory body. Finally, he stated that a prepared board, with a 
knowledgeable advisor, would not require inclusion of an institution's 
213 attorney. 
Little has been written since the mid 1980's which has expanded 
educational thought concerning the right to counsel. In part, this 
parallels the limited number of cases brought in court involving substan­
tial claims of denial of due process right to counsel. A recent article 
cited several college and university judicial administrators and author­
ities on their handling of lawyer involvement in disciplinary 
21 proceedings. They all indicated that, although lawyers' involvement 
in disciplinary proceedings were the exception, they were comfortable 
with inclusion of legal counsel. In effect, the presence of lawyers in 
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disciplinary hearings is no longer considered problematic or out-of-the-
ordinary. 
Overlapping Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy 
Another significant due process procedural issue which has 
generated significant legal and scholarly attention is that of over­
lapping jurisdiction between civil authorities and university officials 
in matters where student behavior consti'tutes both a violation of civil 
law and university regulation. One reason for special attention to this 
issue is fact that several of the early due process cases, including 
Dixon, involved students disciplined for actions which came under civil 
jurisdiction. Arrests associated with involvement in the civil rights 
protest movement were central to significant cases of the Dixon era, 
including Knight v. State Board of Education and Due v. Florida 
215 Agricultural and Mechanical University. 
The issue of overlapping jurisdiction resulted from decisions 
college and university officials faced when contemplating disciplinary 
action against a student facing criminal action for the same incident. 
Questions arose concerning the timing of the disciplinary proceedings 
relative to criminal action. The student's right to counsel issue was 
further heightened by the prospect of hearing proceedings affecting the 
criminal case disposition. The right to protection against self-
incrimination took on new significance when applied to the student 
defending himself against both civil campus proceedings and a criminal 
215 
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court trial. There was added pressure upon institutions to respond 
forcefully to students arrested for violating laws of society as well as 
institutional regulations. The legal concept of double jeopardy was 
often invoked when students were tried in both a college hearing and the 
criminal court. Courts addressed these issues involving overlapping 
jurisdiction early on after Dixon, and so did the educators and legal 
scholars. 
Brady and Snoxell, consistent with their forceful distinction 
between disciplinary and judicial procedures, stated that institutional 
216 proceedings were not parallel to criminal or civil proceedings. They 
pointed out that educational disciplinary processes often considered 
217 facts in a different light than courts. 
Sherry's article of 1966 recognized the problems inherent in 
jurisdictional overlap between civil and university authorities. 
Addressing that difficulty, he wrote: 
When on-campus behavior of this sort is of such a degree, however, 
that it constitutes a violation of the criminal law, a jurisdic­
tional choice may present itself in which the guidelines of 
decision may be most unclear. As a matter of law, since the conduct 
is an offense against university regulation as well as an offense 
against the state, both have jurisdiction to impose appropriate 
penalties. As a matter of prudence and discretion, however, wisdom 
may welj^ictate that in some cases, action by one jurisdiction is 
enough. 
While cautioning against institutional suppression of constitutionally 
protected behavior both on and off the campus, Sherry noted that student 
216 
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conduct of a reckless and unjustifiable nature was not immune or subject 
219 to special consideration when disciplined by university proceedings. 
The 1968 "Joint Statement" addressed pertinent jurisdictional 
220 issues under the heading "Off-Campus Freedom of Students." Echoing 
the cautions raised by Sherry, the document stated: 
Students who violate the law may incur penalties prescribed by 
civil authorities, but institutional authority should never be used 
merely to duplicate the functions of general law. Only where the 
institution's interests as an academic community are distinct and 
clearly involved should the special authority of the institution be 
asserted.^j^^stitutional action should be independent of community 
pressure. 
Robert B. McKay, Dean of the New York University of Law, contri­
buted an article to the 1968 special issue of the Denver Law Journal 
which expounded on issues of double jeopardy and jurisdictional 
222 
overlap. He was quick to dismiss the question of constitutional 
double jeopardy as inapplicable to the college disciplinary proceed-
223 
ing. While noting that violations of laws were also violations of 
university regulations, express or implicit, he stated that imposition 
of university discipline should be restricted to violations that 
224 threatened identifiable institutional interests. 
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Van Alstyne, writing in the same special issue, suggested that 
universities exercise caution in prosecuting incidents where students 
225 
faced concurrent court action. He outlined several of the over­
lapping jurisdictional issues and situations which institutions needed 
to address. 
Wright's comprehensive due process review of 1969 addressed the 
procedural issues inherent in overlapping jurisdiction. He dismissed 
claims of double jeopardy as invalid, and noted that postponement of a 
disciplinary proceeding pending the conclusion of criminal charges was 
• j 226 not required. 
In 1970, the Duke Law Journal observed that self-incrimination 
resulting from university disciplinary proceedings was "too speculative" 
an argument to require a stay on the proceedings pending completion of 
227 
criminal action. Their survey results found universities divided on 
questions related to exercising disciplinary action concurrent with 
228 
criminal action. 
As with other due process rights and issues, the question of 
overlapping jurisdiction was prominently cited in publications in the 
early and middle 1970's. The notion of universities only prosecuting 
actions which interfere with the school's primary educational functions 
225 
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regardless of civil or criminal action, was noted as the "furthest 
departure to date from the once-popular idea that the school stands in 
229 
loco parentis to the student..." Another writer restricted 
concurrent university action to situations where off-campus conduct 
threatened or harmed members of the university community or posed a 
230 threat to university property or operations. Decisions faced by 
university officials in deciding whether to bring certain violations of 
law to the attention of civil authorities instead of processing through 
231 campus disciplinary proceedings were discussed in another article. 
One other article addressed the role of sanctions in the overlapping 
jurisdiction issue, stating: 
Once the university has decided to bring a case either internally 
or externally, they should defer bringing the case concurrently 
until after the case is resolved in the original tribunal. Once a 
decision is made, the university should carefully weigh that 
decision with the question of whether the sanction is sufficient or 
whether there is need for some additional sanction. If the answer 
is that the sanction is sufficient, the university should not 
pursue the matter further. If, however, they feel that some addi­
tional sanction is necessary then it is quite appropriate for 
additional charges to be brought... However, the second tribunal 
should consider the original sanction so thQpl^their efforts do not 
merely duplicate what has already been done. 
229 
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233 
The 1968 case, Zander v. Louisiana State Board of Education was cited 
in 1972 as recognizing the university's "right and responsibility to 
take disciplinary action concurrently with civil action in those 
instances where student behavior represents a threat to the purpose, 
234 
function, and facilities of the institution. Two bases were observed 
to offer judicial support of the rejection of double jeopardy issues: 1) 
the noncriminal nature of disciplinary proceedings; and 2) the non-
235 punitive nature of disciplinary proceedings and sanctions. 
Packwood cited several publications addressing jurisdictional and 
double jeopardy issues, including a 1969 survey which included responses 
236 
from five hundred fifty-eight institutions. The study reported that: 
1) two thirds of respondents did not act on violations of law unless the 
college was involved; 2) two thirds delayed disciplinary proceedings 
until court actions were resolved; 3) nearly seventy-five percent kept 
on-campus violations and misdemeanors within institutional processes; 
and 4) only twelve percent left all violations of law for civil 
237 
prosecution. 
233 
Zander v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 
(W. D. La. 1968). 
234 
Edward H. Hammond, "Institutional Justification for the 
Existence of a Campus Judicial System," in Proceedings—Substantial 
Justice on Campus, p. 42. 
235 
Thomas E. Kelly, Jr., "Double Prosecution of the State 
University Student," Journal of College and University Law 1 (Spring 
1974): 275-277. 
236 
Packwood, p. 247, citing T. B. Dutton, F. W. Smith, and T. 
Zarle, Institutional Approaches to the Adjudication of Student 
Misconduct (Buffalo: National Association of Student Personnel 
Administrators, 1969). 
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In his 1981 article, Weisinger noted that a student's defense 
against concurrent criminal and university charges presented the student 
with a "strategic dilemma": "If appellee chooses not to risk self-
incrimination and possible imprisonment... he throws his college degree 
238 into the balance against a possible loss of liberty." He went on to 
point out that campus police reports, if included in the student's 
disciplinary file, might be reviewable by the student under the provi­
sions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, sometimes over 
the resistance of officials who don't want student access to such 
239 records prior to a court action. 
A 1987 article highlighted a dilemma confronting increasing numbers 
of colleges: The proper response for a university to take when its 
240 students face serious criminal charges. The article included the 
following conditions under which a student's Fifth Amendment rights 
against self-incrimination could be protected in a hearing held before 
the resolution of criminal charges: 
1. If the student is required to appear at the hearing, but not 
compelled to testify. 
2. If the student's failure to testify is not considered substan­
tial evidence of guilt or even a piece of evidence suggesting 
guilt. 
238 
Weisinger, p. 53, citing Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F. 2d 100, 
105 (First Cir. 1978). 
239 
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Cheryl M. Fields, "When Students Face Serious Criminal Charges, 
Some Colleges Await Court Action, Others Mete Out Quick Discipline," The 
Chronicle of Higher Education 33 (March 18, 1987): 41. 
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The article further noted that schools had the right to conduct a 
disciplinary action even after acquittal of criminal charges because the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in criminal proceedings is 
higher than that of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard accept-
242 able in disciplinary proceedings. 
Appeals Procedures 
The Dixon decision, as noted earlier, was cited as much for its 
absence of opinion as it was for what is specified regarding procedural 
due process. One of the key elements which Dixon omitted was the right 
of a student to an internal appeal subsequent to a due process hearing. 
What Dixon did say was that a student could appeal an unconstitutional 
denial of due process in the federal court system. 
The issue of denial of appeal or inadequacy of appeal was not 
central to most denial of due process claims raised in disciplinary 
court challenges. As early as 1963, Van Alstyne's survey of seventy-two 
state universities indicated an appeals process offered by ninety 
percent of the respondent schools. He called this one of the brighter 
243 aspects of the survey results. Most scholars examining due process 
procedures noted the presence of an appellate review in most 
disciplinary systems, even though other procedural rights were lacking. 
An article written in 1962 noted that statutory remedies were 
sometimes available for appeals of unjust expulsion from state 
242 
Ibid., p. 45. 
243 
Van Alstyne, "Procedural Due Process and State University 
Students," p. 369. 
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244 
universities. Citing the 1958 case, Steier v. New York State 
Education Commissioner, it was observed that, where the plaintiff 
student failed to exhaust his internal appeal to the state commissioner 
of education as provided by statute, his complaint was dismissed by the 
245 federal district court. 
A 1964 review of procedural due process stated that an internal 
appellate review system would most easily alleviate the need for the 
2 / g 
judiciary to review original hearing decisions. It was further 
stated that administrative systems were not required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to provide a system of appeals, although it would be 
desirable. 
Brady and Snoxell observed that most institutions had an internal 
appeals process, with the president of the school usually serving as the 
248 
appellate authority. They suggested restrictions against reopening 
the determination of facts and the presence of any counsel within the 
appeal. 
Sherry, couching his recommendations for due process in terms of 
guarantees of procedural fairness, recommended a full review of serious 
244 Eugene L. Kramer, Notes —"Expulsion of College and Professional 
Students—Rights and Remedies," Notre Dame Lawyer 38 (December 1962): 
182. 
245 
Steier v. New York State Education Commissioner, 161 F. Supp. 
549 (E. D. N. Y. 1958), affirmed, 271 F. 2d 13 (Second Cir. 1959), cert, 
denied 361 U. S. 966 (1960). 
246 
Johnson, pp. 361-362. 
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disciplinary action by a high administrator as a routine matter, and at 
250 least upon request of the accused student. This reasoning was 
reiterated by Beaney two years later when he recommended an opportunity 
251 
for appeal. The "Joint Statement" gave a simple affirmation to the 
right to appeal to the president or ultimately the institutional 
252 
governing board. One writer in a 1969 publication suggested the 
possibility of schools using an appeals body which would include one or 
253 
members of the broader community. It was further suggested that a 
"distinguished judge or educator with no involvement in the particular 
2 C A 
conflict might contribute to a more enlightened judgement." The same 
year D. Parker Young reiterated the need for an appeal procedure before 
255 
the ultimate administrative authority of the institution. 
The 1970 survey project of the Duke Law Journal reported that 
fifty-seven percent of respondent schools provided some type of appel-
256 
late review, with only three percent reporting no appeals process. 
250 
Sherry, p. 38. 
^'''Beaney, pp. 520-521. 
252 
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253 
Tom J. Farer, "The Array of Sanctions," in Student Protest and 
the Law, p. 80. 
254Ibid. 
255 
D. Parker Young, The Legal Aspects of Student Discipline in 
Higher Education, p. 25. 
256 
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The president of the institution was the most popular choice of appel­
late officer, with error in hearing procedures being the most reviewable 
257 
grounds. The authors stated the contemporary status of appeals 
procedures, writing: 
No case has held that a college must provide for institutional 
review of the hearing panel's decision, but procedures embodying 
such an appellate framework have been impliedly endorsed by courts 
which state that the student has a right to make a transcript of 
the.proceedings before the hearing panel. It would appear that some 
appellate procedure would be desirable from both the student's and 
the administration's point of view. Appellate review would benefit 
the student by serving as a safeguard against individual arbitrari­
ness of the hearing panel and aid the university by correcting 
procedural errors which, if left unanswered, might result in 
judicial intervention and reversal on petition of the students 
involve. To accomplish these ends, a procedure of automatic review 
by the President or Oi êr higher university official would be 
adequate and desirable. 
A 1972 publication referred to Van Alstyne's 1962 findings of 
appeals procedures in place at ninety percent of the respondent institu-
259 
tions in advocating the student's right to an institutional appeal. 
Cazier, reviewing procedural due process rights and procedures, noted 
that "while only a bare majority of institutions specifically provide 
for appellate review, such a review would seem a proper extension of the 
260 
requirements of fundamental fairness." 
An interesting point regarding appellate review was raised in a 
1973 journal article which suggested that state universities needed to 
257 T. . . Ibid. 
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259 
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require administrative review of decisions rendered by student-
261 
controlled judicial processes. The author wrote: 
But, as a state instrumentality, a public university cannot enforce 
any denial of due process; it seems well within the bounds of its 
legitimate interests to insist on the right to review (on appeal) 
any case which might entangle them in such a denial... Giving 
students autonomous control over discipline... allows operation of 
some classical conflict of interest forces. Interest groups do not 
have particularly good records when it comes to self-regulation. 
Broadening the constituencies of review mechanisms, either by 
providing new sources of review at succeeding levels of the process 
or by including a pluralist membership on any review panel, would 
serve to introduce varying points of view on issues at hs^ and to 
enrich debates and compromises before decisions are made. 
The author concluded that institutional officials must review decisions 
by student groups "in the interest of ensuring adherence to constitu-
263 tional requirements." 
Leslie and Satryb's 1974 survey of due process procedures at 
ninety-eight institutions indicated that the vast majority of public 
264 universities included the right to appeal in their procedures. They 
proposed that identification of the final appellate authority be open 
and specific, suggesting that boards of trustees were often that 
265 
authority. 
A 1977 article referred to the decision in Zanders v. Louisiana 
State Board of Education as providing judicial recommendation for an 
261 
David W. Leslie, "Some Implied Legal Restraints on Student 
Power," NASPA Journal 11 (October 1973): 63. 
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266 
appeals process. The author indicated that appeal procedures did not 
need to be lengthy or expensive, with the value of such a procedure to 
enhancing the university's image greatly outweighing the minor inconven-
267 
ience to some administrators. Further, the appeals procedure would 
probably reduce challenge suits, and in fact, might become an important 
268 factor in determining the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings. 
The l<agal challenge reduction value of an internal appeals process 
was noted in a publication one year later, as well as other factors. 
Specifically, the author reiterated the lack of judicial requirement for 
an appeals procedure. He noted that both the student and the insti­
tution can appeal a decision, a point not generally recognized by the 
269 
writings of others. He also indicated that penalties can be in-
270 creased on appeal, another point not addressed in other writings. 
More recent writings in the 1980's continue to support the need for 
an appeals process, if not the legal mandate for it. It appears that 
appellate reviews will remain an accepted practice of most institutions 
in the absence of future judicial decisions having any significant 
impact on the appeals issue. 
^^Fournet, p. 945. 
267ibid. 
268ibid. 
269 
E. T. "Joe" Buchanan, "Student Disciplinary Proceedings in 
Collegiate Institutions—Substantive and Procedural Due Process 
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Interim Suspension 
Interim, or summary suspension, is the last major disciplinary 
procedural issue to be reviewed in this chapter. Interim suspension 
involves a separation of a student from the institution on a basis other 
than permanent dismissal. It is usually invoked immediately after the 
commission of some behavior, often with a specified time period noted 
for the duration of the suspension. The act can affect both academic 
student status and the student's status as a welcome member of the 
university or college community and campus. 
Van Alstyne, addressing alternatives to summary dismissal of 
students without a fair hearing, wrote that an "interim measure in the 
extreme case" would be suspension of the student for the balance of the 
271 semester to remove any immediate danger posed against other students. 
He contended that such an interim suspension should not prejudice the 
final determination of a case processed in a regular disciplinary 
272 
hearing. 
The authors of the "Joint Statement" were cognizant of the volatile 
nature of many college campuses at the time their document and its 
standards were being developed. It was a time when civil and student 
rights actions presented perceived and real threats to the facilities, 
members, and orderly processes of the campus environment. It was also a 
time when court cases had been and continued to involve disciplinary 
271 
Van Alstyne, "Procedural Due Process and State University 
Students," p. 385. 
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action taken by student protesters. They realized that a statement 
.concerning interim suspension would be particularly applicable to the 
campus environment of the day. The authors wrote: 
Pending action on the charges, the status of a student should not 
be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to attend 
classes be suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical 
or emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons relating to the 
safety aj^ well-being of students, faculty, or university 
property. 
Professor Wright referred to the "Joint Statement's" allowance for 
imposition of interim suspension in addressing the issue, and noted that 
three cases had permitted interim suspension consistent with the "Joint 
2> 7 A 
Statement." He observed the difficulty of acting forcefully under 
conditions of violence and rioting on campus, while trying to hold a 
hearing under less than ideal conditions on a campus in uproar. This 
situation was suited for the imposition of a summary suspension pending 
a later hearing which would offer the student all ordinary procedural 
„ _ 275 protections. 
Holloway, writing in the 1969 book, Student Protest and the Law, 
summarized options open to campus officials dealing with student dis­
orders as: 1) institutional discipline leading to probation, suspension, 
or expulsion; 2) injunctive relief granted by courts; and 3) prosecution 
273 
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274 
Wright, p. 1075, citing Stricklin v. Regents of University of 
Wisconsin, 279 F. Supp. 416, 420 (W. D. Wis. 1969); Marzette v. McPhee, 
294 F. Supp. 562, 568-570 (W. D. Wis. 1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln 
University, 291 F. Supp. 161, 172 (W. D. Mo. 1968). 
275Ibid., p. 1074. 
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276 
under criminal trespass or special criminal laws. He concluded that 
all three remedies were appropriate for serious campus disruptions, with 
277 institutional discipline being the first and most effective remedy. 
The Duke Law Journal survey of 1970, within its inclusive scope, 
spoke about interim suspensions. The authors cited Stricklin v. Regents 
of University of Wisconsin, a 1969 case where the District Court upheld 
an interim suspension challenge where there was no clear reason for 
278 
imposing the interim suspension pending a preliminary hearing. The 
article went on to sketch the form of the preliminary hearing: 
... the requirement is satisfied by providing a student an early 
opportunity to appear before a single officer or an agency of the 
university to be informed of the nature of the offense. The student 
should also be allowed to make a statement before any decision on 
preliminary suspension is reached. Admission of guilt would justify 
no further steps before suspension, but a detailed denial supported 
by names of witnesses would probably require further investigation. 
A plausible explanation constituting an excuse or justification for 
continued presence on the campus might require a broader revelation 
by the university authorities of the source and nature of adverse 
informati^g and possibly even necessitate confrontation with 
accusers. 
Sixty-two percent of respondent schools maintained the right to impose 
an interim suspension after the bringing of charges and prior to a 
formal hearing, while twenty-one percent would not. About forty-five 
percent of grounds given for imposing interim suspension were considered 
legal grounds while numerous other grounds were not legally sound. 
^^Holloway, pp. 100-101. 
277 
"ibid., p. 103. 
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774-775, citing Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, at 420. 
279 
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Fifty-two percent of respondents had at least an informal appeals or 
review procedure for the interim suspension while eleven percent had 
280 
none. 
Young, writing in 1970, pointed out that "guilt" was not an 
acceptable rationale for imposition of interim suspension. He stated 
that a quick hearing, probably within three days, was required before 
281 the suspension was enacted. One writer found interim suspension to 
be the issue of most public (political) interest surrounding due process 
282 
disciplinary procedures. 
An insightful analysis of interim suspension written in 1971 found 
such action analogous to the concept of bail in a criminal action, with 
bail serving to restore the status of the accused because of presumption 
of innocence. It was also suggested that the accused student had the 
same right to presumption of innocence, with interim suspension imposed 
283 
only under conditions of immediate danger. The writer suggested that 
suspension without hearing, becoming final if the student did not 
request a hearing, would be violative of due process and "contrary to 
fundamental fairness to reverse the presumption of innocence and force 
284 the student to prove his right to be readmitted." 
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281 
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Hearing," Texas Tech Law Review 2 (1971): 272. 
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Stein wrote a thought-provoking article regarding temporary 
285 
suspension in 1974. Noting the development of thought on interim 
suspension, both judicially and scholarly, he nonetheless pointed out 
problems regarding the appropriateness and potential "irreparable harm" 
286 
of interim suspension. Finally, Stein suggested intermediary steps 
to interim suspension, including warnings and partial temporary suspen­
sion, where the student is separated from a specific class or campus 
287 
facility. Another writer one year later also mentioned less drastic 
steps before interim suspension, including cooling down, containment, 
288 
and persuasion. 
In his 1983 review of procedural due process, Buchanan specified 
procedures for interim suspension. He observed that notice of a pre­
liminary hearing should include: 1) facts uncovered by investigation; 2) 
facts constituting possible violations of regulations, with appropriate 
citation; 3) the opportunity for the student to present further evidence 
at a preliminary hearing; and 4) that a preliminary hearing will be held 
289 
in the student's absence if he or she doesn't respond to the notice. 
285 
Ronald H. Stein, "The Nature of Temporary Suspension," NASPA 
Journal 11 (Winter 1974): 16. 
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Suspension and Expulsion for Academic Misconduct 
Dixon and those cases which followed in the 1960's dealt with a 
wide range of disciplinary conduct on campus. As such, they were often 
very specific in defining procedural due process for the adjudication 
for disciplinary misconduct. One of the areas of which they usually 
stayed clear was a definition of due process for other dismissal 
/ 
matters, particularly those involving academic performance. 
The distinction between academic and disciplinary suspensions and 
expulsions has been given a great deal of attention by both the courts 
and the scholars. While due process in disciplinary dismissals has been 
greatly refined since Dixon, issues involving dismissals for academic 
reasons have been less than settled. Even intervention into the issue 
by the United States Supreme Court in the 1978 case, Board of Curators 
290 
of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, did not prevent writers and 
courts from reexamining the nature of academic dismissals. 
One of the most significant aspects of that case was the Court's 
distinction between academic and disciplinary dismissals. From that 
distinction arose a defined separation between dismissal based on 
disciplinary misconduct and academic misconduct. Subsequently, the 
focus has been on due process procedures applicable to the academic 
misconduct dismissal proceeding. 
As early as 1963 a major review of current judicial thought 
observed that academic misconduct in the form of cheating was a 
290 
Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 
U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978). 
89 
non-academic matter subject to review by courts in dismissal actions. 
The article, differentiating between academic performance and 
misconduct, stated: 
But where an allegation of crime - even one related to academic 
performance - is dependent on non-academic facts, as cheating on 
examinations may be, or is established by the school in a manner 
not involving academic judgment, the court is competent to review 
the appropriateness of the school's decision. The school has, it 
must be admitted, greater concern with academic than with other 
forms of student misbehavior. But unless the decisions it makes 
require academic expertise, this concern ought not to preclude a 
court from judging for itself. Evaluation of fact-finding to 
determijjg^ the occurrence of crime is standard business for the 
courts. 
This thought, that factual determinations could be reviewed by courts, 
was consistent with developing judicial views concerning reviews of 
disciplinary actions. 
Wright, in his 1969 article, wrote that he could perceive "no basis 
on which a student can claim a constitutional right to a D rather than 
an F," but later suggested that cases of cheating demanded consti-
292 
tutionally required due process procedures. Noting the costs of time 
and money required for such cases, he nevertheless contended that 
schools would gladly incur "any cost to be sure that it is not commit­
ting a serious injustice, likely to damage the student for life, by 
293 
finding him guilty of an offense he did not in fact commit." 
Two authors of a 1975 article provided an insightful view of 
development of judicial review of academic dismissal cases since 
291 
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292Wright, pp. 1069, 1083. 
293 
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90 
294 
Dixon. The authors noted that several federal court cases had 
distinguished between academic performance and misconduct of an academic 
nature in determining the appropriateness of institutional dismissal 
295 
proceedings. The authors, contending situations such as cheating and 
plagiarism involved an inseparable mix of academic infractions and 
misconduct, considered these offenses to be misconduct "warranting 
dismissal on disciplinary grounds and requiring a due process 
hearing."296 
Articles which followed the Horowitz decision analyzed and 
sometimes criticized the Court's distinction between academic and 
disciplinary dismissal due process requirements and the definition of 
academic versus misconduct evaluations. One writer found elements of 
Horowitz to be a hybrid of academic and disciplinary concerns (i.e., 
personal hygiene, lack of regular attendance), entitling the student to 
297 
a due process hearing before dismissal. Another writing observed the 
distinction between purely academic decisions and misconduct, and noted 
that problems arise when conduct falls in between (such as attendance, 
298 
personal hygiene, and patient rapport). Disagreeing with the Supreme 
294 
William Toombs and Elaine DiBiase, "College Rules and Court 
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Court's contention in Horowitz that such conduct was part of academic 
performance, the article suggested it was analogous to misconduct, and 
further suggested that "labeling conduct academic does not address 
whether its verification if susceptible to a fact-finding process or to 
299 
a subjective evaluation..." Echoing the same thoughts about 
Horowitz, Pavela wrote, "Specifically, administrators may be tempted to 
avoid a time-consuming and potentially embarrassing hearing by dis­
guising disciplinary action as 'academic evaluation.He felt that 
cases of academic dishonesty presented the greatest potential for 
confusion and abuse after Horowitz, but urged educators to incorporate 
hearings into the resolution of charges of plagiarism or cheating. He 
cautioned educators to reject arguments for purely academic judgments 
since contested cases of academic dishonesty invariably involve factual 
disputes and may leave students with the most burdensome stigma an 
301 
educational institution can impose." He suggested that institutions 
develop clear statements defining policies and procedures regarding 
academic dishonesty in order to protect student rights and limit sub-
302 
jective resolution by faculty. 
Buss's comprehensive review of the Horowitz decision and other 
academic dismissal cases suggested that Horowitz was an unsatisfactory 
due process decision on several counts. Among the weaknesses cited was 
"^^Gary Pavela, "Judicial Review of Academic Decisionmaking After 
Horowitz," NOLPE School Law Journal 8 (1978): 67. 
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the Court's rejection of procedural fact-finding as appropriate to 
303 
"academic decisions." He noted that standard misconduct cases were 
often clear cut factual determinations, but that other misconduct cases, 
where factual issues were not the controlling factors, still required 
the right of the accused to present a version of the circumstances of a 
304 
particular incident. Like others, he cautioned about "the relative 
ease with which 'academic' judgments can be enlarged to include the very 
types of personal behavior that, by someone else's jargon, might be 
305 
regarded as disciplinary conduct." 
The Horowitz decision, while widely questioned by scholars, 
established the academic/disciplinary dichotomy with enough judicial 
power to force writers to recognize, if not totally accept, the distinc­
tion. One writer observed that "drawing the line between behavior 
matters... can be tricky," but suggested cheating and plagiarism were 
306 
behavioral problems requiring due process in dismissal proceedings. 
Another writer concluded that an emphasis on the academic versus disci­
plinary distinction ignored the determinative issue of whether facts in 
307 dispute were open to adjudication. Two authors of a 1981 article 
concerning academic misconduct wrote: 
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While educators continue to be split in their opinion about the 
proper characterization of cheating and plagiarism as academic or 
disciplinary misconduct and the way such misconduct should be 
institutionally addressed, the courts have been consistent in their 
characterization of such violations as academic dishonesty; thus 
requiring the same due process protections be afforded students as 
in other misconduct situations of a disciplinary nature. These 
requirements are considerably more stringent than those which need 
to be followed in cases of scholastic failure. 
They suggested that incidents of cheating and plagiarism be incorporated 
309 into existing due process disciplinary procedures. 
A comprehensive brochure concerning issues of academic integrity 
was published in 1985 by the National Association of Student Personnel 
310 
Administrators. The publication cited several cases suggesting most 
academic dishonesty cases involved disciplinary decisions rather than 
academic judgments. A policy of processing academic dishonesty for 
311 
disciplinary action would have significant educational value. Among 
the due process procedures suggested for academic dishonesty cases were: 
1) the right to a hearing, which could be informal and nonadversarial; 
2) no active participation by legal counsel for any party; 3) the review 
of suspensions or expulsions by a senior administrator; and 4) recession 
of any penalties imposed by a faculty member if the student was found 
312 
innocent. The article observed that some faculty had an erroneous 
308 Denney G. Rutherford and Steven G. Olswang, "Academic 
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perception of due process requiring full-blown, complex adversarial 
procedures, and as a result, either ignored academic dishonesty or 
313 lowered grades after assuming cheating or plagiarism occurred. 
The author of a 1985 article wrote that expulsions for academic 
dishonesty triggered procedural rights including notice of specific 
charges, a fair and impartial hearing, an opportunity to defend against 
the charges, and a record of the proceedings. One year later a 
writer proposed that six different due process procedures might be 
applicable to academic dishonesty proceedings: notice; right to counsel; 
cross-examination; right to a hearing; reasons for a decision; and 
315 
appellate review. The writer went on to qualify each of these rights 
316 
in terms of different court findings and situational contexts. The 
same year, another writer concurred with the need for notice and hearing 
in academic dishonesty cases, observing "the Constitution, according to 
the courts, does not require a public university to provide students an 
opportunity to cross-examine their accusers and witnesses, to appeal a 
suspension or expulsion decision, or to have a lawyer represent the 
317 student at the disciplinary hearing." 
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Mandatory Withdrawals for Mental Disorders 
The issue of mandatory withdrawal from a college or university on 
grounds of a mental disorder is the most recent major area of investi­
gation having a direct relationship with disciplinary due process in 
dismissal proceedings. Also referred to as psychiatric withdrawals, 
these institutional policies and procedures are designed to separate 
students with threatening, disruptive, self-destructive behaviors from 
the institution, where such behavior has a diagnosed basis in some 
mental disorder. Withdrawal actions are taken to prevent the affected 
student from posing a danger to self, others, institutional property, or 
the orderly educational process. This action is also taken consistent 
with institutional recognition that many mental disorders are beyond 
both the scope and ability of campus health officials to properly treat. 
In such cases, where the student may not be willing or mentally capable 
of recognizing the need to leave the campus environment, the institution 
may resort to a mandatory withdrawal process. 
A contributor to the 1978 book, The Legal Foundations of Student 
Personnel Services in Higher Education, projecting future legal issues 
in higher education, listed issues pertaining to mental health among 
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those issues to receive greater educational and judicial attention. 
It was predicted that court actions would be initiated by students 
319 
contesting summary removals due to medical or psychological reasons. 
318 
Barrie Wright, "Projections of Future Legal Issues and 
Developments in Higher Education," in The Legal Foundations of Student 
Personnel Services in Higher Education, p. 149. 
319- .. Ibid. 
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Two years later a journal article noted psychiatric separation of 
students from colleges as an open and unsettled area of the law not yet 
320 
charted. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
Section 794, which prohibits discrimination against handicapped students 
in institutions receiving federal aid, did not present obstacles to 
separating a disruptive student. Also, a lack of any applicable case 
321 
law was cited. Recommendations for handling determinable cases of 
emotional or mental disturbance included combinations of disciplinary 
action and preventive health measures such as psychiatric separation and 
civil commitment for treatment. Disciplinary procedures covering 
disturbed behavior needed to incorporate due process while separation 
procedures needed policy authorization specifying conditions and methods 
322 
for both voluntary and involuntary separation. 
Gary Pavela wrote a significant article in the early 1980's 
reviewing some of the court decisions and legal/educational issues 
323 
surrounding misuse of mandatory psychiatric withdrawals. He noted 
that schools often drafted psychiatric withdrawal policies that violated 
provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and often gave 
students little or no procedural protection against both the stigma 
associated with a finding of a mental disorder and misuse of such 
320 
Perry A. Zirkel and Charles T. Bargerstock, "Two Current Legal 
Concerns in College Student Affairs: Alcohol Consumption and Psychiatric 
Separation," Journal of College Student Personnel 21 (May 1980): 254. 
321 ° xIbid., p. 255. 
322- .. 
Ibid. 
323 
Gary Pavela, "Therapeutic Paternalism and the Misuse of Man­
datory Psychiatric Withdrawals on Campus," College and University Law 9 
(1982-83): 101. 
97 
*3 0/ 
procedures for removal of "troublesome" or "eccentric" students. He 
further noted that interpretations of Section 504 supported exclusion 
based on behavior resulting from mental disorders, but not solely 
because of the student's past mental health history, any assumption of 
disturbed behavior, or a paternalistic concern to force the seeking of 
325 
treatment. 
Around the same time Gehring focused on several issues related to 
326 
dismissal of students with mental disorders. He supported the use of 
disciplinary procedures in treating disruptive emotional behavior, 
writing: 
Another response which is normally advanced is that individuals 
with emotional problems "disrupt" the educational process. Again, 
there are many students who did this but we refer to them as 
discipline problems and there are established procedures for 
dealing with them. Administrators are familiar with due process 
procedures for disciplinary situations. This option is certainly 
available for "disruy^ve" students if campus regulations prohibit 
disruptive behavior. 
One year later, in 1984, an article dealing with discipline of phy­
sically and emotionally handicapped students reiterated Gehring's 
suggestion that "no overriding reason exists to avoid use of normal 
disciplinary procedures, regardless of... a physical or emotional 
,,328 
disability. 
324 
^ Ibid., p. 103. 
325Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
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Donald D. Gehring, "The Dismissal of Student with Serious 
Emotional Problems: An Administrative Decision Model," NASPA Journal 20 
(Winter 1983): 9. 
327 J 'ibid., p. 10. 
328 
Ron Weisinger, Jane Thierfeld, and Rod Crafts, "Campus Disci­
pline and the Handicapped Student: Accountibility with Accomodation," 
NASPA Journal 22 (Fall 1984): 46. 
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Another 1984 article considered the limitations of psychiatric 
329 withdrawal and the appropriate uses of such procedures. The authors 
noted that a pattern of disruptive behavior needed to exist before a 
predictive diagnoses could be made which would warrant a psychiatric 
withdrawal. Also, they reiterated the need to prevent such a policy 
from becoming an "easy alternative to an effective disciplinary 
. i,330 code. 
Pavela followed his earlier article on misuse of psychiatric 
withdrawal with a 1985 book which is the most comprehensive treatment of 
331 
students dismissals based on mental disorders. After reviewing 
pertinent court cases dealing with due process issues and mental dis­
orders, Pavela suggested due process procedures which would serve both 
legal and educational purposes in involuntary dismissal proceedings. He 
included the following procedural guidelines: 
1. A substantive showing that the student engaged, or threatened 
to engage in behavior indicating the posing of a threat to 
self, others, property, or lawful activities of others. 
Allegations of disciplinary violations should be resolved 
through disciplinary channels absent the student's incapacity 
to respond to the charges, or inability to discern the wrong­
fulness of the behavior in question. 
2. . The giving of adequate notice is required to convey the 
possibility of involuntary withdrawal. Emergency situations 
are an exception, but notice should follow as soon as 
possible. 
329 
Bob E. Leach and James D. Sewell, "Responding to Students with 
Mental Disorders; A Framework for Action," NASPA Journal 22 (Fall 1984): 
37. 
330Ibid., p. 39. 
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Legal Issues, Policy Considerations and Alternative Responses, The 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
A 1986 article addressed the issue of psychiatric withdrawals from 
333 
the perspective of college health professionals. The author noted 
that misconduct, even if directly related to a physical or mental 
handicap, could be subject to disciplinary action, but that such action 
was strictly limited to the behavior, not the "mental illness" 
334 etiology. The article also denounced the use of mandatory psycho­
therapy as a form of discipline and a condition of continued enrollment 
335 or reenrollment on a variety of grounds. 
332Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
333 
Gerald A. Amada, "Dealing with the Disruptive College Student: 
Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations," Journal of American 
College Health 34 (April 1986): 221. 
334 
Ibid., p. 222. 
335 
Ibid., p. 224. 
The student should be given an opportunity to examine relevant 
evaluations, and discuss with campus officials in an informal 
proceeding. The student should be allowed assistance by family 
or friends and mental health professional of choice. 
A tenured faculty member, rather than legal counsel, should 
appear at the proceeding to challenge and question the with­
drawal recommendation, in the role of a "devil's advocate." 
A statemeflJt, of reasons should be given for any withdrawal 
decision. 
100 
Conclusion 
The development of the student-institution relationship moved from 
the strict, Puritanical authoritarian relationship of the Colonial 
period, with heavy emphasis on external disciplinary control to 
relationships governed by contractual terms, constitutionally protected 
rights, and an emphasis on internal control. The advent of numerous 
societal forces, coupled with the Dixon decision and its successors, 
established a constitutional rights disciplinary relationship between 
the student at a tax-supported college or university and his or her 
institution that is all but taken for granted at present. 
The Dixon decision established the applicability of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protection of due process when students are threatened with 
disciplinary suspension or dismissal from their tax-supported 
institutions. The decision also diminished the privilege-right dis­
tinction regarding enrollment at public colleges and universities. 
Dixon was the first federal court case to define minimal due process 
procedures in a disciplinary dismissal to include notice and hearing. 
Dixon was also noted, and sometimes criticized, for the limitations of 
its holding, including its inapplicability to private institutions 
issues. 
The Dixon decision created great judicial and scholarly interest in 
a developing field of educational law. A large number of writers 
interpreted and defined Dixon and the court decisions which followed, 
both for the developers and practitioners of student discipline in 
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higher education. Much of the scholarly attention was devoted to 
further defining the due process mandate of Dixon and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as defining those issues which were not protected or 
covered by the Dixon constitutional rights umbrella. 
Much of the scholarly writing generated by educators has lauded the 
Dixon mandate for due process, while frequently cautioning against the 
conversion of campus disciplinary proceedings into full-blown, 
adversarial trials similar to criminal proceedings. The majority 
opinion among educational commentators favors institutions erring on the 
side of "reasonableness and fairness" when deciding the extent of due 
process procedures and rights to offer in disciplinary proceedings 
involving suspension or expulsion. At the same time, these authorities 
have consistently pointed out the differences between criminal court 
processes and aims, and those of colleges and universities. Few writ­
ings have suggested disciplinary proceedings are analogous to criminal 
courts. Basic, minimal due process has been consistently defined to 
include written notice of charges, some form of a hearing for the 
purpose of refuting the charges, the keeping of a record of the hearing, 
and a written report of the hearing findings. Generally accepted 
procedural rights for the accused student include some advisory as­
sistance during the hearing, the right to present witnesses and testi­
mony, the right to refute adverse testimony and evidence, and the right 
to speak on one's own behalf. 
Other due process rights and procedures have generated significant 
debate, substantial support, but not universal acceptance. Part of the 
reason for this is a perceived lack of full judicial deference to these 
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issues. Points such as the right to appellate review, limited right to 
legal counsel, and limited right to cross-examination have strong 
support from legal and educational authorities, but do not have an 
absolute legal mandate supporting them. Other points which also have 
mixed support and opinions include the right to an open or closed 
hearing, the right to be tried separately or jointly, the right to 
representation by counsel, the overall composition of hearing panels, 
and applicable rules of evidence. 
The issues involved with overlapping jurisdiction for a particular 
student misconduct incident have received considerable attention in 
disciplinary writings. Generally, the institution has been found to 
have the right to proceed against the student irregardless of concurrent 
or pending criminal action. The emphasis behind this contention is the 
noncriminal nature of the disciplinary proceeding. Other related issues 
such as the double jeopardy argument against dual proceedings, and the 
need to keep the two proceedings separate, have raised additional points 
addressed by the experts. In general, it is accepted that double 
jeopardy is not involved when the student is tried for the same offense 
by both institutional proceedings and civil or criminal court. However, 
the student's right against self-incrimination and the right to legal 
counsel have been stretched in the student's favor by some educators 
when concurrent charges are present. 
Interim or summary suspension is a special due process situation 
which has received considerable attention in disciplinary writings. 
While most writers support an institution's right to impose interim 
suspension under limited circumstances involving threat to persons, 
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property, or the orderly, educational process, they also emphasize the 
limited nature of such an imposition. Many note the due process pro­
cedures attendant upon interim suspension, including a preliminary 
hearing where possible. 
Two issues which have been linked by some with the adjudication of 
disciplinary misconduct are dismissals based on academic misconduct and 
mandatory, or psychiatric, withdrawals of students with mental 
disorders. Numerous writers have noted judicial acceptance that issues 
of academic misconduct are more amenable to judicial due process review 
than those of academic performance. Accordingly, the courts and the 
scholars have consistently supported due process protections to students 
facing dismissals for academic misconduct. Where the courts and the 
scholars have differed is in the interpretation of acts and behavior 
which constitute "academic misconduct." The legal and educational 
opinion is consistently more encompassing of such things as appearance, 
class attendance, and personal habits within the due process protection 
of academic misconduct than judicial opinion. There is general agree­
ment between both parties that issues of academic dishonesty, which are 
amenable to factual determinations, are protected by due process pro­
cedures comparable with disciplinary proceedings. 
The mandatory withdrawal of students with mental disorders is among 
the most recent significant expansions of judicial and scholarly review 
of due process issues in higher education. The consensus authoritative 
opinion that such withdrawals may be sought, but only after offering the 
student some procedural due process, represents an opinion supported by 
the few applicable court cases. Limitations have been placed on such 
104 
withdrawals to protect students from the impreciseness of mental health 
336 
diagnoses and the paternalism of institutional officials. General 
opinion suggests that students should be treated under disciplinary 
procedures where their actions represent violations of disciplinary 
rules and regulations. Limitations which may preclude such a process 
include the student's incapacity to respond to charges, or his or her 
inability to understand the wrongness of the action. 
This represents the summary of the pertinent literature addressing 
legal and educational concerns central to the study of disciplinary 
procedures at tax-supported colleges and universities. The next section 
will examine applicable court decisions addressing these same issues and 
others. 
^^^Leach and Sewell, pp. 38-39. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DISCIPLINARY DUE PROCESS 
PERTAINING TO SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL 
Overview 
The authority for the administration of discipline was once the the 
exclusive domain of college and university faculty and administrators. 
The proliferation of court cases in the past twenty-five years clearly 
illuminates the judicial influence now exerted on disciplinary 
philosophy, procedures, and systems. The purpose of this chapter is the 
identification and analysis of selected court cases which involve 
substantial legal issues pertaining to disciplinary due process and 
disciplinary suspension and expulsion. The primary focus will involve 
the seminal Dixon case and those cases which follow Dixon. 
The first cases examined are those which describe the relationship 
between the individual student and the institution of higher education, 
particularly with regard to the imposition of discipline. 
The next cases examined define components of disciplinary due 
process related to suspension and expulsion. These component headings 
are: 
1) Sufficiency of notice 
2) Right to a hearing; adequacy of hearing and procedures 
3) Composition and jurisdiction of hearing agency 
4) Right to counsel 
5) Failure to follow specified procedures 
6) Procedures used where jurisdiction overlaps 
7) Imposition of interim suspension 
8) Appeals procedures 
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The chapter also discusses cases pertaining to two related topics. 
One topic is due process involving suspension and expulsion based on 
academic misconduct. The second topic is the mandatory (psychiatric) 
withdrawal of students with mental disorders. 
Most cases examined were litigated in United States District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal. The basis for this federal 
jurisdiction lies largely with United States constitutional and 
statutory claims invoked by the litigants. A lesser number of decisions 
rendered by the higher state courts have been examined. Many of those 
decisions involve state constitutional and statutory issues. 
Decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court establish legal 
precedence, thereby influencing judicial decisions of inferior courts. 
Circuit Courts of Appeal issue decisions which generally carry greater 
precedence than those of District Courts. State court decisions 
generally have precedence only within the state of their location. The 
limited number of applicable Supreme Court decisions focuses attention 
on the Circuit Court and District Court decisions which address 
disciplinary due process in higher education. 
Despite the significance of legal precedence, cases are decided on 
their individual merits. Cases with several similarities may result in 
different decisions because of many diverse factors; therefore, caution 
should be exercised when drawing generalizable conclusions from an 
analysis of judicial findings. 
Judicial Decisions Which Address the 
Student-Institution Relationship 
The legal relationship between an institution of higher education 
and its students is one of flux and evolution. That relationship is 
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defined by educational philosophy, legal theories, and judicial deci­
sions. D. Parker Young, speaking with regard to the student-institution 
relationship, noted: 
There is an unending progression of court decisions that continue 
to define the rights and responsibilities of both the student and 
the institution. 
A number of cases which have addressed the student-institution 
relationship have been linked with legal theories regarding that rela­
tionship. These cases examine the administration of and authority for 
student discipline within the context of the student-institution rela­
tionship. This review will examine cases within the context of signifi­
cant underlying legal theories and concepts. 
The few cases which upheld the standing of in loco parentis doc­
trine were primarily adjudicated in state courts during the last half of 
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. 
2 3 
Landers v. Seaver and State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton are two early 
cases which established the right of the teacher to stand in loco 
4 parentis in exercising discipline, according to Mills . 
Gott v. Berea College interjected the legal concept of in loco 
parentis into case law defining the student-institution relationship in 
*D. Parker Young, The Law and the Student in Higher Education, 
N.O.L.P.E. Monograph Series (Athens, Ga.: Institute of Higher Education, 
1976), p. 2. 
^Landers v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). 
3 
State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wise. 150 (1878). 
4 Joseph L. Mills, The Legal Rights of College Students and Admin­
istrators , (Washington, D. C.: Lerner Law Book Publishing, 1971), p. 40. 
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American higher education.^ At issue in this 1913 case was the right 
of a college to proscribe and enforce a rule limiting students' conduct 
off-campus. The court clearly upheld the college's authority to dismiss 
the students for violation of the regulation, stating: 
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical 
and moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are 
unable to see why, to that end, they may not make any rule or 
regulation for the government or betterment of their pupils that a 
parent could for the same purpose. 
The 1924 case of John B. Stetson University v. Hunt gave further 
standing to the judicial concept of in loco parentis, the court noting: 
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare 
of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in 
their discretion may make any regulation foTj their government which 
a parent could make for the same purpose... 
Although the 1927 case of Anthony v. Syracuse University cited the 
g 
doctrine of in loco parentis , the key 1967 case of Goldberg v. Regents 
of the University of California began the judicial denial of in loco 
9 parentis as a basis for institutional power over student conduct. The 
California Court of Appeals held that "the better approach ...recognizes 
that state universities should no longer stand in loco parentis in 
relation to their students."^ The following year a District Court 
^Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913). 
6Ibid., p. 206. 
^John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924). 
^Anthony v. Syracuse University, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928), 223 N.Y.S. 
796 (1927). 
9 
Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
463 (1967). 
10Ibid., p. 470. 
109 
further diminished the standing of in loco parentis in Buttney v. 
Smiley.^^ The court agreed with the students that "the doctrine of 'In 
1 2  Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university community." 
Three other cases in 1968 also contributed to the demise of in loco 
parentis as a viable doctrine for institutional regulation of student 
13 
conduct. Noting the dawning of a new era in student-institution 
relationships, the District Court in Zanders v. Louisana State Board of 
Education observed that "the doctrine [in loco parentis] is of little 
use in dealing with our modern 'student rights' problems."*^ In Moore 
v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, the court stated 
that "the college does not stand strictly speaking, in loco parentis to 
its students," thereby denying the university grounds for search and 
seizure based upon this doctrine.^ 
The trust theory was introduced in two cases to explain the rela­
tionship between an institution and its students. The 1901 case of 
Koblitz v. Western Reserve University implied a university assumed the 
role of a trustee to the student upon enrollment.In Anthony v. 
^Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo., 1968). 
12Ibid., p. 286. 
13 Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 
(W. D. La. 1968); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State 
University, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M. D. Ala. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State 
Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M. D. Tenn. 1968). 
^Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, p. 756. 
^Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 
p. 729. 
^Koblitz v. Western Reserve University, 21 Ohio Cir. C. R. 144, 
11 Ohio C. Dec. 515 (1901). 
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Syracuse a dismissed student was described by the trial court as the 
beneficiary of a trust, according to Ratliff.*'7 He noted that in both 
18 cases a trust theory was advanced only to be rejected by the court. 
The status theory hypothesizes that students and their colleges and 
universities have rights and duties inherent in the status of each, and 
through development by custom, tradition, and usage. Knapp has noted 
that status theory "gave to the university or college the power to take 
action, in its discretion, for disciplinary purposes, subject only to 
the requirement that such action not be arbitrary, or unreasonable, or 
19 
an abuse of discretion." In Koblitz v. Western Reserve University the 
court ruled for the university against a student seeking reenrollment 
following criminal prosecution, stating: 
Custom again, has established the rule. That rule is so uniform 
that it has become a rule of law; and if the plaintiff had a 
contract gffth the university, he agreed to abide by that rule of 
law . . . 
Ratliff has noted that two other cases, Anthony v. Syracuse and Tanton 
21 v. McKenney, have couched the status theory in terms of "inherent" 
22 
powers which belong to the institution. 
17 
Richard C. Ratliff, Constitutional Rights of College Students, 
Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1972), p. 50. 
18̂ .., 
Ibid. 
19 
S. R. Knapp, "The Nature of 'Procedural Due Process' as Between 
the University and the Student", College Counsel 3 (1968): 27. 
20 
Koblitz v. Western Reserve University, p. 523. 
^Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N. W. 510 (Mich. 1924). 
22Ratliff, p. 49. 
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Judicial Decisions Invoking Contract Theory 
Contract theory was the primary legal theory advanced in cases 
litigated prior to Dixon involving the imposition of discipline as a 
function of the student-institution relationship. In Koblitz v. Western 
Reserve University the court ruled that the enrollment constituted 
entrance into a contract which obligated the student to yield to 
reasonable discipline. The court stated: 
The University agrees with him that it will impart to him in­
structions; that it will aid him in the ordinary ways of his 
duties; that it will treat him fairly; that it will give him every 
oppotunity to improve himself; and that it will not impose upon him 
penalties which Jpta in no wise merits, and that it will deal with 
him impartially. 
The 1909 case, Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College found the 
court suggesting an implied contract to continued enrollment subject to 
the student's maintenance of good standing. The court said: 
The institution in advertising, seeks students, and in extending 
admission makes an offer to the student, and the student by 
registration accepts. The student agrees to pay tuition and fees 
and the college agrees to provide instruction as described, and the 
appropriately earned degree, if the student remains in good 
standing academically 2 n̂(* abides by the institution's reasonable 
rules and regulations. 
In Anthony v. Syracuse University, the court ruled that the signed 
registration card constituted a contract between the student and the 
23 
Koblitz v. Western Reserve University, p. 522. 
^Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N. W. 
589 (Mich. 1909). 
25Ibid., p. 591. 
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institution. Anthony was dismissed from the university for the apparent 
26 reason that she was not a "typical Syracuse girl." The University 
contended that the contractual relationship allowed it to dismiss 
without stating cause, and the appellate court agreed, noting: 
I can discover no reason why a student may not agree to grant to 
the institution an option right to terminate the relation between 
them. The contract between an institution and a student does not 
differ in this respect from contracts of employment. 
Very few cases in the thirty-five years after Anthony involved an 
28 alleged breach of contract by either the institution or its students. 
In the 1962 case, Carr v. St. John's University, the notion of an 
implied contract was advanced by the court in upholding the dismissal of 
29 students participating in a civil marriage ceremony. The court held: 
When a student is duly admitted to a private university, secular or 
religious, there is an implied contract between the student and the 
university that if he complies with the terms prescribed by the 
university, he will obtain the degree which he sought . . .There is 
implied in such contract a term or condition that the student will 
not be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive of the 
discipline of the college or school, or as would^show him to be 
morally unfit to be continued, as a member therof. 
Five years later, in Green v. Howard University, a District Court 
cited catalog provisions as the basis for a contractual arrangement 
31 
between the university and its students. The court upheld the 
26 
Anthony v. Syracuse University, p. 437. 
27Ibid., p. 439. 
28 
Eileen K. Jennings, " Breach of Contract Suits by Students 
Against Postsecondary Education Institutions: Can They Succeed?", 
Journal of College and University Law 7 (1980-81): 194. 
29 
Carr v. St. John's University, 231 N. Y. S. 2d 410, 187 N. E. 2d 
18 (1962). 
30 
Ibid., p. 413. 
31 
Green v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D. D.C. 1967). 
113 
dismissal of students who participated in campus disorders, citing a 
catalog provision allowing the institution to "require the withdrawal of 
any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to the 
University. 1,32 
A District Court in the 1969 case, Krawez v. Stans, ruled that 
authorized agents of the institution could enter into a binding contract 
33 between the institution and its students. Midshipmen at the United 
States Merchant Marine Academy were suspended after admitting to the use 
of marijuana on campus. Their admittance was prompted by questioners 
who assured them that their discussion would not be used against them. 
The court denied the institution the right to use the admissions as 
evidence in disciplinary proceedings, saying: 
As agents, the questioners were authorized to make promises to the 
students concerning the use of their statements. They told 
plaintiffs that if they spoke freely nothing they said would be 
used against them. Plaintiffs, by speaking freely, accepted this 
offer, and a contract was made. The Academy is bound by this 
agreement. It cannot use as evidence in disciplinary proceedings 
admissions made by the plaintiffs to the agents. 
The issue of a contractual relationship was explored and dismissed 
35 
by a state court in Ryan v. Hofstra University. In this case the 
court ordered a student reinstated after his expulsion for violation of 
student regulations. Although the court that "no contract was proven or 
32Ibid., p. 613. 
33Krawez v. Stans, 306 F. Supp. 1230 (E. D. New York 1969). 
3AIbid., p. 1235. 
3̂ Ryan v. Hofstra University, 324 N. Y. S. 2d 964 (1971). 
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36 
argued by either side," it held that Hofstra was entwined with the 
state of New York to the degree requiring due process within its 
disciplinary system. 
One year later a California appeals court also established a 
contractual relationship between a public university and its students in 
37 
Andersen v. Regents of University of California. A student dismissed 
for misconduct filed suit claiming breach of contract and a denial of 
due process. The court held that enrollment did constitue a contract, 
saying: 
While constitutional principles of due process apply to 
disciplinary action taken by the university, this in itself does 
not mean that enrollment in the university does not create a 
contract between student and university ... A contract is created 
by the state which, by its^gery nature, incorporates constitutional 
principles of due process. 
In Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision that a rigid application 
of commercial contract doctrine was applicable in finding for the 
student's action for breach of contract arising out of his expulsion on 
39 
the ground of academic dishonesty. 
The court noted that "some elements of the law of contracts . . . 
should be used in the analysis of the relationship between plaintiff 
36Ibid., p. 973. 
37 
Andersen v. Regents of University of California, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
531 (1972). 
38Ibid., p. 535. 
39 
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F. 2d 622 (Tenth 
Cir.1975). 
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and the University to provide some framework into which to put the 
problem of expulsion for disciplinary reasons." The court then stated, 
"The student-university relationship is unique, and it should not be and 
cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal category. 
Breach of contract was the basis for another suit challenging 
imposition of suspension on the ground of academic dishonesty in Pride 
41 
v. Howard University. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled 
that Howard University's Code of Conduct did constitute part of a 
contract between the student and the school. 
In Swanson v. Wesley College, the plaintiff brought suit charging 
his due process rights were violated and the institution breached its 
contract to provide an education when it permanently suspended him for 
violations of three disciplinary rules involving weapons and threats 
42 made against officials. The Superior Court of Delaware held that both 
the college bulletin and student handbook constituted the terms of the 
43 contract and found him in breach of the contract to educate. 
The 1980 case, Tedeschi v. Wagner College, involved a student who 
was suspended from Wagner College because of disruptive social 
44 behavior. The plaintiff alleged she was deprived of her due process 
40 
Ibid., p. 626. 
^*Pride v. Howard University, 384 A. 2d 31 (D. C. 1978). 
42 
Swanson v. Wesley College, 402 A. 2d 401 (Del. 1979). 
43Ibid., p. 404. 
44 
Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 427 N. Y. S. 2d 760, 404 N. E. 2d 
1302 (1980). 
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rights. The Court of Appeals of New York ordered reinstatement based on 
the school's failure to follow its own procedures for suspension. 
However, the court noted the contractual relationship between student 
45 and institution was not satisfactory in resolving this dispute. 
In 1981 a state court upheld the dismissal of a student based on 
the terms of a contract as stated in the college catalog in Aronson v. 
46 47 
North Park College. The court cited Eisele v. Ayers to establish 
a contract was present based on the following catalog provision: 
The institution reserves the right to dismiss at any time a student 
who in its judgment is undesirable and whose continuation in the 
school is detrimental to him self or his fe^ow students. Such 
dismissal may be made without specific charge. 
In Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, the Superior 
Court of New Jersey upheld Princeton University's decision to withhold a 
49 
degree for a year based on a finding of plagiarism. The student cited 
a breach of contract by the institution as grounds for reduction of the 
penalty, and the court observed the relationship between student and 
institution: 
Cannot be described either in pure contractual or associational 
terms. In those instances where courts have dealt with the rela-
45Ibid., p. 1305. 
46 
Aronson v. North Park College, 418 N. E. 2d 776 (111. 1981). 
47Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N. E. 2d 21 (111. 1978). 
48 Aronson v. North Park College, p. 781. 
49 
Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, 453 A. 2d 263 N. 
J. 1982). 
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tionship of a private university to its students in contractual terms, 
they have warned against a rigid amplication of the law of contracts to 
students' disciplinary proceedings. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the expulsion of a law 
student based on four incidents of misconduct in Cloud v. Trustees of 
Boston University.^ The student contended that an improper discipli­
nary hearing was conducted constituting a violation of contractual 
• u- 52 rights. 
In another 1983 case, Coveney v. President & Trustees of Holy Cross 
College, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the dismissal of a 
53 student charged with violating student regulations. The student 
contended that the expulsion was arbitrary and capricious, but the court 
rejected this assertion. The court said the plaintiff "did not have a 
contractual right to a hearing."^ 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the expulsion of a 
medical student based on a charge of cheating in Corso v. Creighton 
University."*"* The court noted the contractual nature of the relation­
ship between student and institution with the Student Handbook being the 
50 
Ibid., p. 272. 
"^Cloud v. Trustees of Boston University, 720 F. 2d 721 (First Cir. 
1983). 
52Ibid., p. 724. 
53 Coveney v. President and Trustees of Holy Cross College, 445 N. 
E. 2d 136 (Mass. 1983). 
^Ibid., p. 140. 
"^Corso v. Creighton University, 731 F. 2d 529 (Eighth Cir. 1984). 
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primary source of terms governing the relationship. The court held the 
student "must be afforded his contractual right to such a hearing before 
the Committee on Student Discipline] prior to being expelled from the 
56 
medical school." 
In Fussell v. Louisiana Business College of Monroe, Inc., the 
Louisiana Court of Appeals heard a breach of contract suit brought 
against the school by a student suspended due to her involvement in a 
student petition campaign.^ The court ruled for the plaintiff and 
remanded the case to the trial court. The court established the 
student's probable claim to a breach of contract, saying: 
The only probable cause for the breach of the educational contract 
in this case is the requirement that 'the school may require 
withdrawal of any student whose attitude or conduct is not in 
accordance with school standards'. . . The school standards are not 
defined, nor was any evidence presented as ̂ o what those standards 
might be in the context of this litigation. 
A different circuit of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana heard 
another 1985 case involving a breach of contract suit in Simmons v. 
59 Sowela Technical Institute. The student, who was suspended from a 
practical nursing program for violating school rules and nursing ethics, 
sued alleging breach of an implied contract. The court ruled that 
because the student paid no fees and could leave voluntarily from the 
56Ibid., p. 533. 
"^Fussell v. Louisiana Business College of Monroe, Inc., 478 So. 2d 
652 (La. 1985). 
"*®Ibid., p. 655. 
59 
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program, there existed no bilateral contract and no cause for action.^ 
A student who was dismissed for falsifying grade change forms filed 
suit alleging breach of contract in Life Chiropractic College v. 
Fuchs.^* The court ruled the college did not breach its contract 
with the student by denying the student the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses at a hearing, stating: 
Being a private institution, the college was not, of course, 
constitutionally required to provide the appellee with the full 
panoply of due process protections whicj^would be applicable at a 
state sponsored educational institution. 
In the 1986 case, Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College, the 
plaintiff brought suit against the institution charging it with a breach 
63 
of its implied contract with him. The school dismissed the plaintiff 
based on an allegation of homosexuality although he had completed all 
requirements for a degree. The court affirmed a number of contentions 
raised by the plaintiff including the existence of an implied contract. 
The court noted: 
The elements of a traditional contract are present in the implied 
contract between a college and a student attending that college, 
and are readily discernible. The student's tender of an applica­
tion constitutes an offer to apply to the college. By 'accepting' 
an application to be a student at the college, the college accepts 
the applicant's offer. . . and upon satisfactory completion of the 
school's academic requirements (which constitutes performance), the 
school becomes obligated to isse the student a diploma. 
60Ibid., p. 917. 
^*Life Chiropractic College v. Fuchs, 337 S. E. 2d 45 (Ga. 1985). 
62Ibid., p. 48. 
^Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College, 501 N. E. 1380 (111. 1986). 
64Ibid., p. 1384. 
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Judicial Decisions Establishing A 
Constitutional Rights Doctrine 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, decided by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1961, represents a firm federal judicial 
commitment to students' right to constitutionally guaranteed due process 
in disciplinary proceedings involving suspension or expulsion from 
tax-supported colleges and universities. The preponderance of future 
cases involving disciplinary procedures at tax-supported colleges and 
universities have been built on the due process foundation set in Dixon 
and subsequent cases. 
The six plaintiffs, former students at Alabama State College, 
appealed their dismissal from the college, which was based on alleged 
misconduct. The U. S. District Court, Middle District of Alabama, 
upheld the dismissal and denied a requested injunction against 
65 
obstructing the plaintiffs' right to attend college. 
The plaintiffs, members of a group of Negro students, joined a 
group in a prearranged sit-in at a publically owned lunch grill. After 
being refused service the facility was closed and the students were 
asked to leave. They refused to leave, police were summoned, and the 
students were ordered outside the facility. 
During the next two days several of the plaintiffs were involved 
participants of mass demonstrations. The president of the college, Dr. 
Trenholm, warned students, including the plaintiffs, to cease disruptive 
activities. The Governor of Alabama, John Patterson, asked President 
fi 5 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 186 F. Supp. 945 (M. 
D. Ala. 1960). 
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Trenholm and the investigative staff of the Attorney General of Alabama 
66 
to investigate the students' conduct. 
The State Board of Education received the Governor's report and a 
report from President Trenholm. The Board subsequently voted unani­
mously to expel nine students, including the six plaintiffs. Each of 
the plaintiffs was officially notified of his expulsion. No formal 
charges were made against the students and no hearing was offered to any 
6 7 of them prior to their expulsion. 
Judge Rives, writing for the Circuit Court, held the plaintiffs 
were entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior 
to expulsion for misconduct, stating: 
In the disciplining of college students there are no considerations 
of immediate danger to the public, or of peril to the national 
security, which should prevent the Board from exercising at least 
the fundamental principles of fairness by giving the accused 
students notice o^gthe charges and an opportunity to be heard in 
their own defense. 
Having upheld the fundamental constitutional principle that due 
process requires both notice and hearing, the court further defined the 
nature of both elements required prior to dismissing a student from a 
tax-supported college or university. The court identified the following 
standards: 
1) The notice should state the specific charges and the grounds 
which would justify expulsion. 
2) The nature of the hearing should vary depending on the parti­
cular circumstances of the case. 
3) A charge of misconduct is best processed in a hearing which 
gives the hearing authority an opportunity to hear both sides 
in considerable detail. 
66 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150, 154. 
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4) A full-dress judicial hearing, including the right of cross-
examination, is not required, but an adversarial proceeding is 
acceptable. 
5) The accused should be given the names of adversarial witnesses 
and an oral or written report on the facts addressed by the 
witnesses. 
6) The accused should be allowed to present his own defense, and 
to produce oral or written testimony or affidavits of wit­
nesses on his behalf. 
7) The results and findings of the hearing authority shoulggbe 
presented in a report open to the accused's inspection. 
The judgement of the District Court was reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 
One important issue addressed by the court was that of the 
"privilege versus right" distinction applicable to enrollment in a 
tax-supported university. The court noted that although the District 
Court said, " The right to attend a public college or university is not 
in and of itself a constitutional right,that distinction was not a 
justification for denial of due process. The court stated, "It none­
theless remains true that the State cannot condition the granting of 
even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to 
procedural due process.This part of the decision further built the 
foundation for a constitutional right to due process in disciplinary 
proceedings at tax-supported colleges. The court observed the right to 
continued enrollment was a valuable private right not easily waived by 
72 
administrative regulations and provisions. 
This case set the precedent for the right of students at tax-
69 
Ibid., p. 158. 
^Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 186 F. Supp. 945, 950. 
^^Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150, 156. 
72Ibid., p. 157. 
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supported colleges and universities to receive fundamental due process 
notice and hearing prior to expulsion for misconduct. Important cases 
which followed addressed the constitutional rights doctrine and further 
defined the nature of due process required within this doctrine. 
Another 1961 case emanating out of the civil rights protest move-
73 
ment was Knight v. State Board of Education. This case featured 
thirteen students of Tennessee A & I University arrested in Mississippi 
for participation in a sit-in protest. The university discipline 
committee subsequently suspended them without notice or hearing. The 
students brought action alleging a violation of their constitutional 
right to due process. The District Court, in deference to the Fifth 
Circuit's finding in Dixon, observed: 
With respect to the type of notice and hearing to be provided, 
consideration should be given to the observations m^e by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Dixon case. 
Two years later another District Court cited Dixon as the judicial 
precedent for adjudicating due process rights claims brought by students 
suspended or expelled from tax-supported institutions. The case Due v. 
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, like Dixon and Knight, 
involved students suspended for participation in civil rights 
demonstrations.^"* The court relied heavily on the Dixon decision in 
upholding the constitutional right of the students to due process, but 
it denied the students' claims to certain due process rights, stating: 
73 
Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M. D. Tenn. 
1961). 
74-. .. 
Ibid., p. 
^Due v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 233 F. 
Supp. 396 (N. D. Fla. 1963). 
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"A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary to due 
process requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by 
76 the university disciplinary committee. . ." 
These cases were among the first to reiterate the federal judi­
ciary's acceptance of Dixon's mandate for minimal constitutionally 
guaranteed due process rights in cases involving disciplinary suspension 
and expulsion from tax-supported institutions. Many of the cases which 
followed the early post-Dixon decisions not only embraced the constitu­
tional rights doctrine, but further expanded and defined the procedural 
points of due process. Some cases, such as Esteban v. Central Missouri 
State College, examined and redefined a number of specific points of 
procedural due process.^ Many other cases focused judicial scrutiny on 
a limited number of due process issues, with one point of procedure 
often the grounds for either the suit or the court's decision. An 
examination of court decisions from Dixon to the present still shows 
courts examining, reaffirming, and redefining legal and educational 
concepts of disciplinary due process. 
The next section of this chapter is devoted to a review of several 
cases which have helped define specific components of disciplinary due 
process procedures. These cases are grouped into the following 
component headings: 
1) Sufficiency of notice 
2) Right to, and adequacy of disciplinary hearing 
3) Composition and jurisdiction of the hearing agency 
4) The right to advisement/representation by counsel 
76Ibid., p. 403. 
^Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W. 
D. Mo. 1967). 
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5) Failure of the institution to follow specified disciplinary 
procedures 
6) Procedures used where jurisdiction overlaps 
7) Imposition of interim suspension 
8) Disciplinary appeals procedures. 
Sufficiency of Notice 
A key procedural due process issue addressed by courts following 
Dixon was that of the giving of notice of charges and hearing. Early 
cases reaffirmed the constitutional necessity for notice to be given, 
and in some cases, the validity of the form of notice. Later cases 
involved fewer challenges to the necessity of notice, although the form 
of notice was still challenged. 
The District Court in Knight v. State Board of Education clearly 
supported the need for adequate notice as required by the due process 
78 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court observed that without 
such due process, "the school authorities are not in position to 
exercise their discretion and judgment in a fair and reasonable 
79 manner." This court was not the last to couch judicial due process 
doctrine in terms of "fairness and reasonableness." 
In Due v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, the court 
allowed suspensions to stand despite the students' assertion that notice 
was not received. The charges were read to the students when they were 
brought before a disciplinary committee. Judge Harrold Carswell, in 
upholding the notice given, wrote: 
78 
Knight v. State Board of Education, p. 180. 
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Procedures are subject to refinement and improvement in the never-
ending effort to assure, not only fairness, but every semblance of 
fairness. More specific routines of notice and advisement may be 
indicated in this regard, but a foisted system of rigid procedure 
can become so ritualistic, dogmatic, and impractical as to itself 
be a denial of due proces^ The touchstones in this area are 
fairness and reasonableness. 
The 1967 case, Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, sometimes 
referred to as Esteban I, found the District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri considering several due process issues connected 
with the suspension of two students involved with demonstrations. This 
case preceeded the court's release of its extraordinary document on the 
subject of student discipline, General Order on Judicial Standards of 
Procedures and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Sup-
81 
ported Institutions of Higher Education. 
The court examined the students' contention that inadequate notice 
of charges was given because the Dean of Men orally advised them 
concerning the disciplinary action, rather than give them written 
notice. The court upheld the plaintiffs' argument, and suggested that 
written notice of the precise charge would remedy the appearance of 
"uncertainty in the minds of the students as to the ground or grounds 
82 
upon which the college proposed to take action." The court also 
specified that written notice should be provided at least ten days prior 
83 
to the disciplinary hearing. 
80 Due v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, p. 403. 
Q ] 
45 F. R. D. 133, U. S. District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri (en banc), 1968. 
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Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, p. 651. 
83Ibid. 
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A District Court in Jones v. State Board of Education Of & For 
State of Tennessee followed or exceeded some of the Esteban provisions 
84 
with the exception of ten days notice. The court allowed the school's 
giving of notice two days in advance of the hearing, and upheld the 
expulsion of the students. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
85 
the trial court's findings. 
The same court which issued the Dixon decision considered suf­
ficiency of notice in the 1968 case, Wright v. Texas Southern Univer-
86 sity. Several students at the institution were refused reentry after 
being charged with violations of student regulations. The disciplinary 
administrator was unable to give written notice because of the students' 
failure to notify the university of changes of address as specified by 
regulation, which led to the return of the notices. Other methods of 
giving notice were also tried without success. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals denied the appellants' due process claims, writing: 
It would be unreasonable to hold that a university could not take 
disciplinary action against students who could not be contacted 
although diligent attempts were made, particularly where their 
whereabouts were gyt disclosed to the University in violation of a 
valid regulation. 
The California Court of Appeal reviewed claims of denial of due 
84 
Jones v. State Board of Education Of & For State of Tennessee, 
279 F. Supp. 190 (M. D. Tenn. 1968). 
85 
Jones v. State Board of Education Of & For State of Tennessee, 
407 F. 2d 834 (Sixth Cir. 1969). 
^Wright v. Texas Southern University, 392 F. 2d 728 (Fifth Cir. 
1968). 
87Ibid., p. 730. 
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process made by a student dismissed for misconduct in Andersen v. 
88 
Regents of University of California. The court upheld the adequacy of 
the disciplinary procedures including lack of notice of charges prior to 
89 
the hearing. 
Two students suspended by the University of Puerto Rico challenged 
their suspensions on several grounds in the 1974 case, Marin v. Univer-
90 
sity of Puerto Rico. The District Court, in upholding the plaintiffs' 
claims of denial of due process, noted that due process required 
"adequate advance notice to the student of (a) charges, (b) the spe­
cific, previously promulgated regulations under which the charges are 
91 brought, and (c) the evidence against the student." 
One year later the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again heard 
another case involving adequacy of notice in Jenkins v. Louisiana State 
92 
Board of Education. The students alleged that notice was not given 
regarding the specific charge of conspiracy for which they were sus­
pended. The notice specified charges of inciting to riot, disturbing 
the peace and criminal damage to public property. The students' claimed 
that lack of specification of a "conspiracy" charge led them to be 
88 
Andersen v. Regents of University of California, 99 Cal Rptr. 531 
(1972). 
89 
Ibid., p. 536. 
90 
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613 (D. Puerto 
Rico 1974). 
91Ibid., p. 623. 
92 
Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 506 F. 2d 992 
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93 "tried and disciplined upon charges were not even made against them." 
The court upheld the suspensions and found the notice given to be 
sufficient, stating: 
Due process in the context of this case is not to be equated with 
that essential to a criminal trial and the notice of charges need 
not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment. . . There 
is no doubt in our minds that the notice given the appellants was 
in sufficient detail to fairly ̂ jiable them to present a defense at 
the Disciplinary Board hearing. 
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas examined 
several claims of denial of the due process in the 1978 case, Adibi-
95 
Sedeh v. Bee County College. The plaintiffs, all Iranian students, 
were charged with several violations of student regulations. Notice of 
their hearing was given by certified letter, by copies of the letter 
handdelivered to many of the students, and by notices posted directing 
the students to seek messages at specific locations. The court found 
that these steps were procedurally sufficient, noting: 
Taking into account the size of the college, the several reasonable 
ways notice to the offenders had been given, and the reasonable 
assumption that the Iranian community at the school is closely 
knit, the Court finds all of th^. members of the class had fair and 
adequate notice of the hearing. 
Right to, and Adequacy of Disciplinary Hearing 
The right to a disciplinary hearing, like the right to receive 
notice, was a procedural due process issue which was reinforced by most 
93Ibid., p. 999. 
94Ibid., p. 1000. 
95 
Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County College, 454 F. Supp. 552 (S. D. Texas 
1978). 
96 
Ibid., p. 556. 
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of the early decisions following the Dixon decision. Later decisions 
focused on specific aspects of the hearing which did or did not meet due 
process. Issues such as introduction of evidence, the right to cross-
examine witnesses, the public or private nature of the hearing, and the 
record of the hearing are among the issues which were raised in suits and 
decided by the courts. 
In Wasson v. Trowbridge, the Second Circuit of Appeals heard the 
case of a cadet of the Merchant Marine Academy who was dismissed for 
97 
disciplinary reasons. The student argued about a number of due process 
points in claiming a deprivation of due process. The court remanded the 
case to the District Court after upholding Wasson's right to challenge 
the hearing because of allegations of concealed evidence and the denial 
98 
of a continuance requested by Wasson to obtain favorable witnesses. 
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College (Esteban I) was the 
first case to significantly expand the concept of the disciplinary 
hearing put forth by the Dixon court. Judge Elmo Hunter, writing for the 
court, set forth essential elements of due process including: 1) a 
hearing before the college's president; 2) the student's right to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; 3) the student's right to 
present his version as to the charge, and to offer exhibits, affidavits, 
and witnesses; and 4) written findings and disposition, with permission 
99 
by either party to make a record of the hearing at its own expense. 
^Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807 (Second Cir. 1967). 
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This court expanded Dixon's mandate by allowing for cross-examination, 
the right to a record of the hearing, and the right to counsel. 
One year later, in Buttney v. Smiley, the District Court for the 
District of Colorado heard a First Amendment case concerning students 
who were suspended for blocking access to the Placement Center of the 
University of Colorado to protest recruiting by the Central Intelligence 
Agency. The court decided that university officials were not re­
quired to advise students involved in disciplinary proceedings of their 
right to remain silent and to be provided with counsel. 
The first of two 1971 cases involving the University of South 
Carolina, Bistrick v. University of South Carolina, was initiated by a 
student suspended for his involvement in the take-over of a campus 
102 building. The student filed suit claiming the university denied him 
due process. The court cited the four requirements of fundamental 
fairness put forth by Professor Charles Wright in assessing the adequacy 
103 
of Bistrick's disciplinary action. The court noted that the uni­
versity went beyond Wright's requirement for the accused to be given the 
names of adverse witnesses and a summary of their testimony. Adverse 
witnesses testified in Bistrick's presence and were subject to cross-
examination by his counsel.In addition, Bistrick's counsel was 
^^^Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968). 
101Ibid., p. 287. 
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furnished with a full transcript of the hearing. The court decided 
that Bistrick was given a proper due process hearing. 
The same District Court heard Herman v. University of South 
106 
Carolina later in 1971. The court quickly noted that the facts of 
this case were "practically identical to those in Bistrick v. University 
of South Carolina.The student, who was suspended for occupying the 
university union building, raised many of the same due process claims 
that were raised in Bistrick. The court, again citing Professor Wright's 
four safeguards, concluded that the plaintiff was not denied due process. 
A California appeals court upheld the adequacy of several hearing 
due process issues challenged by a dismissed student one year later in 
108 
Andersen v. Regents of the University of California. Among those 
issues, the court found that "Plaintiff has cited no authority and we 
have found none holding that college disciplinary proceedings must be 
public, at least in the absence of a request by the student that the 
109 hearing be made public." The court also decided the student was not 
injured because he wasn't told that he had the right not to testify. 
Another 1972 case, Paine v. Board of Regents of University of 
Texas System, concerned a suit brought by a student against the Board of 
105Ibid., p. 952. 
i 
Herman v. University of South Carolina, 341 F. Supp. 226 (D. S. 
C. 1971). 
107Ibid., p. 227. 
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Regents of the University of Texas System because of his suspension, 
based on a rule created by the Board which mandated an automatic suspen­
sion for drug offenses.The rule, which affected those who were 
placed on probation or convicted of the use, possession, or sale of 
drugs, did not allow the student to have a disciplinary hearing. The 
court, in finding the rule violated constitutional guarantees to due 
process, stated: 
The Board of Regents may not lawfully provide for the suspension or 
expulsion of a student in good standing upon the bare fact of his 
final conviction or probation for a drug or narcotic offense absent 
a hearing affording him the opportunity to show that despite this 
fact he poses not substantial threat of influenci^ other students 
to use, possess or sell other drugs or narcotics. 
The court pointed out that a student found guilty of murder would be 
accorded greater due process rights than the drug violator under this 
i 113 rule. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard suspended students claim 
denial of due process as a result of suspension for participating in 
"sleep-ins" in the 1973 case, Blanton v. State University of New 
York.Among other claims raised was the due process right to cross-
examine and confront adverse witnesses. The court noted Dixon1s 
indication that cross-examination is not necessary, but cited Winnick v. 
^''"Paine v. Board of Regents of University of Texas System, 355 F. 
Supp. 199 (W. D. Texas 1972). 
112 
Ibid., p. 205. 
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^"^Blanton v. State University of New York, 489 F. 2d 377 (Second 
Cir. 1973). 
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Manning in observing "if a case of a substantial suspension of a state 
university student has resolved itself into a problem of credibility, 
'cross-examination of witnesses might be essential to a fair 
hearing. The court concluded that the cross-examination was not 
necessary in this case. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado handed down a decision which further 
expanded the right to a hearing in the 1973 case, Watson v. Board of 
Regents of University of Colorado.'*'^ A non-student brought action 
against the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado because the 
plaintiff was denied admission to the university, after which he was 
denied access to the campus because he had a prior criminal record and 
had made threatening gestures to university personnel. He claimed that 
he had been denied due process because a hearing was not held prior to 
being denied access. The court, drawing comparisons between this case 
and that of a disciplinary suspension or expelsion, stated: "The same 
protections must be afforded non-students who may be permanently denied 
access to University functions and facilities.A United States 
Military Academy cadet brought suit against his disciplinary dismissal in 
118 
Brown v. Knowlton. The cadet raised a number of due process claims 
including claims concerning his hearing. 
^^Ibid. p. 385 citing Winnick v. Manning, 460 F. 2d 545 (Second 
Cir. 1972), p. 550. 
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The court dismissed the cadet's argument that his hearing was not timely 
because of a time lapse between the offense and his hearing. The court 
concluded that timeliness was not an issue because the hearing was held 
119 
in the same semester as the infractions. The student also claimed 
that a failure of the Academy to produce several witnesses who were no 
longer present at the Academy was a due process violation. The court 
120 dismissed that claim as well as others in upholding the dismissal. 
The 1974 case, Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, was decided in 
favor of the plaintiff students on a number of grounds. The District 
Court offered its view of proper due process to include "A full, 
expedited evidentiary hearing (a) presided over by an impartial, 
previously uninvolved official, (b) the proceedings of which are 
transcribed, at which the student (c) can present evidence and (d) 
cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e) with the assistance of retained 
i ..121 counsel... 
The year 1975 saw the United States Supreme Court hand down a 
decision in Goss v. Lopez which, although not about a college or 
university action, did have significant standing in future disciplinary 
122 
due process cases in higher education. 
The Court, with four Justices dissenting, affirmed the decision of 
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, upholding the 
119 
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denial of due process claims of public school students suspended without 
notice and an opportunity to be heard by school authorities. The Court 
stated: 
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce 
standards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very 
broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safe­
guards. Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize 
a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a 
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and 
which may not be taken away for misconduct Yj§hout adherence to the 
minimum procedures required by that Clause. 
The Court spoke to. the need for a process which would allow the student 
to avoid being subjected to unfair deprivation of his right to an 
education. The decision noted that "requiring effective notice and 
informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the 
12 A events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." 
The Court qualified its holding to short suspensions, not exceeding ten 
days, and suggested that longer suspensions or expulsions might require 
more formal procedures. 
In Nzuve v. Castleton State College, a Kenyan student dismissed 
because of criminal activities occuring on campus brought suit alleging 
126 several claims of denial of due process. The Supreme Court of 
Vermont dismissed the student's claims, including the absence of "random 
selection" of College Court members, and noted "laudable, if not 
123 
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mandated, provisions in the Castleton College Court procedures," includ­
ing the right to a closed or open hearing, the right to remain silent, 
127 and the right to present evidence and examine witnesses. 
A student at a two-year community college brought suit challenging 
his disciplinary probation in DePrima v. Columbia-Greene Community 
128 
College. The student,, who was charged with violations of college 
rules, was given a requested hearing, although his attorney was not 
allowed to cross-examine witnesses and the student was not allowed to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call his own witnesses. The 
court remanded the matter back to the disciplinary panel to allow for 
cross-examination and presentation of witnesses on behalf of the 
«. ^ «. 129 student. 
The 1978 case, Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County College, was the result of 
a suit by several plaintiffs, Iranian students, who challenged discipli­
nary action brought against them for disruption operations of the 
130 
college. One due process claim raised was that of the college's 
denial of the plaintiffs' attorney's request to allow cross-examination 
at a later separate hearing for each student. The court decided that 
such a request would have placed an unreasonable burden on each of the 
college's witnesses. 
127 
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A student suspended for one year because of charges of several 
disciplinary offenses alleged a violation of due process rights in 
132 
Turoff v. Kibbee. In this 1981 case, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York ruled on a number of contentions offered by 
the student. The student did not receive notice of a pre-hearing 
informal conference because of a mistaken mailing. He contended the 
absence of the pre-hearing conference constituted a due process viola­
tion. The court, disagreeing, wrote: 
The hearing procedure provides greater protection than the informal 
conference and is designed to lessen the change of an unjustified 
suspension or other disciplinary measure. This does not imply that 
the informal conference is a meaningless exercise. It is clearly a 
more ^xneditious and simpler means of resolving less complex 
cases. 
A student of the University of Maryland School of Pharmacy was 
dismissed due to disciplinary charges resulting from observed 
drug-induced impairment and a later guilty plea to possession of 
cocaine. He brought suit in District Court in Sohmer v. Kinnard, 
134 
alleging several due process violations. The court addressed the 
student's contention that certain evidence concerning his cocaine 
possession was inadmissable in the hearing, stating: 
Plaintiff contends that it was not proper for the Grievance 
Committee to admit into evidence the agreed statement of facts 
which he entered into the court proceedings concerning his cocaine 
possession... It was not improper for the Committee to rely^ji this 
agreed statement of facts as evidence of plaintiff's guilt. 
1 
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The 1986 case, Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, resulted from 
a suit brought by a student who claimed several violations of procedural 
due process arising from three separate disciplinary hearings resulting 
136 in suspension. The court decided that the plaintiff was not denied 
due process right to cross-examination because he was not allowed to 
137 
cross-examine adverse witnesses about potential sources of bias. The 
court recognized that the courts were far from unanimous 
about the right of cross-examination. The court upheld the student's 
right to make a tape-recorded copy of the hearing at his own expense, 
stating: 
In sum, the interests at stake are substantial, the risk of errors 
in significant, and the corrective value of a verbatim record is 
similarly significant. Furthermore, allowing a student to tape-
record the hearings imposes no burden upon the university. I 
therefore hold, based on this balancing test, that where no other 
verbatim record of the proceeding will be made available, a student 
threatened with a year-long disciplinary suspension from a public 
university has the *ij|l^g to tape-record the disciplinary hearings 
at his or own expense. 
The court used this finding and others in dismissing the disciplinary 
sanctions, and ordered the university to afford the plaintiff a de novo 
hearing complying with due process points decided by the court. 
Composition and Jurisdiction of Hearing Agency 
Several court decisions involving claims of due process violations 
by tax-supported colleges and universities have addressed issues 
concerning the composition and jurisdiction of the hearing agency which 
"I 
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adjudicated the campus disciplinary process. Courts have issued 
opinions on matters such as bias among hearing board members, the proper 
judicial venue for a disciplinary action, and the appointment of special 
disciplinary panels. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dixon indicated that the 
appellees "should be given the opportunity to present to the Board, or 
139 at least to an administrative official of the college..." 
The composition of a hearing panel was a significant due process 
point examined by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Wasson v. 
Trowbridge. The student, dismissed based on an accumulation of 
excessive demerits, claimed that members of a panel which awarded him 
demerits had participated in the investigation against him, resulting in 
a biased panel. The court decided that "Wasson was entitled to show 
that members of the panel had had such prior contact with his case that 
they could be presumed to have been biased.The case was remanded 
to the District Court for a hearing on due process issues addressed by 
the Circuit Court. 
The District Court in Esteban I noted that the issue of the hearing 
agency was a key point favoring the plaintiff's denial of due process 
claim. The court, addressing the point, wrote: 
...As the Court views the matter, the critical defect in the 
hearing procedure used by the college was the fact that the person 
to whom the students were permitted to make their explanation or 
showing... was only one of a number of persons on the board which 
made the recommendation of suspension. It is imperative that the 
students charged be given an opportunity to present their version 
139 
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of the case and to make such showing as they desire to the person 
or group of persons who have the authorized responsibility of 
determining ±hje facts of the case and the nature of action, if any, 
to be taken. 
The court directed the president of the college to conduct the hearing 
142 
granted the plaintiffs by the court. 
The District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the 
assertion of the suspended student that he was denied fair and impartial 
/ 
hearing in the 1971 case, Herman v. University of South Carolina. The 
plaintiff's claim rested on the fact that Special Committee (hearing 
committee) members were also members of the Board of Trustees, the 
appeals authority which later heard his appeal. The court cited three 
appellate decisions which held that a "combination of investigative and 
143 
judicial functions within an agency does not violate due process..." 
The court also decided against Herman by declaring the Special Committee 
established by the Board was a permissable hearing body, even though 
normal disciplinary procedures required a hearing before a disciplinary 
144 
committee. 
One year later the Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard a proce­
dural due process claim raised by the appellees regarding the hearing 
body in Sill v. Pennsylvania State University. The university's 
board of trustees appointed a group of private citizens to serve as 
141 
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a fact-finding panel, and to hear charges and make recommendations to 
the president concerning students subject to disciplinary action. The 
students claimed that failure to assign their case to the established 
faculty-administrator-student judicial board constituted a denial of due 
process. The court pointed out the fluid nature of due process, and 
sided with the university, stating: 
The appointment of the special disciplinary panel for the purpose 
of making factual findings and disciplinary recommendations to the 
president was a reasonable exercise of the power vested in the 
board of trustees and did not off^i the appellants' constitutional 
rights to procedural due process. 
Winnick v. Manning, decided in 1972 by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, revolved around the appellee's claim of denial of due process 
147 
based on the assigned hearing official. The student was suspended 
for disrupting class activities. Because the Student Conduct Committee 
had disolved at the end of the academic period, a hearing was conducted 
by the Associate Dean of Students. The student alleged bias because the 
Associate Dean's department initiated the formal disciplinary 
proceedings. The court denied the student's allegation, writing: 
It may well be that having an administrator as the sole judge in 
student disciplinary proceedings is undesirable. In fact, the 
University's regulations recognize that a tribunal composed of 
students and faculty is preferable. Nevertheless, the mere fact 
that the decisionmaker in a disciplinary hearing is also an admin­
istrative officer of the^giiversity does not in itself violate the 
dictates of due process. 
In Blanton v. State University of New York, students who parti­
cipated in "sleep-ins" were suspended after disciplinary proceedings. 
146 
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The students claimed that the inclusion of the Dean of Student Life in 
their hearing as a "non-voting coordinator" created impartiality because 
the Dean had participated in the "sleep-in" confrontation. The court 
upheld the university's procedure, pointing out that "in any event, the 
students were given a full opportunity to present their case to a 
decision maker with no previous involvement in the incident, President 
149 
MacVittie." 
Prior involvement of a disciplinary board's members with a discipli­
nary matter was a due process issue in the 1974 case, Brown v. Knowlton. 
The members of the initial disciplinary board were also members of a 
second board which again heard the case. The plaintiff claimed that 
membership on both boards constituted bias. The court, rejecting 
plaintiff's argument, wrote: 
The only prior contact which members of the panel have been shown 
to have had with the plaintiff's case is the previous hearing. 
There is not even an allegation that any member of the panel 
initiated or investigated any charg^Qagainst the plaintiff. Thus 
there can be no presumption of bias. 
Students suspended because of disciplinary charges while attending 
Grambling University, brought suit in the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, alleging a number of due process violations in Jenkins v. 
Louisiana State Board of Education. Among other grounds, the students 
claimed the Hearing Board appointed by the president was not an im­
partial tribunal. The Court noted that "mere speculation and tenuous 
inferences" were not enough upon which to allege prejudice in a hearing 
149 
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body, and dismissed the appellants' claim. 
Marshall v. Maguire, a 1980 case, was brought into court by a 
student expelled from The State University of New York at Old 
152 
Westbury. The student, who had his hearing before the Judicial 
Council and his appeal before the Judicial Review Committee, claimed a 
violation of due process because the Associate Dean of the College 
served on both councils, in violation of the student code of conduct. 
The court found "the presence of the Associate Dean on the Judicial 
Council... so taints the proceedings of the Council as to require that 
153 
they be undertaken anew." 
In Sohmer v. Kinnard, the District Court for the District of 
Maryland heard a student of the University of Maryland School of 
Pharmacy claim the due process right to be given a hearing before the 
ultimate disciplinary authority. He was given a hearing before the 
Student Grievance and Disciplinary Committee, which recommended 
suspension to the Faculty Assembly. The Faculty Assembly voted to 
dismiss the student instead. The court denied the student's right to 
have his hearing before the Faculty Assembly, noting that other cases 
had not established such a right. 
In Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, a student bought suit 
alleging several violations of due process concerning his suspension 
Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education, p. 1003. 
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from the University of Rhode Island. The student, who was heard by 
three different hearing boards, claimed that the Acting Director of 
Student Life, in his capacity as advisor to the University Board of 
Conduct, was not an impartial member of each hearing proceeding. The 
court, in an extensive review, agreed with the plaintiff, writing: 
...The evidence offered by the plaintiff on the issue of impartial­
ity necessitates two findings, either of which alone rises to the 
level of a due process violation: first, that the defendant Ronald 
Weisinger[advisor]as an agent of the defendant University, exerted 
such influence over the various hearing boards as to compromise 
their necessary independence; and second, that the cumulative 
likelihood of bias on the part of heariiji^- board members rendered 
the proceedings insufficiently impartial. 
The court instructed the University to "take all necessary steps to 
structure the hearing procedures in a way that preserves the inde-
156 
pendence and impartiality of the hearing boards." 
Right to Advisement/Representation by Counsel 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the due process 
right to receive, advise, or be represented by counsel during 
disciplinary proceedings in its Dixon decision. The absence of such a 
decision opened the door for a number of different courts to ponder the 
right to and limitations of participation of legal counsel in 
disciplinary proceedings in higher education. The findings of these 
courts do not reveal the strong consensus that follows the right to 
notice and hearing. 
^"'Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, p. 813. 
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Wasson v. Trowbridge was among the earliest of cases brought before 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concerning disciplinary due process 
at military service academies. In this 1967 case the court addressed a 
number of due process questions, and remanded the case to the District 
Court. One issue addressed by the court was Wasson's right to represen­
tation to counsel at his hearings. The court observed, "The requirement 
of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the 
other aspects of the hearing.The court cited the non-criminal, 
non-adversarial nature of the hearing and the school's lack of counsel 
158 among other aspects mitigating the need for counsel. 
In Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, the District Court 
accorded the plaintiffs the right to have counsel present at the hearing 
159 
to advise them. The court then limited questioning of adverse 
160 
witnesses to the plaintiffs, not their attorney. 
The 1968 case, Barker v. Hardway, resulted from the suspension of 
students who participated in racial demonstrations at Bluefield State 
161 
College. Six of the suspended students refused to participate in an 
appeal hearing because the college denied them representation by legal 
counsel. They brought suit contending a denial of due process rights. 
The court disagreed, Judge Christie stating: "I have been cited to no 
decision by the Supreme Court or any other court expressly extending the 
''^Wasson v. Trowbridge, p. 812. 
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162 right of counsel to a student at a school disciplinary hearing." 
Students disciplined for occupying administration offices and 
buildings at Southern University brought suit in the District Court for 
the Easter District of Louisiana claiming a right to counsel, in the 
163 
1969 case, French v. Bashful. The school allowed the case to be 
prosecuted by a senior law student who later practiced law. The stu­
dents were denied representation by their attorneys. The court decided 
the special circumstances of the case required the permitting of repre-
164 sentation of the students by their retained counsel. The court went 
on to state that the holding was limited to retained counsel (as in this 
case), not appointed counsel. The school did not have to pay for 
165 counsel for the students. 
In Andersen v. Regents of University of California, the state 
Appeals Court upheld the adequacy of several due process procedures 
instituted by the university during a disciplinary dismissal action. 
The student claimed denial of due process because he was not informed of 
his right to counsel prior to his hearing. The court dismissed his 
argument, noting: 
Plaintiff at the beginning of the hearing was advised of his right 
to counsel and between hearings was urged to get counsel. He was 
not injyggd because he was not so instructed prior to the 
hearing. 
162Ibid., p. 237. 
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The 1972 case, Hagopian v. Knowlton, found the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals considering the due process claims of a cadet dismissed 
167 
from the United States Military Academy. The cadet, dismissed 
because of excessive demerits, claimed several due process rights were 
denied him. The court upheld his right to a hearing, but denied his 
claim to a right to representation by counsel, noting "the importance of 
informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the 
168 cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel..." 
Two students suspended for disruptive behavior at El Centro Junior 
College in Texas brought action in District Court in Haynes v. Dallas 
169 
County Junior College District. The students, whose request for 
representation by counsel at their hearing was denied, claimed such 
denial violated their due process rights. The court cited Dixon's 
findings in refusing to extend basic due process rights including 
representation by counsel. 
The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico indicated a 
number of necessary due process procedures applicable to disciplinary 
hearings in its decision in the 1974 case, Marin v. University of Puerto 
Rico. One distinctive point rendered by the court was its requirement 
that counsel retained by the students be allowed to assist with presen-
^^Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201 (Second Cir. 1972). 
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tation of evidence and cross-examination "if his or her attendance does 
not unduly delay the hearing. 
In Nzuve v. Castleton State College, the Supreme Court of Vermont 
considered the appellee's claim of deprivation of due process concerning 
his disciplinary hearing. Among the points raised was deprivation of 
counsel. The court noted the student's right to have an advisor, who 
172 could be legal counsel, present at the hearing. The court dismissed 
this claim and lauded the College for its procedures. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals heard a claim of violation of 
due process involving a disciplinary procedure at the University of 
173 
Rhode Island in the 1978 case, Gabrilowitz v. Newman. The court 
upheld the District Court's decision in finding an unconstitutional 
deprivation of due process. The student was forced to decide whether to 
testify or not at a campus hearing pending criminal action for the same 
incident, without benefit of counsel. The court supported the student's 
need for legal counsel, stating, "Only a lawyer is competent to cope 
with the demands of an adversary proceeding held against the backdrop of 
174 a pending criminal case involving the same set of facts." The court 
went on to define a limited role for counsel: 
Counsel would be present only to safeguard appellee's rights at the 
criminal proceeding, not to affect the outcome of the disciplinary 
hearing. Counsel's principal functions would be to advise appellee 
whether he should answer questions and what he should not say so as 
^^Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, p. 624. 
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to safeguard appellee from self-incrimination; and to observe the 
proceeding first-hand so as to be better prepared to deal with 
attempts to introduce evidence from the hearing at a later criminal 
proceeding. To fulfill these functions, counsel need speak to no 
one but appellee. Counsel should, however, be available to consult 
with appellee at all stage^^of the hearing, especially while 
appellee is being questioned. 
In Turoff v. Kibbee, the District Court upheld the due process 
procedures used by Brooklyn College in its suspension of a student for 
disciplinary reasons. The court dismissed the student's claim of 
deprivation of due process based on the college's denial of representa­
tion of the student by his attorney. The court noted that the attorney 
was allowed to be present and to advise the student during the hearing, 
and that such involvement was adequate. 
The 1982 case, Kolesa v. Lehman, was brought by a scholarship 
student in the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) at the 
University of Rochester.The student alleged a denial of due process 
in the disciplinary proceedings which led to his disenrollment from the 
NROTC program. Specifically, he claimed the right to representation by 
legal counsel at his hearing. The court cited Wasson v. Trowbridge and 
Hagopian v. Knowlton, two decisions rendered by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals concerning due process procedures at military academies. It 
held that the non-criminal, essentially investigative nature of the 
hearing, coupled with the absence of counsel on the part of the govern­
ment and the individual's ability to "develop the facts adequately," did 
^^Turof v. Kibbee, p. 886. 
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178 
not necessitate the student's representation by counsel. 
A statutory claim to right to representation by legal counsel in a 
disciplinary proceeding was upheld by a state court in the 1982 case, 
179 
Kusnir v. Leach. The court, reviewing the Pennsylvania Administra­
tive Agency Law, declared Clarion State College to be an agency of the 
Commonwealth. As such, the provision of the law allowing the student to 
180 
be represented by counsel before the agency, was applicable. Al­
though this case was not decided on constitutional grounds, it points 
out the need for institutions to review applicable state administrative 
laws which may affect disciplinary procedures. 
In Sohmer v. Kinnard, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's 
claim to right of representation by counsel in a disciplinary dismissal 
proceeding. The court observed that some cases found representation by 
counsel to be an element of due process, but it chose to side with Dixon and 
Herman v. University of South Carolina in ommitting representation by 
counsel as a due process right. 
A student brought suit against Ferris State College alleging a 
number of due process violations incurred during disciplinary pro-
182 
ceedings, in Hart v. Ferris State College. The plaintiff, who was 
allowed to consult with counsel, claimed that denial of counsel's right 
1 7ft 
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to cross-examine was a due process violation. The court, in an exten­
sive discussion, spoke of the conflicting decisions on the matter. 
However, the court dismissed the student's claim, noting "the probable 
value of the additional procedural safeguard of allowing plaintiff's 
counsel to conduct cross-examination is rather minimal where plaintiff 
183 is allowed to question witnesses herself and to consult with counsel. 
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed with 
the plaintiff's claim to a right to consult with counsel in a discipli-
184 nary proceeding, in McLaughlin v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy. 
The student, charged with a criminal offense both on and off the campus, 
alleged a violation of due process since he was denied civilian counsel 
at a second hearing. The court, citing similarities between this case 
and the circumstances of Gabrilowitz v. Newman, found for the plaintiff, 
declaring, "The plaintiff will probably succeed in his claim that the 
disciplinary proceeding, as it has been held to date, without plaintiff 
having the right to a lawyer of his own choice with whom to consult and 
185 
advise, deprived plaintiff of due process of law." 
The 1983 case, Henson v. Honor Committee of University of Virginia, 
was brought before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals by a student 
alleging denial of due process because experienced legal counsel was not 
186 
allowed to represent him at a disciplinary hearing. The student was 
183t, 100 Ibid., p. 183. 
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allowed to have two student-lawyers represent him at no cost as well as 
a practicing attorney to assist, although the attorney could not take an 
active role in the proceeding. The court found these procedures to be 
187 
"constitutionally valid." 
The right to assistance by counsel in a disciplinary proceeding was 
a point raised by the plaintiff in Gorman v. University of Rhode Island. 
The plaintiff's request for assistance by a personally retained attorney 
was denied by the university. The court upheld this denial, citing 
several federal court decisions which denied a right to counsel. The 
court noted that judicial acceptance of the right to counsel required a 
determination of overlapping criminal charges, not an issue in this 
188 case. 
Failure to Follow Specified Procedures 
A few legal challenges to the disciplinary procedures of colleges 
and universities have focused on the institution's failure to follow its 
own specified procedures. Some courts have found this failure to be a 
serious flaw in the proceeding, while other courts have allowed some 
deviation from standard disciplinary procedures, noting the United 
189 
States Supreme Court's finding of flexibility in due process. 
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The 1971 case, Blstrick v. University of South Carolina, allowed 
the District Court for the District of South Carolina to hear a number 
of due process complaints lodged by the plaintiff following a suspension 
proceeding. Plaintiff argued that the establishment of a special 
committee by the board of trustees was contrary to standard disciplinary 
policy, a violation of due process. The court disagreed, finding the 
plaintiff was afforded due process by the special committee hearing and 
190 a later appeal to the entire board. 
In Sill v. Pennsylvania State University, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals heard the appellees object to the appointment of a special 
disciplinary panel which heard their disciplinary case instead of the 
established campus judicial board. They claimed this deviation con­
stituted a violation of due process. The court disagreed, stating, 
"...nor is the procedure required to afford due process of law of a 
fixed and invariable character; the requirements of due process fre-
191 quently vary with the type of proceeding involved." 
The appellee in Winnick v. Manning, a 1972 case, claimed several 
violations of due process concerning his suspension from the University 
of Connecticut. He claimed the university failed to follow its own pro­
cedure in allowing the Associate Dean of Students to conduct the hearing 
rather than the Student Conduct Committee, which had disbanded at the 
end of the academic year. The court quickly dismissed this claim, 
writing: 
190 
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Winnick contends that the University's failure to follow its own 
procedural guidelines deprived him of his right to due process. 
However, we are not inclined to hold that every deviation from a 
university's regulations constitutes a deprivation of due process. 
Here the alleged deprivations did not rise to constitutional 
proportions and did not constitute in themselves a denial of due 
process. Furthermore, the alleged deviations were mir^c^ ones and 
did not affect the fundamental fairness of the hearing. 
A student suspended from Northwest Missouri State University for 
disciplinary reasons alleged a violation of due process in the 1975 case, 
193 Edwards v. Board of Regents of Northwest Missouri State University. 
Specifically, the plaintiff charged that a second hearing, conducted by 
the Board of Regents after a formal hearing was held by the Student-
Faculty Discipline Committee, was a deviation of institutional 
regulations, and constituted a due process violation. The first hearing 
resulted in a unanimous vote for all charges to be dropped. The second 
hearing considered charges of the first hearing along with new charges. 
The District Court for the Western District of Missouri decided 
against the student and upheld the suspension. The decision stated, 
"several courts have upheld dismissal or suspension of students where 
the educational institution followed a procedure which, while contrary 
194 
to its regulations, comported with the requirements of due process." 
The court went on to point out the need to change inadequate or ineffec­
tive rules, and the need for administrators and students to follow those 
195 
that stand. 
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A student suspended by the president of the university brought 
action in District Court alleging a denial of due process in Escobar v. 
196 
State University of New York/College at Old Westbury. The student 
was given a disciplinary hearing before a judicial committee which 
recommended several sanctions, but did not suspend the student. The 
president reviewed the proceedings of the hearing and independently 
suspended the student. The student claimed the president's independent 
action was contrary to established procedures and constituted a 
violation of due process. The District Court agreed, stating: 
But where, as here, an offending student has been formally charged 
under the college's disciplinary code, has been subjected to a 
hearing, has been officially sentenced, and has commenced com­
pliance with that sentence, it is a denial of due process of law 
for the chief administrative officer to step in, conduct his own in 
camera review of the student's record, and impose a different 
punishment without complying with any of procedures which have 
been formally established for the college. 
The State University of New York at Old Westbury was involved with 
a 1980 case, Marshall v. Maguire, where a student expelled after a 
disciplinary proceeding charged a violation of due process. 
Specifically, the student charged that failure to comply with the code 
of conduct led the Associate Dean to serve on both the fact finding 
committee and the review council (appeal body), a due process violation. 
The state court agreed with the student, noting that, although "not 
every deviation from the university's regulations necessarily 
198 
constitutes a deprivation of due process," in this case, it did. 
196 
Escobar v. State University of New York/College at Old Westbury, 
427 F. Supp. 850 (E. D. N. Y. 1977). 
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Suspension was vacated and a new hearing was ordered according to code. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered a 
denial of due process claim involving a deviation from disciplinary 
procedures in the 1981 case, Turof v. Kibbee. The student, who was 
suspended for physical assaults, inadvertently did not receive a 
pre-hearing conference as specified in the trustees' bylaws. He was 
given a hearing which the court found to be satisfactory. The student 
claimed the lack of a mandated pre-hearing conference constituted a 
violation of due process. The court noted that any defects resulting 
from the lack of a conference were "cured by the full disciplinary 
t. 4 ,,199 hearing." 
Procedures Used Where Jurisdiction Overlaps 
College and university disciplinary proceedings have often arisen 
over incidents, both on and off the campus, which have also led to 
criminal and civil proceedings. Students have brought action in court 
over issues such as the timing of one proceeding with regard to the 
other, and the question of "double jeopardy" where two different pro­
ceedings adjudicate the same incident. The courts have been relatively 
consistent in determining that educational institutions' disciplinary 
proceedings do not constitute an unconstitutional "double jeopardy" 
action where court action is also comtemplated or occuring simultane­
ously. Likewise, the courts have been hesitant to link disciplinary and 
criminal proceedings to a degree that limits most actions taken by the 
college or university. 
199Turoff v. Kibbee, p. 885. 
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Students at San Mateo College suspended for acts during campus 
demonstrations were later charged with criminal violations. They asked 
the District Court to postpone college expulsion hearings until after 
completion of the criminal trials, in the 1969 case, Furutani v. 
E w i g l e b e n . T h e  s t u d e n t s  c l a i m e d  t h e i r  t e s t i m o n y  i n  t h e  e x p u l s i o n  
proceedings might jeopardize their rights against self-incrimination in 
the criminal trials if such testimony were used in the trials. The 
court decided against the students, stating: "College authorities should 
be free to enforce fair and reasonable disciplinary regulations neces-
201 
sary to the orderly functioning of the educational institution." 
In the 1975 case, Nzuve v. Castleton State College, a student 
charged with criminal burglary, attempted rape, and simple assault 
argued that testimony from a campus disciplinary hearing held prior to 
the criminal trial would "prematurely disclose his defenses" in the 
trial. The court disagreed and separated the two proceedings, writing: 
Educational institutions have both a need and a right to formulate 
their own standards and to enforce them; such enforcement is only 
cointjjij^entally related to criminal charges and the defense against 
them 
The court noted that offering the injunction sought by plaintiff would 
allow him to complete his education and effectively complete an "end 
203 
run" subverting the disciplinary proceeding. 
^^Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N. D. Cal. 1969). 
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 
decided that criminal and disciplinary proceedings arising from the same 
204 
incident were not unrelated. As a result, the court ruled that 
criminal proceedings against the student necessitated his due process 
right to be represented by retained counsel during the disciplinary 
hearing. The court clearly linked the two proceedings in upholding the 
student's request for representation by counsel. 
In the 1983 case, Hart v. Ferris State College, a District Court 
heard the plaintiff claim the college's failure to delay disciplinary 
proceedings until the resolution fo criminal proceedings regarding a 
drug arrest constituted a violation of due process. The court, citing 
Furutani v. Ewigleben, Nzuve v. Castleton State College, and Gabrilowitz 
v. Newman as leading cases on the subject, ruled against the plaintiff 
and denied the request for an injunction against the disciplinary 
J4 205 proceeding. 
The District Court in McLaughlin v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy 
heard a case similar in fact to Gabrilowitz v. Newman. The student, 
charged with both disciplinary and criminal violations, requested the 
right to have counsel advise him at his disciplinary hearing. The 
school refused, conducted the hearing, and dismissed the student. The 
student claimed a denial of due process, and the court agreed, granting 
an injunction against dismissal. The court declared "the necessity that 
expulsion proceedings, at least in those instances in which they arise 
204 
Gabrilowitz v. Newman, p. 102. 
205 
Hart v. Ferris State College, p. 1385. 
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out of the same facts involved in criminal proceedings...comport with 
206 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause." 
Imposition of Interim Suspension 
The imposition of an interim suspension has been at the center of 
some due process court challenges to disciplinary actions at colleges 
and universities. Often the legal challenge focuses on the lack of 
opportunity for the student to present arguments against an interim 
suspension. Courts have been most tolerant of the imposition of interim 
suspension when there is evident need to remove the student from campus, 
and where possible, the student is offered a preliminary hearing prior 
to imposition of the suspension. 
In the 1968 case, Marzette v. McPhee, students at Wisconsin State 
University-Oshkosh suspended for damaging university facilities brought 
207 
suit challenging their interim suspension. The students, upon 
suspension, were given ten days to request a disciplinary hearing. 
Those who did not request a hearing waived that right and were to be 
expelled automatically. The students claimed that due process required 
a hearing prior to the imposition of the suspension. The court agreed, 
with Judge Doyle writing: 
I find that the plaintiffs and the members of their class (that is, 
the suspended students) will be irreperably harmed by any signifi­
cant extension of their present suspension... I find that this 
suspension has been imposed^Qgnd has been continued to the present, 
without due process of law. 
206 
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207 
Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W. D. Wise. 1968). 
208t, c,0 Ibid., p. 569. 
161 
One year later, the same court again grappled with a due process 
claim involving interim suspension imposed by the University of 
209 
Wisconsin in Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin. The 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin heard the denial of 
due process allegations of students suspended by the Board of Regents 
without notice or hearing after being identified as participants in 
violent campus disorders. The students claimed that lack of a hearing 
was unreasonable and violative of their due process rights. The court 
agreed, noting that "unless the element of danger to persons or property 
is present, suspension should not occur without specification of 
210 
charges, notice of hearing, and hearing." The court spoke to the 
importance of procedural due process in interim suspensions, stating: 
The right of a student in a public university to procedural due 
process with respect to interim suspensions is by its very nature 
shortlived. But the significance of the right is not diminished by 
its inherent br^v^ty. It must be vindicated when, as here, the 
case demands it. 
The same District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin heard 
another challenge to an interim suspension in the 1970 case, Buck v. 
212 Carter. The plaintiffs, suspended temporarily for allegedly invading 
a fraternity house and physically assaulting occupants and destroying 
furnishing, alleged a number of due process violations regarding the 
imposition of the interim suspension. The court noted that the school 
offered a preliminary hearing for the plaintiffs, at which they did not 
209 Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 
416 (W. D. Wise. 1969). 
210 
^ uIbid., p. 420. 
211 
Ibid., p. 422. 
212Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W. D. Wis. 1970). 
162 
deny being present during the incident or offer any explanation for 
213 
their presence. Upon these circumstances the court declined to find 
the school in violation of procedural due process. A student suspended 
without hearing for allegedly carrying a firearm on campus, in violation 
of campus regulations, brought suit against the University of Kansas in 
214 
Gardenhire v. Chalmers. The court upheld the university's right to 
impose the immediate suspension, but held that notice and hearing should 
be commenced within five to fifteen days of the initiation of 
215 
suspension. Such a hearing would allow the student opportunity to 
show cause to lift the suspension or not make it permanent. 
In Braxton v. Municipal Court, a 1973 case, individuals brought 
action as a result of their involvement in campus demonstrations at San 
216 
Francisco State College. Specifically, they challenged a state 
statute authorizing the temporary removal of students or non-students 
from campus prior to notice and hearing in order to "...provide a swift 
remedy, by means of exclusion from the campus, of those students who 
commit overt acts of violence or otherwise engage in illegal conduct 
217 which disrupts 'the orderly operation of such camus."' The court 
upheld the statute, but pointed out that issuance of an exclusion order 
without a hearing necessitated a post-exclusion hearing no later than 
213 
Ibid., p. 1250. 
214 
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216 
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218 
seven days following a request by the excluded party. 
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico was instituted by plaintiffs 
challenging numerous procedural actions of the University during disci­
plinary action taken against them. The students, who were summarily 
suspended, challenged this action. The court, while noting the permissi­
bility of temporary suspension in advance of a full hearing, found no 
219 
factors justifying the imposition of summary suspension in this case. 
The court spelled out essentials of the preliminary hearing, including 
the provision of charges, specific regulations underlying the charges, 
the issue for decision (the summary suspension), and the right to a 
prompt, full hearing. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez gave 
future courts direction in judging the due process nature of interim 
suspensions. This 1975 case, involving public high school students 
suspended temporarily without hearing due to charges of misconduct, was 
cited often by courts deciding similar issues involving colleges and 
universities. 
The court determined that plaintiffs were denied due process 
resulting from a lack of a hearing prior to or shortly after the 
imposition of the suspension. The decision stated requirements of due 
process in connection with suspensions of 10 days or less, including 
oral or written notice of charges, an explanation of evidence and an 
218Ibid. 
219 
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, p. 624. 
220^., 
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221 
opportunity for the student to present his or her side. The court 
also addressed the timliness of the hearing, writing: 
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the 
time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the discipli­
narian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the 
student minutes after it has occurred...Since the hearing may occur 
almost immediately following the misconduct, it follows that as a 
general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the 
student from the school...Students whose presence poses a continu­
ing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of 
disruption of the academic process may be immediately removed from 
school. In such cases, the necessary i^^ice and rudimentary hearing 
should follow as soon as practival... 
In Wallace v. Florida A & M University, a pharmacy student 
summarily expelled after adjudication of guilt for possession of 
223 
cocaine, challenged his summary expulsion. The student, dismissed in 
accordance with a state administrative rule allowing for summary dis­
missal based on certain types of convictions, challenged the action 
because it was initiated prior to the date that a court order set aside 
for the adjudication of guilt. The student claimed that expulsion prior 
to this date was unjustified. The court disagreed, pointing out that he 
was summarily suspended prior to the time that his conviction was set 
aside. This occurence made the administration rule applicable. Beyond 
that, the court found Florida A & M "warranted in taking this summary 
224 
action and removing Wallace from the premises of the institution." 
Since the administrative rule provided for suspension, not expulsion, 
the university's action was so modified. 
221 
Goss v. Lopez, p. 740. 
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Appeals Procedures 
Due process claims involving institutional appeals procedures have 
been raised by students in a number of cases. Some cases already 
examined regarding a failure to follow specified procedures involved 
student appeals of disciplinary proceedings. A few cases have examined 
the adequacy of the appeal process. 
The 1973 case, Becker v. Oswald, was brought in District Court by a 
student dismissed from Pennsylvania State University due to a drug 
225 
arrest. The student was given a hearing, but he chose not to appeal 
the hearing decision through disciplinary procedures. Instead, he filed 
suit in federal court claiming a denial of due process. The court 
dismissed the action, finding a lack of proof that the university's 
226 
appeal procedures were inadequate. 
In Blanton v. State University of New York, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard allegations of denial of due process from 
students suspended for disciplinary reasons. The students, given a 
disciplinary hearing, failed to take the opportunity to appeal the 
hearing decision to the university president. The university raised the 
argument that appellees should be barred from raising due process claims 
because of failure to exhause administrative procedures. The court, 
while unwilling to prohibit such action, noted, "At minimum, such 
failure to appeal can be taken as one of the factors to be weighed in 
Becker v. Oswald, 360 F. Supp. 1131 (M. D. Pa. 1973). 
"°Ibid., p. 1134. 
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determining whether these plaintiffs were deprived of any of their 
227 
constitutional rights." 
The State University of New York at Old Westbury's disciplinary 
appeals process was contested in the 1980 case, Marshall v. Maguire. The 
student, expelled after a disciplinary hearing for an alleged rape, 
unsuccessfully appealed the decision. He brought action in state court 
challenging the dual membership of an administrator on both the hearing 
and appeals bodies, a violation of campus rules. The university claimed 
that because the student didn't raise the issue during his final appeal 
to the university president he waived the right to challenge the issue 
in court. The court found for the student on both points and ordered a 
. . 228 
new hearing. 
The 1986 case, Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, was decided in 
favor of the plaintiff on a number of grounds. One issue raised was the 
adequacy of the appeals process. The court declared the process flawed, 
noting the lack of a record of the hearing denied plaintiff adequate 
229 
protection before the Appeals Board. The only record of the 
disciplinary proceedings presented to the Appeals Board consisted of 
notes prepared by an administrator who appeared before the Board as an 
advocate for the hearing decisions. The court found this partisan role 
230 
to be at odds with the right to an impartial hearing. 
227 
Blanton v. State University of New York, p. 384. 
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Cases Involving Academic Misconduct 
State and federal courts have decided numerous cases brought by 
college and university students challenging suspension and dismissal 
from their institutions because of academic reasons. A significant 
number of cases were brought to court challenging suspensions or dis­
missals based on unsatisfactory academic performance. The Supreme Court 
issued a landmark decision regarding such suspension and dismissal 
actions in the 1978 case, Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. 
231 
Horowitz. 
Other cases involving suspensions and expulsions based on charges 
of academic misconduct such as cheating and plagiarism have been liti­
gated in the same courts. These courts have often differentiated between 
suspensions and dismissals based on deficient academic performance and 
alleged academic misconduct. Courts have sometimes been asked to define 
indicators which constitute academic performance as opposed to non­
performance factors in academic suspension and dismissal proceedings. 
A review of pertinent court cases reveals judicial deference to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Board of Curators of University of Missouri 
v. Horowitz regarding academic deficiency dismissals rendered. The case 
review also shows judicial delineation between issues of academic 
performance and academic misconduct. Much of the case law has drawn 
similarities between dismissals and suspensions based on disciplinary 
violations and charges of academic misconduct. Accordingly, courts have 
suggested proceedings involving suspension or expulsion based on 
231 Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U. 
S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978). 
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academic misconduct should draw upon some due process procedures 
mandated in disciplinary actions. 
A 1966 case, Woody v. Burns, was brought by a student challenging 
his denial of reenrollment in the College of Architecture and Fine Arts 
232 
at the University of Florida. The student, whose application for late 
registration was denied by both a faculty committee and the university 
without notice or hearing, challenged the action. The court, finding 
this action tantamount to expulsion, considered it a decision based 
solely on misconduct, and thus subject to due process considerations 
comparable to those set forth in Due v. Florida Agricultural and 
233 
Mechanical University. The court found for the student. 
In Brookins v. Bonnell, a nursing student challenged his mandatory 
withdrawal from the nursing program at a Pennsylvania community 
234 college. The student claimed a due process right to a hearing to 
answer charges that he did not submit a medical exam or transcript of 
previous work, and that he did not attend classes regularly. The insti­
tution claimed the withdrawal was based on academic requirements which 
did not necessitate a due process hearing. The court disagreed with the 
school, observing that "final determination of the disputed, or at least 
235 
unclear facts, cries out for a fair and impartial hearing." 
232 
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In the 1974 case, McDonald v. Board of Trustees of University of 
Illinois, the District Court heard action brought by students expelled 
from the University of Illinois College of Medicine on charges of 
236 
cheating. The students were given notice and hearing before the 
College of Medicine Committee on Student Discipline, where they were 
represented by counsel. They challenged the finding claiming denial of 
due process because the finding was not based on substantial evidence. 
The court disagreed, and noted that presence of an adequate due process 
237 proceeding led to findings that were supported by the evidence. 
In Garshman v. The Pennsylvania State University, a District Court 
heard the suit of a first year medical student facing possible dismissal 
238 based on alleged academic dishonesty. The university procedures 
included a hearing at which the plaintiff could be assisted by an 
advisor from the university faculty, staff, or student body. The advisor 
was allowed to assist in the hearing proceedings and preparation of 
appeals. 
The student challenged the university judicial process claiming a 
denial of due process right to be represented by legal counsel. The 
court dismissed the student's claim and found the university's 
procedures satisfactory, writing: 
In the face of the extensive procedural safeguards afforded to 
Garshman by the University with respect to the charges against him, 
O 
McDonald v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 375 F. 
Supp. 95 (N. D. III. 1974). 
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the Court cannot accept the proposition that the one factor -
exclusion of counsel at the hearing - renders the University's 
procedure susceptible 2^ unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious 
termination decisions. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case involving 
university action based on alleged plagiarism in the 1976 case, Hill v. 
240 
Trustees of Indiana University. A graduate student receiving failing 
grades from a professor based on alleged plagiarism challenged the 
action. The institutional action was postponed pending a Code of Conduct 
proceeding. Subsequently, the student decided not to reenroll before the 
proceeding was initiated. He filed suit claiming the receipt of failing 
grades absent a prior hearing violated procedural due process. The court 
disagreed, observing that efforts on the university's part to stay any 
consequences of the charges pending a proceeding set forth in the Code 
241 of Conduct constituted adequate due process protection. 
A medical student dismissed from the University of MissouriKansas 
City Medical School for academic deficiencies brought suit challenging 
the dismissal in Horowitz v. Board of Curators of University of 
242 Missouri. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District 
Court's upholding of the dismissal, finding the dismissal "effected 
242 
without the hearing required by the fourteenth amendment." 
239 ZJ*Ibid., p. 921. 
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The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Curators of University 
of Missouri v. Horowitz, granted certiorari to consider "what procedures 
must be accorded to a student at a state educational institution whose 
dismissal may constitute a deprivation of 'liberty' or 'property' within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court sidestepped the 
claim raised by Horowitz that dismissal deprived her of a "liberty" 
interest in continued enrollment protected by Fourteenth Amendment due 
244 
process. Rather, the Court responded that, assuming a liberty or 
property interest, Horowitz was offered "at least as much due process as 
245 the Fourteenth Amendment requires." The Court cited several cases 
which held that academic dismissals did not require formal hearings to 
be conducted. 
The Court also differentiated between disciplinary proceedings and 
the procedures suited for academic evaluations, writing: 
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary 
determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and 
administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have 
traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement... Such a 
judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the 
typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary 
decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the 
proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether 
to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert 
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to 
the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking. 
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic 
judgment of educators and there£>^ formalize the academic dismissal 
process by requiring a hearing. 
244 Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, p. 952, 
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The Court also differentiated between disciplinary proceedings and 
the procedures suited for academic evaluations, writing: 
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary 
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traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement... Such a 
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What the court did not undertake was a definition of the specified 
dismissal issues which are better suited to be adjudicated in discipli­
nary procedural processes. 
A former veterinary student challenged her dismissal from the Ohio 
State University College of Veterinary Medicine on grounds of alleged 
honor code violations in the 1980 case, Bleicker v. Board of Trustees of 
248 
Ohio State University, Etc.. The student, accused of deliberately 
altering an examination, was dismissed after two hearings. The student 
challenged the action claiming a denial of due process because she did 
not receive written notice of the hearing dates, was not told that she 
could request written records of either hearing and the findings, and 
was not told she could inspect physical evidence prior to the hearings. 
The court, while advising the school to "adopt the additional 
procedures as a matter of routine," decided these procedures "would have 
contributed little toward reducing the risk of error in plaintiff's 
249 case." The court noted the plaintiff's opportunity to twice confront 
and question accusers, examine the physical evidence, and offer her 
250 
version of the incident. The court found this process to offer 
acceptable procedural protections. 
In the 1983 case, Lightsey v. King, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York heard the case of a student challenging a 
cheating charge which resulted in a course failure and ineligibility for 
248 
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a Coast Guard licensing exam. The student, who was found to be not 
guilty after an honor board hearing, was refused a change in the failing 
grade by both his instructor and the Merchant Marine Academy administra­
tion. The student alleged a due process violation resulting from the 
institution's refusal to change the failing grade. 
The court found the Academy's failure to honor its own judicial 
procedures to be a violation of the plaintiff's due process rights. The 
court noted, "The procedural requirements of due process presuppose that 
the results of those required procedures will be respected... There is 
no difference between failing to provide a due process hearing and 
252 providing one but ignoring the outcome." The court also criticized 
the Academy for claiming the issue was one of discretionary grading 
253 
rather than one of student discipline. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed alleged due process 
violations pertaining to sanctions imposed resulting from a cheating 
charge in Jones v. Board of Governors of University of North 
Carolina. The student was not given formal notice of the discipli­
nary hearing until the hearing date, and the notice contained no 
information concerning the specifics of the charge, the nature of 
adverse evidence, and the identity of her accusers. In addition, the 
Dean of the Nursing School appeared at the hearing and took an active 
prosecutorial role. No record of the hearing was made. 
951 
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The Student Court found her guilty and imposed a failing grade and 
disciplinary probation. The student appealed to the Chancellor for a 
new hearing before the Chancellor's Hearing Panel, which exonerated her. 
Subsequently, the College of Nursing urged the Chancellor to find the 
student guilty. After reviewing the matter at the request of the 
Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs found her guilty 
and restored the sanctions. 
The student brought action stating a due process claim based on the 
university's arbitrary disregard for the Hearing Panel's findings. The 
student's claim was also based on the school's violation of rules which 
allowed only the accused to appeal a decision. The Circuit Court upheld 
the District Court's finding for the student. The court observed that 
"to the extent a state's procedures directly embody fundamental 
guarantees grounded in the due process clause, a significant departure 
from those procedures would as well violate the underlying constitu-
255 
tionally based guarantees." The court ordered the student reinstated 
until a formal hearing was held to hear the merits of the case. 
Another academic dishonesty case brought into Circuit Court, Hall 
v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, required the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals to determine the due process right to counsel in a 
256 
hearing.^ The student was given notice and hearing, in which he was 
allowed to present witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and 
present testimony. He was offered a transcript of the hearing, given a 
255 
Ibid., p. 717. 
256Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F. 2d 299 (Sixth 
Cir. 1984). 
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copy of the hearing report, and allowed to appeal the decision. He was 
found guilty and dismissed. He brought suit alleging a due process 
violation occurred when the school denied the right to have his attorney 
present at the hearing. The court disagreed, writing: 
However, just because his expulsion from a state medical school on 
grounds of academic dishonesty may implicate a liberty interest 
protected by constitutional due process guarantees, this does not 
mean that Hall was necessarily entitled to all the incidents of a 
full-blown judicial trial. We can find no case authority to 
"clearly es£a^>lish" that he had the right to counsel in such a 
hearing..." 
Another 1984 case, Jaska v. Regents of University of Michigan, was 
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brought by a student suspended for alleged cheating. The student was 
given a hearing after which he was found guilty. He admitted to 
cheating in correspondence to an appeal board, which reduced his 
penalty. He then brought action claiming denial of due process based on 
several points such as the right to a transcript of the hearing, the 
right to confront an anonymous accuser, and the right to be accompanied 
by a representative at the hearing. The court dismissed his claim, 
noting that "a school disciplinary hearing is not a criminal trial and 
that a student accused of cheating is not entitled to all of the proce-
259 
dural safeguards afforded criminal defendants." 
In the 1984 case, University of Houston v. Sabeti, the Court of 
Appeals of Texas heard a student bring action challenging an expulsion 
257Ibid., p. 1250. 
258 
Jaska v. Regents of University of Michigan, 597 F. Supp. 1245 
(E. D. Mich. 1984). 
259 
Ibid., p. 1250. 
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for alleged plagiarism. The student challenged the denial of his 
counsel's right to address the hearing proceedings. The university was 
not represented by counsel. The lower court found for the student and 
the university appealed. 
The appeals court reversed the decision, finding the student had no 
constitutional right to representation by counsel at the hearing. The 
261 
court, citing Wasson v. Trowbridge, did not find factors present in 
the case which supported the right to representation by counsel: the 
case was non-criminal in nature; the university was not represented by 
counsel; the student had the maturity and ability to develop a defense; 
262 
and other aspects of the hearing were fair. 
In the case, Patterson v. Hunt, three dental students at the 
University of Tennessee Center for Health Sciences who were suspended 
263 
for alleged cheating brought suit charging violations of due process. 
Specifically, they alleged they were improperly denied the right to 
present witnesses because they were separated during the proceedings. 
They also claimed the school failed to notify them of their right to 
counsel. These and other claims were rejected by the court, which 
wrote: 
The plaintiffs complain of the secret proceedings of the honor 
council, the inability to confront witnesses, the lack of the 
administrative board hearing, and in sum, the miscarriage of 
justice in denial by UT to grant them a trial. We have carefully 
^^University of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S. W. 2d 685 (Tex. 1984). 
261 
Wasson v. Trowbridge, p. 812. 
262 
University of Houston v. Sabeti, p. 689. 
^"^Patterson v. Hunt, 682 S. W. 2d 508 (Tenn. 1984). 
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reviewed the record and find that plaintiffs have not attempted in 
any way to refute thec^ar facts of the situation, i.e., they 
violated the Honor Code. 
Two students suspended from the Auburn University College of 
Veterinary Medicine due to alleged academic dishonesty challenged 
several of the university's due process procedures in Nash v. Auburn 
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University. Specifically, they argued that notice was given only 
thirty hours before the hearing, allowing inadequate time to prepare. 
The court, noting the plaintiff's agreement with the schedule at an 
266 earlier conference, quickly dismissed the argument. The court denied 
the students' claim to right to pre-hearing notice of the evidence as 
267 well as the right to cross-examine. The court also dismissed claims 
of denial of a meaningful appeal, noting the right to an appeal was a 
268 
"non-existent right." The court denied the claim of right to 
269 representation by legal counsel at the hearing as well. 
Mandatory (Psychiatric) Withdrawal of 
Students with Mental Disorders 
One of the recent significant developments in the study of due 
process procedures applicable to suspension/dismissal proceedings is 
that of mandatory withdrawal of students diagnosed as having mental 
disorders who have committed disruptive actions. The literature focusing 
264Ibid., p. 516. 
Nash v. Auburn University, 621 F. Supp. 948 (M. D. Ala. 1985). 
266Ibid., p. 954. 
267Ibid., p. 955. 
268Ibid., p. 957. 
269 D̂VIbid., p. 958. 
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on this issue, while primarily written in the 1980's, is more extensive 
than applicable court decisions. This area of educational law is 
limited, but in a state of development which should be manifested in 
increased litigation. 
The basis for judicial review of psychiatric withdrawal cases are 
varied. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, state laws, and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections have been cited as applicable to specific psychia­
tric withdrawal situations. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 has been applied to at least one related case in finding that a 
candidate rejected for admission to a psychiatric residency program had 
been discriminated against because of his multiple sclerosis and pre-
270 sumed "emotionally instability" resulting from the handicap. In this 
case, Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found university interview process which denied 
Pushkin admission to the program did so based upon "a mistaken, restric-
271 
tive belief as to the limitations of handicapped persons." Pavela has 
noted that this case supports the need for institutions to carefully 
review the behavior of a student suffering from a mental disorder before 
272 
initiating a mandatory psychiatric withdrawal. 
The 1980 case, Evans v. West Virginia Board of Regents, resulted 
from a medical student's suit challenging a failure to be reinstated as 
270 
Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372 
(Tenth Cir. 1981). 
271Ibid., p. 1385. 
272 
Gary Pavela, The Dismissal of Students With Mental Disorders; 
Legal Issues, Policy Considerations and Alternative Responses 
(Asheville, N.C.: College Administration Publications, 1985), p. 9. 
180 
273 a student at the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine. The 
student, who had taken an approved medical leave based on a physical 
condition and resulting mental anguish, was denied reinstatement without 
a hearing. The court, finding a Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process, ordered the school to reinstate the student immediately, with 
any subsequent termination action to afford due process including: 
notice of reasons for program termination; time -to prepare a defense 
against the charges, the opportunity to have retained counsel at a 
hearing; the right to confront accusers and present evidence on his own 
behalf; an unbiased hearing panel; and an adequate record of the 
274 
proceedings. Underscoring this case was the school's perception that 
the student's physical and mental condition impaired his academic 
ability, even though he was otherwise qualified as a student in good 
standing. The court noted that nothing in the record of the student 
indicated "unfitness or inability to complete the remainder of his 
education. 
The 1982 case, Patton v. State Board of Higher Education, was 
brought to court by a medical student challenging his placement on 
276 mandatory medical leave by the University of Oregon. This leave was 
instituted after reports of disruptive behavior were reported to the 
273 
Evans v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 271 S. E. 2d 778 (W. V. 
1980). 
274 
Ibid., p. 781. 
275 
Ibid., p. 780. 
27 6 
Patton v. State Board of Higher Education, 651 P. 2d 169 (Ore. 
1982). 
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university. The student challenged the mandatory leave claiming the 
right to a contested hearing, which had been denied repeatedly by the 
university. The court found for the student under Oregon Administrative 
Regulations, which require a contested hearing to be held. The court 
examined those procedures offered the student, and concluded that 
"although the procedure followed afforded petitioner some protections of 
a contested case hearing, significant statuatory requirements were not 
met" including failure of the notice to state charges and cite specific 
277 
rules involved. The court remanded the case to the university for 
comtemplation of a contested case hearing. 
Conclusions 
The review of pertinent federal and state cases reveals numerous 
issues litigated regarding the proceedings by which tax-supported 
colleges and universities suspend or expel students for disciplinary 
reasons. Underlying these procedural decisions are other judicial 
decisions which have defined the disciplinary relationship between the 
student and institution. The great majority of the reviewed cases reveal 
consistency regarding many procedural due process issues, although 
numerous expansions of basic due process rights have resulted in a 
variety of judicial opinions about such expansions. 
Federal courts since the 1961 Dixon decisions have consistently 
applied the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in disciplinary 
suspension and expulsion proceedings at tax-supported institutions. 
These decisions have created a recognized student-institution discipline 
277 
* Ibid., p. 171. 
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relationship that rests on constitutional rights. Other legal theories 
of the disciplinary relationship, except contract theory, have been 
given minimal or no judicial attention. 
Contract theory has been widely applied by federal and state courts 
as the governing doctrine for the disciplinary relationship between the 
student and the private college or university. Courts have been 
reluctant to apply constitutional due process guidelines in private 
school disciplinary actions because of a lack of finding of necessary 
"state action" in such proceedings. Contract theory has been applied to 
other aspects of the student-institution relationship at tax-supported 
institutions. 
The Dixon court and most of its successors found notice and hearing 
to be an integral component of minimal due process in discipline 
actions. Written notice is a standard due process procedure defined by 
the courts, as is the right to a hearing before an impartial hearing 
body. The right of the accused student to present witnesses, testimony, 
and evidence at the hearing has been well established. The right of the 
student to be present and to receive or make some record of the 
proceeding is also a due process right with firm judicial standing. The 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, while not upheld in several 
cases, also has substantial backing in a number of other cases, 
particularly where issues of credibility are raised. 
The right to be assisted by counsel of choice has been established 
by courts in most cases. Less clear is an absolute right to 
representation by counsel in the disciplinary hearing. As one standard 
for this right, courts have occasionally linked the right to 
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representation where the student faces concurrent or pending criminal 
action. Where schools have chosen to be represented by counsel, courts 
have balanced that action with the student's right to similar 
representation. 
Courts have fluctuated in their decisions concerning dual 
involvement by institutional authorities in both the enforcement and 
adjudication of the disciplinary case. Likewise, there is judicial 
uncertainty over the appropriateness of due involvement with both the 
initial hearing and any subsequent appeals. In general, courts have 
ruled against schools where such overlapping involvement by school 
officials results in bias to the proceeding. 
An institution's failure to follow its own established disciplinary 
procedures is one due process claim that courts have often upheld in 
favor of the student. Courts most often find for the school in cases 
where the deviation was minimal, or where an appeals process rectified 
the error. Otherwise, the courts have found significant departures from 
normal disciplinary procedures to be a due process violation. 
Courts have consistently held that college and university 
disciplinary actions are independent of concurrent or pending civil or 
criminal action for the same incident. Courts do not require institu­
tions to await the outcome of judicial proceedings before taking 
disciplinary action. Because disciplinary actions are not criminal in 
nature, but rather educational processes, the concurrent execution of 
both disciplinary and legal charges does not impose unconstitutional 
double jeopardy. Courts have extended, in some cases, the right to 
counsel in disciplinary proceedings where the student also faces serious 
charges for the same incident. 
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Courts have consistently given educational authorities judicial 
permission to impose interim suspensions based on the nature of the 
incident and its affect on the health and safety of individuals 
(including the accused), institutional property, and the orderly 
educational process. With equal consistency the courts have required 
schools to offer suspended students the right to a preliminary hearing 
to challenge the imposition of interim suspension. The courts have 
repeatedly admonished school officials to offer both preliminary and 
later formal hearings within a reasonable period of time. These 
decisions follow the mandate of several cases, including Goss v. Lopez, 
a leading Supreme Court statement on student discipline and interim 
suspension. 
Courts adjudicating disciplinary proceedings have generally upheld 
a student's right to an impartial appeals process, if such a process is 
prescribed. The issue of a constitutional right to an internal appeal 
has not been conclusively decided. Where an appeal process is offered, 
courts have been reluctant to step in and enjoin the institution from 
imposing its disciplinary sanctions where the accused student has not 
availed himself or herself of the institutional appellate review 
process. Courts have reviewed the composition of appeals bodies to 
determine if overlapping involvement by members in other phases of the 
proceedings have rendered them biased or partial to the guilt of the 
accused. A finding of bias generally has resulted in a finding for the 
student. 
Issues involving academic suspensions and dismissals have been the 
subject of numerous court decisions, particularly in more recent years. 
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The distinction between academic and disciplinary dismissals and contin­
gent procedures has been observed by most courts since the 1978 Horowitz 
decision of the Supreme Court. Courts which have found challenged 
dismissal decisions resulting from academic misconduct, specifically 
academic dishonesty, have consistently applied due process procedures in 
reviewing these cases. Cases involving academic dishonesty have been 
considered to be amenable to factual determinations consistent with 
disciplinary proceedings. 
The limited case law involving mandatory withdrawals of students 
with mental disorders suggests that certain procedures are applicable to 
such proceedings, consistent with federal law, state statutes, and 
constitutional due process protections. Minimal due process procedures 
addressed include notice, hearing, and some right to advisory 
assistance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES AND POLICIES AT MAJOR 
TAX-SUPPORTED COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Overview 
Colleges and universities derive their authority from acts of 
legislation, institutional charters, bylaws, and other sources. The 
authority to regulate student conduct and administer discipline is 
generally a function delegated to administrators and disciplinary 
agencies by individual institutional boards of trustees. The result of 
individual institutional governance and delegation of this authority are 
disciplinary policies and procedures which have common foundations in 
legal and educational thought, but which vary according to the philoso­
phy, experiences, and perceived needs of the school 
This stage of the study is designed to report and analyze specific 
disciplinary procedures and policies at each of the eleven 
four-year, tax-supported colleges and universities in South Carolina. 
In addition, institutional practices regarding related issues of the 
adjudication of academic misconduct and mandatory withdrawal of students 
with mental disorders are also reported and reviewed. 
Methodology 
Information concerning disciplinary procedures and policies for 
each institution was collected through distribution and collection of a 
survey instrument. The survey and a cover letter were sent to each 
institution's chief student affairs officer. That person was asked to 
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direct the survey to the appropriate primary administrator of campus 
discipline. Five of the surveys were completed by chief student affairs 
administrators and six were completed by other members of the student 
affairs staffs. Self-addressed, stamped envelopes were included to 
facilitate return of completed surveys. The survey form also requested 
additional support materials (i.e. student handbooks, disciplinary 
documents) to be returned with the completed surveys. 
The survey instrument contains thirty items, twenty-three with 
multiple responses and seven requiring a YES or NO response. The 
respondents were asked to indicate all applicable responses to each 
multiple response item. Respondents were directed to write a N/A (Not 
Applicable) beside those items not applicable to their institutions' 
policies or procedures. Respondents were also directed to place ques­
tion marks beside items with unclear meanings. Those unclear responses 
were clarified in follow-up telephone conversations with the respondent. 
Survey items are grouped under seven topical heading suggested by 
the review of literature and analysis of pertinent court cases. These 
headings are listed in order of progression within the survey: 
1. Prehearing Communications, Investigation, and Conference 
2. Elements and Procedures of the Formal Disciplinary Hearing 
3. Appeal Procedures 
4. Interim Suspension 
5. Overlapping Jurisdiction 
6. Academic Misconduct 
7. Mandatory (Psychiatric) Withdrawal of Student With Mental 
Disorders 
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The remaining portion of this chapter reports the survey data 
collected from each institution. The data is depicted in Tables 1-7, 
arranged by topical heading, and described in accompanying narrative. 
Following the narrative is an analysis of the survey findings with 
regard to conclusions about due process reached in earlier chapters 
reviewing authoritative literature and applicable court decisions. The 
survey and cover letter are included in the Appendix section of this 
study. 
Prehearing Communications, Investigation 
and Conference 
Findings 
Six separate items pertaining to initial disciplinary activities 
following report of disciplinary misconduct are included in the instru­
ment. Items 1-6 include: giving of notice; prehearing communications; 
and prehearing investigations and conference. Table 1 indicates 
responses given for these items. 
Item 1 indicates each institution provides students with judicial 
polices and procedures regarding institutional discipline. Eight of 
eleven respondents provided copies of supporting documents with com­
pleted surveys. Some of these documents were clearly oriented toward 
student readers while a couple were internal administrative statements 
of policy and procedures. 
Item 2 indicates each school provides the accused student with 
written notice of charges where suspension or expulsion may be imposed. 
The corresponding item (3) indicates the presence of various elements 
contained within the written notice. Six respondent schools provide 
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TABLE 1 
PREHEARING COMMUNICATIONS, INVESTIGATION AND CONFERENCE 
Institution provides printed 
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a. Sent by unregistered mail a a 3 
b. Sent by registered or b b b b b b 
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c. Hand-delivered to resi- c C 
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d. Hand-delivered to another d d d d 
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e. Other: £* 
•k 
Comments, where appropriate, are described in narrative. 
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5. Information conveyed orally as 
well as in writing 
Yes = Y No =» N N 
6. Frequency of occurrence of 
following elements in pre­
hearing conference 
A • Always G » Generally 
N =» Seldom or Never 
a. Student allowed to plead A A A A A A G A A A A  
innocent or guilty 
b. Student pleading guilty A A A  A A A A A G A A  
given applicable 
sanctions 
c. Accused student offered A A A A A A N A A A A  
opportunity to request 
formal hearing 
d. Student allowed to review A A A G G A A A A A A  
all pertinent documents 
e. Student given explanation A A A A A A A A A A A  
of hearing rights/proce­
dures 
f. Student given explanation N A A A A A A G A G G  
of possible sanctions 
g. Student allowed to offer A A A A A A A A A G A  
testimony regarding 
incident 
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specific facts and evidence related to charges against the student. All 
eleven provide a specific citation to the regulation(s) allegedly 
violated. Although all eleven schools offer a form of a prehearing 
conference (Item 6), only eight include information about the conference 
in the notice. Since all but one of the schools communicates orally 
with the student (Item 5) in addition to the written notice, it is 
likely that prehearing conference information is communicated orally. 
All schools offer the accused a formal disciplinary hearing, but only 
seven schools provide information about the hearing time and place in 
the formal notice, while six schools describe the hearing format and 
procedures. Two institutions, Clemson University and Winthrop College, 
include copies of related documents such as incident reports, witness 
statements, and arrest reports in the written notice. 
The methods used for transmitting the written notice are indi­
cated in Item 4 of the table. Six schools use more than one method of 
providing written notice. The most popular method for delivering 
notice, used by seven respondents, is through registered or certified 
mail. Four schools send written notice through unregistered mail, with 
Clemson and Winthrop using this means exclusively. Two schools hand-
deliver notice to the student's address of residence, while three other 
schools deliver notice to a location other than residence. Notice is 
sometimes provided to the student during the prehearing conference at 
USC-Columbia, where oral communications precede official written notice. 
Prehearing conference activities are reported in Item 6. Respon­
dents provided information concerning the frequency of occurrence of the 
following conference activities: a) student allowed to plead to charges; 
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b) student given sanctions after admitting guilt; c) student allowed to 
request hearing; d) student allowed to review pertinent documents; e) 
student given explanation of hearing rights/procedures; f) student given 
explanation of possible sanctions; and g) student allowed to offer 
personal account of incident. All eleven respondents indicated that 
most of these activities always occur during the conference, with a few 
exceptions in which the activities generally occur. Three schools 
generally give the accused student an explanation of applicable sanc­
tions but The Citadel reports it seldom or never provides this explana­
tion. This was the only conference activity any respondent reported as 
seldom or never being included in the prehearing conference. 
Analysis 
All eleven schools provide students with descriptive documents 
concerning disciplinary policies and procedures as required by consensus 
judicial and authoritative opinion. Likewise, each school provides 
written notice which meets minimal due process standards recognized by 
courts and educators. Educational opinion suggests that written notice 
should include a statement of facts related to the alleged violation of 
of regulations and logistical information about a formal hearing. Five 
schools omit the statement of facts and four schools do not provide 
hearing information. It is likely that courts would uphold the adequacy 
of those schools' notices provided the omitted information was either 
communicated in oral notice or during the prehearing conference. 
Clemson and Winthrop exceed accepted judicial definitions for written 
notice by including copies of related documents with the notice. Some 
influential commentators have found inclusion of such documents to be an 
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appropriate, reasonable component of written notice, even if not legally 
required. The majority of schools provide two methods of delivery of 
notice, a practice compatible with judicial and scholarly opinion. 
Clemson and Winthrop, with their reliance only upon unregistered mail, 
take a small risk that notice will not be assured of reaching the 
student or being returned to the sender. This is probably not an 
adequate process given the potential consequences of such failure, and 
the minimal cost of other, more reliable alternatives. 
Most court decisions and scholarly writings have declined to 
define the parameters and components of the prehearing conference or 
meeting. Despite that, the practice is common in the exercise of 
discipline, not only at these schools but also at many others. The 
literature does suggest that students have a right to review pertinent 
documents related to the incident, and each of the eleven schools 
provides this opportunity during the prehearing conference. Each school 
also uses the prehearing conference to review applicable hearing rights 
and procedures with the accused student. In this respect, the confer­
ence meets the needs and rights of the accused which have generally been 
extended by courts and informed commentators. 
Elements and Procedures of the Formal 
Disciplinary Hearing 
Findings 
Table 2 charts responses to nine items (7-15) regarding aspects of 
the formal disciplinary hearing prescribed by disciplinary policy. Item 
7 reveals that all eleven institutions offer a formal hearing, while the 
remaining items reveal differences concerning aspects such as the 
designated hearing authority, the frequency with which certain due 
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TABLE 2 
ELEMENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING 
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TABLE 2 
ELEMENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING 
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process procedures are exercised, and some structural and logistical 
matters. 
Five institutions designate a particular individual to serve as 
the institutional hearing officer (Item 8). In each case, a student 
affairs staff member is so designated. Two of the five, USC-Aiken and 
USC-Columbia, also offer a designated hearing board as another hearing 
authority. Five institutions utilize a designated hearing board, while 
four other respondents appoint a different board for each case. 
Item 9 indicates the compositional makeup of hearing boards at 
institutions using that format. Only The Citadel uses a homogenous 
composition of three faculty members. The other eight schools include 
students as well as faculty on their boards. Four of those eight 
include administrators in a tripartite board. The item asks respondents 
to provide specific numbers for each constituency of the board. Seven 
schools gave these figures, with the largest total board size being 
eight members (USC-Aiken) and the smallest the The Citadel's three 
member board. All of the multirepresentative boards had either the same 
number of students or one less student than the number of faculty 
members. USC-Columbia indicated that member composition varies between 
different boards. 
Respondents are asked to indicate the frequency with which 
specified procedures or conditions occur regarding the formal hearing in 
response to Item 10. Four of the response choices relate to hearing 
format while three others concern the accused student's participation in 
the hearing. 
Five of the respondent schools always allow the accused student 
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the right to be tried either together or apart from others tried for the 
same incident. Four institutions seldom or never offer the student that 
choice, while USC-Aiken generally does. USC-Coastal does not find this 
element applicable to their hearing procedures. Seven respondents do 
not allow the student the right to request an open or closed hearing. 
Five schools retain the right to compel the accused student to 
attend the hearing. Two of those five, The Citadel and Clemson, will 
seldom or never proceed with the hearing in the student's absence. Six 
of the eleven seldom or never force the student to appear at the hear­
ing, but all six generally or always proceed with the hearing in the 
student's absence. None of the respondents requires the student to 
testify against himself, but USC-Columbia specifically notes the hearing 
official or board may draw a negative inference from the accused 
student's silence or failure to respond to questions, which may be 
self-incriminating if answered. 
Eight of the respondents keep a written record of the hearing 
proceedings (Item 11), while five of those eight keep an audiotaped 
record also. Two other schools, The Citadel and Winthrop, keep only an 
audiotaped record. The College of Charleston, the only school to 
videotape its proceedings, also keeps written records. Clemson is the 
only school that keeps no hearing records, although it does provide a 
brief hearing synopsis in its written statement of findings. 
Item 12 records responses to the frequency of permitted procedural 
activities during the formal hearing. Five of the responses deal with 
advisor and legal counsel issues while the other three pertain to 
witnesses and evidence. All eleven schools allow the accused student or 
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authorized advisor/counsel the right to present witnesses and evidence 
on behalf of the student. Nine schools allow the student or advisor to 
confront adverse witnesses, while Clemson and USC-Spartanburg seldom or 
never allow the student that right. Eight schools allow the student to 
be advised by legal counsel of choice, and all except Lander College 
allow advisement by a third party who is not a lawyer. However, only 
two of the eight schools (Clemson and USC-Coastal) which permit counsel 
advisement also allow legal counsel to represent the student as a 
hearing participant. 
Item 13 indicates that a majority of schools do not exercise the 
power to compel members of the campus community to attend the hearing 
through "campus subpoena" power. Five schools have such a practice, 
with four of the five allowing both the school and the student to compel 
attendance, while USC-Columbia allows only the university to exercise 
that power. 
Ten respondents allow the hearing officer or board to determine 
acceptability of evidence entered into the hearing (Item 14). Clemson 
reports no definition of acceptable evidence and Francis Marion College 
delegates that responsibility to the primary discipline administrator. 
Ten of the eleven schools provide the student with a written 
decision of the hearing after the conclusion of the hearing (Item 15). 
Two of those schools, Clemson and USC-Aiken, also give an oral decision 
upon conclusion of the hearing. The president of The Citadel gives the 
student oral notification of the hearing results after the hearing 
conclusion, while USC-Columbia often offers other responses in addition 
to written decisions. 
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Analysis 
Judicial decisions have not defined a model upon which to base a 
campus judicial structure, and educators and legal observers have not 
reached agreement on a particular arrangement, although some have 
discussed aspects of structure including the composition of hearing 
boards. The different hearing authorities designated by the eleven 
institutions are all acceptable according to prevailing judicial and 
educational opinion. The eight schools which have faculty and students 
on boards have strong educational support for heterogeneous representa­
tion. The Citadel, with is homogenous faculty board, meets judicial 
standards but is not a model recommended by the majority of authorita­
tive writings. 
Each institution offers a disciplinary hearing which incorporates 
minimal due process procedures as defined by both the courts and the 
scholars with a few procedural exceptions. Other issues which expand 
minimal due process, but without a clear mandate from courts and educa­
tors, are also addressed by institutions in various ways. Seven of the 
respondents do not allow the student to request an open (public) or 
closed (private) hearing format, although some educators support that 
right. None of the institutions require the student to provide poten­
tially self-incriminating testimony, even though courts have generally 
not found self-incrimination to be an issue upon which a student may 
base a denial of due process claim. Some educational opinion has been 
cited as supporting USC-Columbia's practice of permitting negative 
inferences from the silence of the accused, with Pavela arguing that 
such silence is inconsistent with the ethical dialogue crucial to the 
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disciplinary process. 
All institutions except Clemson provide one or more forms of 
record of the hearing, an almost universally recognized due process 
requirement. It would appear that Clemson's synopsis of the hearing as 
contained in the written findings is not adequate to provide the appeal 
authority with needed hearing information. The lack of such a record 
could conceivably require Clemson to hold a de novo hearing on appeal, 
even though prevailing judicial decisions and expert opinion do not 
suggest the necessity for a rehearing at the appeal level. 
The issue of advisor/counsel assistance and representation for 
the accused student is not clearly defined by either court decisions or 
educational thought in all its aspects. Ten schools allow the accused 
to be assisted by a third party advisor during the hearing, a practice 
almost always supported by courts and universally recognized in educa­
tional and legal writing. The right to similar assistance by retained 
counsel, observed by eight schools, also enjoys substantial judicial and 
authoritative support, although not at the level of nonlegal advisory 
assistance. Only Clemson and USC-Coastal have expanded the right of 
counsel to include representation during the hearing. This expansion 
has both support and opposition, but generally is not considered a due 
process requirement except in specific, limited circumstances, such as 
when the institution is represented by counsel Both USC-Columbia and 
USC-Spartanburg reserve the right to institutional counsel 
^Cheryl M. Fields, "When Student Face Serious Criminal Charges, 
Some Colleges Await Court Action, Others Mete Out Quick Discipline," 
The Chronicle of Higher Education 33 (March 18, 1987): 45. 
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representation even though they deny that right to the accused student. 
A number of court decisions and scholarly articles have suggested that 
such a practice places the student at a disadvantage, creating a pro­
ceeding which is not fundamentally fair. 
All eleven schools allow students fundamental procedural rights to 
present supporting witnesses, testimony, and evidence during the hear­
ing. Only Clemson does not allow the right to confront adverse 
witnesses, largely because such witnesses are not participants of the 
hearing; only their statements are used. The right to confront and 
cross-examine is an expansion of due process sometimes upheld by courts, 
and often, but not always supported by educational opinion. The primary 
objection to these procedural rights is that of creating a proceeding 
analogous to a criminal trial. 
A couple of articles have suggested that schools should use a 
"subpoena" to require needed witnesses to appear at disciplinary hear­
ings. No court decisions were found which required compelled atten­
dance. However, four schools have chosen to institute this requirement, 
and it appears that educational sentiment is favorable toward this 
practice. Few articles or court decisions have defined appropriate 
rules of evidence although the consensus of that limited opinion is that 
exclusionary rules do not apply and that a "preponderance of evidence" 
is sufficient to find guilt. Little has been said regarding the author­
ity for determing acceptability of hearing evidence. Nine schools 
authorize the hearing body to make that determination, a practice 
consistent with most views of hearing agency powers. 
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All of the schools provide the student with a written report of the 
hearing finding except The Citadel. The requirement for written 
findings, while not upheld in every case, has substantial judicial 
support and universal authoritative recognition. The three schools 
which give additional oral findings upon conclusion of the hearing 
provide the hearing body with additional opportunities to expound on its 
findings. This is a positive aspect of the educational process at work 
in the disciplinary hearing. 
Appeals Procedures 
Findings 
Table 3 provides information concerning institutional appeals 
procedures. Item 16 indicates that all eleven schools provide the 
student with appellate review following the formal hearing. Nine 
schools have established grounds for appeal, while Clemson and USC-
Coastal grant appeals regardless of the reason for the request. South 
Carolina State College alone also permits the school to appeal the 
hearing decision. None of the schools automatically generates an 
appellate review after suspension sanctions, unlike the automatic 
appeals which are often triggered by certain severe sentences given for 
convictions of criminal law. The designated appellate authority is 
reported in Item 17. The results of the survey reveal some variability 
with four schools delegating that authority to an appeals board. 
Francis Marion designates its chief student affairs officer as its 
appeals official. Seven of the institutions designate their president 
or chancellor as the ultimate appeals authority, while USC-Spartanburg 
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appeal: 
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designates both its chancellor and its academic vice chancellor. Two 
schools, The Citadel and Lander, list their governing boards as final 
appellate bodies. 
Item 18 reports the schools' methods for informing students of 
their right to appeal. The most common method for noting an appeal 
right is through instructions listed in institutional documents (nine 
schools use this). Four schools give those instructions in the original 
notice of charges, while six schools give appeals information with 
hearing findings. Three schools provide three or more sources of 
appeals information. 
The nine schools which specify certain grounds for appellate review 
generally provide several such grounds (Item 19). Only two schools 
(Francis Marion and Lander) have a single requirement upon which to base 
an appeal. Four institutions allow appeals for procedural defects in 
both the handling of the incident and the subsequent hearing. Three 
other schools allow appeals based on defective hearings, but not the 
prehearing processing of the incident. USC-Aiken and USC-Columbia 
allow numerous grounds for appeals including the issue of proper juris­
diction regarding the incident. Four schools consider the insufficiency 
of testimony and evidence supporting the hearing findings as an appeals 
ground. Seven schools allow appeals based on a showing of bias in the 
hearing, resulting in a proceeding which was not fundamentally fair. 
USC-Columbia also includes the discovery of new, relevant evidence as an 
applicable appeals issue. USC-Aiken and USC-Columbia both provide seven 
different grounds for appeal, six of which are common to both schools. 
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The possible results which can arise from appellate review are 
listed in Item 20. All the schools allow the appeals authority to 
uphold or reverse the original decision, a standard appeals function. 
Only six of the schools will order a new hearing as a result of an 
appeal, with four of those six allowing a hearing bias claim to be 
reviewed. All of the schools except Lander allow a sanction to be 
reduced through appeal, with six schools also permitting the appeals 
authority to increase the severity of the sanction. Only Lander refuses 
to consider the severity of the sanction on appeal. 
Analysis 
All eleven schools, with their guarantee of a right to appeal, 
offer their students a procedural right which the courts have not fully 
mandated, but have recognized as curing some procedural defects which 
would otherwise be subject to litigation. Disciplinary commentators are 
unanimous in upholding the student's right to an appeal, and in pro­
claiming the educational and procedural soundness of appellate review. 
The designation of the appellate authority at most institutions 
clearly meets the judicial requirement of impartiality arising from the 
appeals official or board's lack of prior involvement with the proceed­
ing. This separation of functional involvement is inferred through 
responses to the survey and review of supporting documentation. Most 
institutions (8) provide for an appeal to the ultimate appellate 
authority, usually defined in the literature, court decisions, and 
common practice as the president (chancellor) or the board of trustees. 
One school, Francis Marion, has designated the chief student affairs 
officer as the appeals official, a practice not uncommon at other 
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institutions around the country. 
All eleven colleges and universities provide a method for informing 
the student of the right to appeal, with seven schools providing written 
documentation and directions in more than one document. This practice 
is consistent with authoritative opinion, which supports fully informing 
students of their basic rights. Courts reviewing denial of due process 
claims have commented favorably upon the presence of appeals procedures. 
The grounds for appeals reported by the institutions, in some 
cases, exclude factors which have been given judicial and authoritative 
support. Only seven schools consider evidence of a biased hearing as a 
basis for appellate review. A claim of bias has been widely embraced 
by courts and writers alike in reviewing a claim of violation of due 
process. Some decisions have upheld schools' disciplinary proceedings 
where the institution's appellate review cured a defective, or biased 
proceeding. The two schools with no established grounds for appeal 
(Clemson and USC-Coastal) and the three others granting appeals simply 
because the student requests an appeal to a higher authority, have 
extended the appeals right farther than many educators would require. 
Other grounds accepted for appeals, including procedural defects in the 
investigation and adjudication of the incident, are grounds which court 
cases have used to review due process challenges. 
Appeals decisions, as reported by the schools, appear to offer a 
process which considers the appropriateness of the sanction given or 
recommended by the hearing. By not authorizing the appellate authority 
to modify the hearing sanction, Lander College constricts the appeals 
process in a manner inconsistent with opinions offered regarding 
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appeals. Few court decisions or scholarly writings have spoken about 
the right of the appeals authority to increase the hearing sanctions. 
Six schools allow this action, but only S.C. State permits the institu­
tion to appeal the hearing decision. The practice of permitting the 
appeals authority to increase the hearing sanctions, while possibly 
legal, appears to have little authoritative support in the literature 
reviewed for this study. 
Interim Suspension 
Findings 
Responses to three items (21-23) of the survey regarding interim 
suspension are found in Table 4. All of the schools except Clemson 
reserve the right to order an immediate temporary suspension prior to 
holding a formal hearing (Item 21). Item 22 indicates reasons given to 
justify imposition of an interim suspension. The immediate danger which 
the student poses to self or others is an accepted standard for all ten 
schools. Eight of them also allow interim suspension if the presence of 
the student on campus is deemed likely to substantially disrupt the 
educational process. Three schools (Francis Marion, Lander, and 
USC-Aiken) temporarily suspend according to the nature of the particular 
alleged offense. The College of Charleston, Francis Marion, and S.C. 
State can suspend on an interim basis if the accused student is arrested 
for certain violations of law. Francis Marion is the only school using 
all the aforementioned reasons for imposition of interim suspension. 
Only one school, USC-Coastal, relies solely on a single criteria, the 
danger to self and others, to authorize interim suspension. 
212 
TABLE 4 
INTERIM SUSPENSION 
a) 
C 00 
O 0) 
>> 1 1 
•ri 
cn 
t-i 
0) 
> r—f •H 
<u C 
S3 co 
4J c •H a CJ m 
e a) 01 
rC T—f 
tH u 
en oj 
i—t u 
CO 
o 
<+-l 
o 
0) 
60 
0) 
t-l tH 
O 
u 
o 
u 
c 
o 
•H 
CO 
s 
CO 
•rH 
O 
c co 
P* 
<u 
oo 
cu 
o 
0 
M 
01 
T3 
c CO 
hJ 
<U 
00 
<D 
00 u 
u CO 
<u •H 
T—( c CO CO 4J c e u u co 0) 0 CO u JJ 1—i <0 CO •H o 0 Q. <J CJ 1 u CO 
u o 1 a 
1 CJ CJ 
• CO CO CO CO £3 p p p 
OJ 
00 
01 
o 
u 
a 
o 
. u 
C •H 
12 
21. Institution reserves right to 
order immediate suspension 
prior to holding formal 
hearing 
Yes No - N 
22. Reasons which may be used to 
justify imposition of interim 
suspension: 
a. Immediate danger student 
poses to self/others 
b. Nature of offense in 
question 
c. Possibility that con­
tinued presence of 
student will substan­
tially disrupt educa­
tional process 
d. Arrest of student for 
violation of specific law 
e. Other: 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
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23. Conditions which apply when 
imposing interim suspension: 
a. 
b. 
d. 
Student is given notice 
that interim suspension 
is imposed 
Student is offered 
opportunity to appeal 
interim suspension 
Student is offered 
opportunity for formal 
hearing during or after 
the interim suspension 
Other: 
a a a  a a a a a  
b b 
c  c c c c c c c  
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Item 23 provides responses concerning conditions which apply when 
interim suspension is imposed. Only The Citadel does not define certain 
applicable conditions. All others give notice of the suspension, with 
eight schools offering the student subsequent opportunity for a formal 
hearing either during or after the interim period. Two schools, USC-
Columbia and USC-Spartanburg, allow the student to appeal the interim 
suspension. 
Analysis 
The ten schools which reserve the right to impose interim suspen­
sion do so with full support from courts and educators, subject to 
certain conditions. The "immediate danger to self and/or others" 
criteria used by all ten is a standard required by courts and scholars. 
The threat of potential disruption to the educational process, used by 
eight schools, has been upheld by several court decisions as a constitu­
tionally valid basis for interim suspension. 
The four schools which use as a criteria the nature of the offense 
or specific law allegedly violated do so without strong support from 
judicial and educational opinion. If the offense in question does not 
reflect upon the student's suitability to continue as a member of the 
campus community, the general rule is against the use of interim 
suspension. The same rule is applicable where the specific law alleg­
edly violated is not relevant to the student's continued enrollment but 
still becomes grounds for an interim suspension. 
Eight of the ten schools offer the student notice of the interim 
suspension, a procedure required by courts and supported by legal 
experts. The Citadel does not have notice, but indicates that this is 
214 
based oil an absence of experience in exercising interim suspension 
power. South Carolina State does not provide notice of the interim sus­
pension, an apparent violation of due process precedent. The constitu­
tional requirement of a preliminary or appeals hearing to challenge the 
interim suspension is specifically cited only by USC-Columbia and USC-
Spartanburg. Five other schools allow the student to have a formal 
hearing either during or after the interim suspension period. It is not 
clear whether these hearings, if held during the suspension period, 
permit the student to challenge the interim suspension. If not, such 
hearings, whether conducted during or after the interim period, are in 
violation of due process mandates unless an emergency situation prevents 
the holding of a preliminary hearing. 
Francis Marion provides no formal hearing either during or after 
the interim suspension, an apparent violation of due process. It is not 
clear if their response also indicates a further due process violation 
caused by a lack of opportunity for a later due process hearing concern­
ing the incident which precipitated the original disciplinary action. A 
lack of hearing on the original charge would compound the institution's 
denial of due process. 
Overlapping Jurisdiction 
Findings 
Table 5 shows institutional disciplinary policies and practices 
related to concurrent or pending action for violation of civil or 
criminal law. Item 24 indicates that seven schools' disciplinary 
procedures are affected by overlapping charges resulting from the same 
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24. Are institution's disciplinary 
proceedings affected when 
student is concurrently-
charged for violation of law 
for same incident 
Yes = Y No = N Y Y N N N Y Y Y N  
25. Frequency of occurrence of 
activities resulting from 
concurrent violations of 
school and civil/criminal laws 
A = Always G = Generally 
N = Seldom or Never 
a. Institution delays 
proceeding until criminal 
action is done 
b. Institution proceeds with 
disciplinary action, but 
delays giving sanctions 
until criminal action is 
finished 
c. Student can request 
school proceedings prior 
to court proceedings 
d. Student can request 
postponement of school 
action until court action 
finishes 
e. Institution proceeds with 
action regardless of 
circums tances 
A A N 
N 
G N 
N 
N 
G 
G 
N 
26. Does institution offer/give on 
request disciplinary documents 
and reports to civil author­
ities if materials are not 
part of civil/criminal action, 
or are not subpoenaed 
a. Always 
b. Generally 
c. Seldom 
d. Never 
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incident. The Citadel's actions are seldom affected by such overlap, 
but the school's respondent reports an increasing trend toward consider­
ing concurrent or pending charges before proceeding with disciplinary 
action. Three other schools indicate that such charges do not alter 
their disciplinary proceedings. 
Schools responding affirmatively to Item 24 also responded to Item 
25 concerning the frequency of occurrence of certain conditions where 
jurisdiction overlaps. Four institutions generally or always delay 
their proceedings until concurrent judicial action is completed. 
USC-Columbia and Winthrop seldom or never delay proceedings where 
concurrent charges are present. Clemson and Winthrop generally proceed 
with disciplinary action, but delay giving sanctions until criminal 
actions are finished. Both Clemson and Winthrop extend to the student 
the right to request that disciplinary action proceed either before or 
after concurrent criminal action. 
Five schools never provide, either by request or at their own 
discration, institutional disciplinary documents to law enforcement or 
judicial officials where such documents are not already part of the 
civil or criminal process or have not been subpoenaed (Item 26). Three 
schools seldom provide these materials but reserve the right to do so on 
occasion. 
Analysis 
Judges and scholars alike have recognized the separate and inde­
pendent functions of disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials for 
adjudication of the same incident. They have also defined fundamental 
fairness as requiring the disciplinary proceedings to be more protective 
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of the accused student where that student faces serious criminal charges 
for his/her behavior. Seven institutions consider concurrent or pending 
criminal actions, with four of them generally or always deferring to the 
judicial process. Since none of these four require a student to offer 
self-incriminating evidence or testimony at the disciplinary hearing 
(see Table 2, Item 10), the delay in proceeding with the hearing would 
not seem to be related to the due process "double jeopardy" issue. 
Therefore, these schools are practicing a policy which is not mandated 
by courts or proposed by most authoritative writings. 
Two schools, Clemson and Winthrop, delay giving sanctions as a rule 
until criminal action is complete. Courts have not required schools to 
delay sanctions even when both disciplinary and criminal charges and 
sanctions are of a serious nature. The writings regarding this matter 
are mixed with some writers arguing that such delays allow the student 
to draw an inappropriate inference that couples the two proceedings. 
Conversely, some writers have suggested the appropriate- ness of linking 
institutional sanctions to court sentences, particularly where the 
sentence is deemed sufficient for educating and rehabilitating the 
misbehaving student. 
Both Clemson and Winthrop permit the student to request a postpone­
ment or initiation of the disciplinary proceeding relative to the court 
proceeding. No court has suggested this as a due process right, and in 
fact, one court noted that a student's request for a delay pending his 
criminal trial for serious charges would allow him to complete his 
2 
education and subvert the disciplinary process. The Citadel and 
2 
Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 335 A. 2d 321 (Vt. 1975). 
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USC-Columbia both indicate that disciplinary proceedings are sometimes 
affected by concurrent adjudication, but they did not indicate what such 
an affect might be. Since courts and authoritative scholars have 
acknowledged the college or university's right to proceed irrespective 
of criminal or civil court action, these institutions have a great deal 
of flexibility with which to respond to the particular issues and 
conditions of each incident. This flexibility is certainly in keeping 
with the nature of due process procedures as defined by courts from the 
United States Supreme Court down and reiterated by legal and educational 
scholars. 
It is questionable whether federal legislation allows a student's 
disciplinary file to be shared with authorities outside of the discipli­
nary process and the institution. While three schools reserve the 
right to do so, they would be wise to define the conditions and records 
which could be shared with outside agencies, seeking assistance from 
qualified counsel in this policy task. 
Academic Misconduct 
Findings 
Data charted in Table 6 indicates certain aspects of institution­
al policies and practices concerning suspension or dismissal based on a 
charge of academic misconduct, defined as actions usually considered 
academic dishonesty. Item 27 indicates that six schools treat academic 
misconduct procedurally different from disciplinary misconduct. Four 
schools treat the two types of misconduct in a similar manner, while 
three other schools handle academic misconduct like failing academic 
performance. Winthrop indicates it has no set procedure available to 
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27. Policies and procedures which 
apply Co possible suspension/ 
expulsion for academic mis­
conduct : 
a. Academic misconduct is 
treated differently than 
disciplinary procedures 
b. Academic misconduct is 
treated like disciplinary 
misconduct 
c. Academic misconduct is 
treated like failing 
academic performance 
d. No sec procedure for 
handling academic mis­
conduct 
28. If academic misconduct is 
treated differently from 
disciplinary misconduct, in 
which of the following ways: 
a. Not applicable—they are a a 
treated the same 
b. Formal nocice given b b b b 
c. Accused given hearing 
with procedural rights C C C C C 
similar Co disciplinary 
hearing 
d. Accused given hearing noc d d 
similar Co disciplinary 
hearing 
e. Incidents are indivi­
dually processed—no set 
procedure 
f. An appeal process is f f f 
present if requested ^ 
e. Other: § 
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process academic misconduct, although it treats it different from disci­
plinary misconduct. USC-Spartanburg treats academic misconduct both 
like disciplinary misconduct and failing academic performance. The 
school did not give indicators to explain how incidents were channeled 
into either of the two processes. 
The six schools which process the two types of misconduct differ­
ently do so in a number of ways (Item 28). Four of them offer their 
students formal notice of charges. Those four plus one other school 
allow the student the right to a hearing with procedural rights similar 
to those offered in a disciplinary hearing. Two schools, S. C. State 
and USC-Columbia, offer a hearing which is not procedurally comparable 
to a disciplinary hearing. Three schools offer the student the right to 
appeal the hearing findings. USC-Columbia, which has academic miscon­
duct hearings that are similar to disciplinary proceedings, notes that 
"fundamentals" are common to all, but that some variability is present 
depending on the colleges and/or professors involved with the process. 
Analysis 
Six institutions treat academic misconduct in a manner different 
from disciplinary misconduct, with Francis Marion treating it like fail­
ing academic performance. Both judicial and educational opinion has 
been generally supportive of treating academic misconduct, where defined 
as academic dishonesty, in a manner similar to disciplinary misconduct. 
Four of the six schools provide the student with notice and a hearing 
procedurally similar to their disciplinary hearing. These four would 
appear to meet judicial and authoritative expectations, which do not 
require that disciplinary structures be used, so long as the designated 
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format offers notice and a hearing conforming to fundamental procedural 
protections. Francis Marion, despite treating academic misconduct like 
failing academic performance, may still meet judicial and educational 
standards because the student is offered a hearing similar to a due pro­
cess disciplinary hearing. However, their absence of written notice 
would not be viewed favorably by most courts. Winthrop has no set pro­
cedure for handling academic misconduct; incidents are processed on an 
individual basis. It is doubtful that many courts or educational law 
experts would suggest such a lack of uniformity in processing these 
incidents. 
South Carolina State offers a hearing which is not similar to that 
of a disciplinary hearing. It is not evident whether their hearing 
meets accepted standards. Three schools offer an appeals process. 
While this is not judicially mandated, such appeals rights are generally 
recognized as consistent with the concept of fundamental fairness where 
separation based on academic dishonesty can have a stigmatizing effect 
on the student. USC-Columbia notes that procedures vary to a degree 
between colleges, but common fundamental elements are present in all 
hearings. Such variation is acceptable if the college and its faculty 
agree to observe fundamental procedural rights and abide by the hearing 
decision. 
Mandatory Withdrawal of Students with 
Mental Disorders 
Findings 
Table 7 reports information concerning institutional policies and 
due process procedures pertaining to the mandatory (psychiatric) with-
TABLE 7 
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MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL OF STUDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 
29. Does school have written 
policy and due process pro­
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30. The following policies and 
procedures are applicable to 
mandatory withdrawal situa­
tions: 
a. School has clear state­
ment concerning appli­
cable policy 
b. Institution must show 
cause for mandatory 
withdrawal 
c. Institution will use 
disciplinary policies and 
procedures in the absence 
of mitigating factors 
d. Institution provides 
notice that withdrawal is 
considered 
e. Institution used inde­
pendent evaluation in 
decision 
f. Institution relies on 
evaluations of in-house 
professionals 
g. Student offered hearing 
or conference (formal or 
informal) 
h. Institution allows 
student advisory assist­
ance during hearing or 
conference 
i. Legal counsel for student 
is allowed 
j. Appeal process is avail­
able 
k. Other: 
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drawal of students with mental disorders. Item 29 shows that six of the 
eleven schools have no written policy applicable where a student is re­
commended for a mandatory psychiatric withdrawal. However, four of the 
six report practices related to this type of withdrawal action. 
A variety of applicable policies and procedures are charted in Item 
30. Four schools have policies which require the school to show cause 
for pursuing a psychiatric withdrawal. Eight schools use disci­
plinary procedures to process the student's misconduct unless mitigating 
factions are present which would not allow the student to adequately 
respond to the charges. Five schools provide notice that a psychiatric 
withdrawal is contemplated. Five institutions use independent evalua­
tions when seeking withdrawals, while three schools rely on evaluations 
provided by the institutions' mental health staff. Three of the schools 
providing notice (S. C. State, USC-Columbia, and USC-Spartanburg), also 
offer an informal or formal hearing. In addition, those three and 
Winthrop allow the student to be assisted by an advisor. While S.C. 
State does not provide for assistance by legal counsel, the other three 
do. Four schools offer the student the opportunity to appeal the 
hearing or conference decision. 
Analysis 
This is a relatively new field of scholarly inquiry, as revealed by 
the review of literature. It is therefore not surprising that six 
institutions do not have a written policy concerning mandatory psychia­
tric withdrawals. Also, there is not clear judicial precedent available 
to guide the development of policy and corresponding procedures. 
Despite these limitations, five schools do have written policies while 
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four others observe established procedures where such withdrawals are 
pursued. Only one school, USC-Coastal, reports no policy or procedures 
in use to process psychiatric withdrawals. 
Eight of the schools process disturbed behavior through discipli­
nary proceedings when the student is capable of adequately participating 
in the proceeding. Where this process is not appropriate, institutions 
draw upon various procedures. This reliance on disciplinary channels to 
address disturbed behavior is consistent with the consensus opinion of 
leading experts on the subject. The writings on mandatory withdrawals 
all stress the need to treat the disturbed behavior like other misbeha­
vior where possible. 
Five institutions provide notice of a withdrawal action, a proce­
dure recommended by most commentators. Five schools provide for inde­
pendent evaluation of the student, while three consider in-house staff 
evaluations. Pavela, a leading authority in this field, urges use of 
independent evaluations as a procedure which ensures a fundamentally 
fair protection of the student's constitutional rights. He requires a 
notice to be given where possible. Those schools which proceed without 
notice or independent evaluation do so contrary to significant expert 
recommendation. 
Only four schools offer the student an informal or formal confer­
ence as suggested by most opinion on this subject. Those four seem to 
offer some of the protections suggested including the right to advisory 
assistance. The hearing, with accompanying right to advisory help, is 
an essential element of due process recognized by authorities and those 
court decisions which have upheld denial of due process claims. The 
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three schools expanding the right of assistance to include legal counsel 
do so without judicial mandate. The opportunity to appeal a withdrawal 
decision is also not judicially mandated, but is consistent with most 
writings discussing the procedural protections which have value where a 
separation may have a stigmatizing effect on the individual. Pavela, 
however, has proposed that legal counsel not be invited to actively 
participate in the conference or hearing, urging instead the use of a 
faculty member to challenge the hearing as a "devil's advocate." None 
of the schools reported the presence of this role. Pavela also has 
suggested that appeals not be considered. 
The status of mandatory withdrawal policies and procedures at the 
eleven institutions suggests that schools with written policies and 
procedures generally offer minimally acceptable procedural protections 
against arbitrary withdrawal actions. Only four schools come close to 
offering the range of protections recommended by Pavela. The limited 
applicable court cases suggest that notice and hearing, where possible, 
are minimally required before such withdrawals are considered 
constitutionally adequate. The widespread use of disciplinary 
proceedings to handle emotionally disturbed behavior is a sound 
educational practice. Although such practice will help these schools 
who do not have written policies regarding psychiatric withdrawals, was 
well as their own established practices, the lack of formalization could 
be a litigious matter. There would appear to be no reason for these 
schools not to formalize present procedures and use this process to 
consider other elements which Pavela and others have recommended. 
226 
Conclusion 
The data reported from this survey suggests that all eleven major 
tax-supported colleges and universities in South Carolina have discipli­
nary policies and exercise disciplinary procedures which address similar 
issues and offer somewhat similar disciplinary proceedings. Only a few 
significant fundamental procedural protections are missing from the pro­
cedures reported in the survey. 
All eleven institutions appear to offer the student both oral and 
written communications which convey needed information to the student 
concerning charges for disciplinary misconduct. The majority of schools 
include several items within their written notice which have been 
recommended by most legal experts and upheld as necessary by numerous 
courts. Only two schools have expanded the notice to include copies of 
important documents not mandated by courts. Several scholars have 
suggested that such documents, when included in the notice, help ensure 
the student is allowed to adequately prepare a defense to the charges. 
The nine other schools offer the student the opportunity to review these 
documents at a prehearing conference. This process, which is also not 
mandated by courts, would seem to provide additional helpful interaction 
between the student and the institution. 
Most of the formal hearing procedures described by the institu­
tions work to ensure that constitutional rights are preserved, as out­
lined by applicable court decisions. The most suspect absence of 
procedural protections include one school's failure to keep a record of 
the hearing (Clemson) and another school's prohibition against assis­
tance for the accused by a nonlegal advisor (Lander). These omissions 
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of procedure are not likely to be reviewed favorably by any court 
hearing a denial of due process claim, where these omitted procedures 
are challenged in a suspension or expulsion action. 
Other hearing procedures, while not representative of the weight of 
authoritative opinion, do not appear to be procedurally deficient with 
regard to court mandated minimal procedures. Some writers have 
suggested that students should have the right to ask for an open or 
closed hearing, with the institution complying with the request. Only 
four schools offer the student this right. Three schools do not allow 
the student to be advised by legal counsel of choice during the hearing. 
The preponderance of literature regards this as a reasonable procedural 
right, particularly where dismissal is contemplated, or where the 
student faces concurrent civil or criminal charges. Court decisions 
usually reflect favorably upon an institution's extension of right to 
advisory assistance to include legal counsel. 
Most of the reported hearing procedures are squarely in line with 
judicial and educational thinking. The schools all appear to have 
properly designated hearing authorities, with most schools providing for 
representation by both students and faculty, and four also including 
administrators. This heterogeneity is widely applauded by disciplinary 
writers. Only one school does not allow any advisory assistance, while 
eight schools expand this important right to include assistance by a 
lawyer. The schools all appear to allow the student or advisor the 
right to present evidence, witnesses, and testimony on behalf of the 
student. All but one allow for the confrontation of adverse witnesses. 
These procedural hearing rights have been upheld by numerous court 
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decisions and the vast majority of related writings. 
Appellate review is an important procedural protection given almost 
universal support by scholars and paid great deference by judicial 
decisions. The unanimous offering of an appeals process, for which 
eight schools designate their chief executives or boards of trustees as 
the appeals authority, indicates statewide observance of this right. 
Most schools offer grounds for appeal which will meet judicial scrutiny, 
but those institutions which do not accept evidence of bias or defects 
in the hearing as appeals grounds are overlooking a significant basis 
upon which several court decisions have revolved. The majority of those 
decisions have upheld the schools' suspension or expulsion actions where 
the appeals process cured procedural defects or bias in the hearing. 
These should be appeals grounds considered by every school, not just the 
six who affirmed them. 
It is interesting to note that five institutions allow the sanc­
tion to be increased on appeal, yet only one school reports the right to 
appeal its own decisions. No literature suggests that increasing sanc­
tions is an appropriate purpose of an appeals process, although it is 
seldom discussed at all. Likewise, the right of the institution to 
appeal has drawn little scholarly comment, with courts addressing the 
issue primarily in cases where the institution improperly reversed a 
finding contrary to established policy. There appears to be no reason 
why an institution can't increase a sanction on appeal or reserve for 
itself an appeal right as long as their procedures establish that right 
and it is not exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. 
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Responses to the condition of interim suspension suggest that some 
institutions, while reserving the right to impose temporary suspension, 
seldom put that practice in use. The schools are on solid foundation in 
their primary criteria for imposition of an interim suspension. 
However, those five schools which appear to use facts such as the nature 
of the offense or the instance of arrest to justify interim suspension 
are doing so without much judicial or authoritative backing. 
The two schools which offer the student an opportunity to appeal 
the interim suspension (USC-Columbia and USC-Spartanburg) allow for a 
procedural right that numerous courts have enforced for the benefit of 
students. The lack of such an appeal, or preliminary hearing, offers 
the institution too much discretion to deny an important, constitution­
ally protected right to continued enrollment. It is unclear if any of 
the eight schools which offer a formal hearing during or after the 
period of suspension meet the constitutional mandate to allow the 
student to challenge the suspension. Any hearing held after the suspen­
sion, except where postponed by emergency, would appear to be insuffi­
cient to protect against arbitrary and unwarranted imposition of interim 
suspension. 
The consensus opinion shared by courts and scholars alike regards 
the disciplinary process as an educational function independent of con­
current civil or criminal action for the same offense. As such, disci­
plinary proceedings need not be linked with court action except in 
particular circumstances regarding specific procedural points. It 
appears that four institutions follow that opinion, while five others 
vary their proceedings in relation to both student requests and 
230 
institutional deliberation. Although many writers would urge schools to 
act independently in processing violations of institutional rules, many 
would suggest that concurrent actions can also serve an educational 
function upon which the disciplinary process can build. With that 
thought in mind, it would be hard to find fault with institutions which 
can show logical reasons for linking certain disciplinary actions with 
concurrent judicial action. 
The four institutions which treat academic misconduct procedur­
ally similar to disciplinary misconduct have little to fear from 
judicial inspection or educational scrutiny. Those seven schools which 
treat it differently than disciplinary misconduct have the burden of 
showing that certain procedural protections are offered the student when 
suspension or expulsion is contemplated. Of those seven, four schools 
offer notice and hearing with similar procedural rights. These four 
schools would appear to be meeting judicial and authoritative standards. 
The expansion of an appeal process can only be an asset for the 
remaining three schools in the event they are subject to judicial 
review. Winthrop, with its lack of established, formalized procedures, 
is open to potential claims of arbitrary action and denial of due 
process. 
The lack of written psychiatric withdrawal policies by a majority 
(six schools) of the respondents reflects the relative newness of this 
issue and a probable lack of institutional experience processing such 
withdrawals. Certainly, few schools have been challenged in court for 
initiating these type of withdrawals. Those schools which do report 
procedures for psychiatric withdrawals, whether written or not, seem to 
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offer most minimally accepted due process protections. The two greatest 
deficiencies occur where notice is not given (4 schools) or a hearing is 
not offered (5 schools). On the positive side, the use of independent 
evaluations by five schools and the extension of advisory assistance in 
the hearing and appeals process by four institutions provides adequate 
safeguards for the student. All of the schools are also following 
educationally sound policy by treating disturbed behavior as 
disciplinary misconduct where possible. This practice is lauded by most 
as a proper, logical, educational approach to disturbed behavior. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was designed to gather and analyze data regarding 
disciplinary policies and procedures for each of the eleven major, tax-
supported colleges and universities in South Carolina. Related 
procedural issues of academic misconduct and mandatory psychiatric with­
drawals were also studied as a result of this analysis. A second study 
purpose was a review of pertinent judicial decisions and authoritative 
opinion regarding the evolution of the student-institution relationship 
and the development of constitutionally defined due process rights in 
disciplinary suspension and expulsion proceedings. 
The primary focus of the historical review was the period from the 
1961 Dixon decision to the present. This period of time was character­
ized by a transition in judicial and educational philosophy regarding 
discipline in higher education that took on historic proportions. This 
adjustment mirrored changing societal concepts of civil rights and atti­
tudes toward access to higher education. One manifestation of the 
changing times were court decisions which clearly established a consti­
tutional basis for the disciplinary relationship between the student and 
his/her tax-supported institution. These same court decisions and other 
cases, reinforced by the weight of significant authoritative opinion, 
imposed minimal due process protections, which were subsequently rede­
fined and sometimes expanded, in cases where students challenged disci­
plinary suspensions and dismissals. Coupled with an analysis of the 
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institutional data, this review of judicial and educational opinion 
provided knowledge which allowed conclusions to be drawn concerning the 
status of disciplinary due process at tax-supported colleges and univer­
sities in South Carolina. 
Summary 
The first key research question concerned the effect of educa­
tional and legal opinion on the status and future direction of the 
student-institution relationship. The complex nature of higher educa­
tion does not allow for one particular relationship theory or doctrine 
to satisfactorily explain the entire range of interactions between a 
student and a college or university. Elements of in loco parentis, 
contract, status, fiduciary, and constitutional rights theories have all 
had proponents touting them as sufficient to define aspects of the 
relationship. The societal forces which have significantly shaped the 
development of higher education in America have also exerted great force 
on the evolution of the student-institution relationship. The Dixon 
decision would not have had the impact it did on public higher education 
had it occurred well before the development of the civil rights movement 
of the sixties. Dixon was the product of turbulent social change, and 
in turn, it contributed to further change in a specific context: the 
right to continued enrollment under an umbrella of constitutional 
protection. 
The judicial bombshells dropped by the United States Supreme Court 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. Board of Education and 
Dixon marked an inevitable intrusion into government provisions for 
education. Those two decisions laid to rest the prevailing notion that 
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education was a governmentally extended privilege not subject to 
constitutional protections or federal judicial review. Dixon, in 
finding an application of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
in suspension/expulsion proceedings at tax-supported colleges and 
universities, firmly established that one aspect of the student-
institution relationship, the discipline function, was supported by the 
United States Constitution. No courts or legal and education author­
ities have yet mounted any serious challenge to that assertion. 
The vast majority of educators and legal scholars support the 
applicability of a constitutional rights doctrine to the disciplinary 
function. Most laud the doctrine for providing fundamentally fair and 
reasonable dispensing of discipline. At the same time, significant 
educational opinion has cautioned against overdevelopping the definition 
and technical expansion of disciplinary due process at the expense of 
the underlying educational philosophy of personal development. The 
constitutional rights concept has been embraced by the educational 
community where it is modified to meet educational needs which are not 
analogous to society's expectations of the criminal justice system. 
The second study question addressed the body of judicial decisions 
reflecting on the disciplinary relationship between students and their 
colleges and universities. The review of cases reported in Chapter III 
reveals that both state and federal courts have clearly supported 
student' rights to certain procedural protections when faced with 
potential suspension or expulsion based on disciplinary misconduct. The 
Dixon decision and its early successors (i.e. Knight, Due, and Esteban) 
have all been cited by numerous courts to uphold the precedent of a 
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constitutional right to due process in disciplinary proceedings at 
tax-supported institutions. Similarly, Dixon and subsequent decisions 
have been repeatedly cited both for specifying minimally acceptable due 
process procedures and expanding due process beyond minimal expecta­
tions. There are no court cases since Dixon which have repudiated the 
student's right to continued enrollment at tax-supported institutions 
under constitutional protection. 
It is equally clear that students of private colleges and univer­
sities have little judicial support for a claim of constitutional 
protection in disciplinary suspension/expulsion proceedings. Courts 
have been loath to extend due process protections to private school 
students under a constitutional mandate. Numerous decisions have been 
rendered in cases where students have attempted to prove enough evidence 
of "state action" on the part of the private college to require a 
finding of applicability of constitutional due process. These deci­
sions, with few exceptions, have repeatedly rebuffed the "state action" 
argument for a constitutional rights mandate in the private school 
setting. 
Courts have upheld student challenges to private institutional 
disciplinary proceedings where claims of arbitrary or unfair treatment 
have been sustained. Contract theory has been advocated by numerous 
courts as governing the student-institution relationship. These courts 
have typically upheld institutional disciplinary decisions which are 
based on procedures specified in documents containing the terms of the 
implied contract (i.e. student handbooks, catalogs). Conversely, 
disciplinary actions have been overturned where institutions have been 
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found to violate the terms of the enrollment contract, particularly 
where disciplinary procedures have not been observed as specified by 
school policy. 
The third study question focused on the definition of due process 
guidelines which have been established and recommended by courts and 
authoritative opinion. The courts and educators have used the Dixon 
decision as a foundation upon which to craft a set of procedures which 
will meet constitutional standards while serving the educational needs 
of a college's disciplinary process.. The results of this procedural 
evolution have generally favored some expansions of procedural rights 
beyond the Dixon mandate. Thus, notice and hearing are no longer 
discussed by courts; rather, they define the expansion of these and 
other due process procedures. They have also been consistent in observ­
ing Dixon's disclaimer against a "full-dress judicial hearing" require­
ment, and in rendering subsequent opinions which do not require disci­
plinary procedures conforming to criminal court trials. At the same 
time, many courts and most writers have advanced disciplinary due 
process procedures beyond the "rudimentary elements of fair play" 
espoused by the Dixon court. 
Two important expanded procedural rights now firmly established by 
authoritative opinion and most judicial decisions are the right to have 
advisory assistance in the preparation of a hearing defense and during 
the hearing, as well as the right to appeal a hearing decision. The 
first procedural right has been specifically identified by court 
decisions while the right to appeal has seldom been denied by judicial 
review. Both procedural protections enjoy overwhelming support by 
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educational commentators. Both procedures have been elevated to a level 
above that of a "rudimentary element" but not to the extent offered in 
criminal proceedings. Even the expansion of advisory assistance to 
include legal counsel in an advisory capacity, while enjoying consensus 
support, has been limited regarding representation during the hearing 
because such a limitation is compatible with the educational, nonadver-
sarial nature of the disciplinary hearing. 
Other due process issues which have developed under constitutional 
due process applications have included technical issues (i.e. rules of 
evidence, right to protection against self-incrimination) and 
philosophical issues (i.e. adjudication when jurisdiction overlaps, 
imposition of interim suspension). Most courts reviewing these issues 
have distinguished between criminal law applications and disciplinary 
usage. Courts generally have sided with institutions where student 
challenges have rested on arguments of technical deficiencies without 
showing how such deficiencies have resulted in an unfair or biased 
proceeding. Likewise, courts have allowed institutions to proceed with 
concurrent disciplinary action or impose interim suspension where such 
actions do not unfairly deprive the student of basic constitutional 
rights. Limitations have been imposed by courts on schools when interim 
suspension is contemplated, with preliminary or appeals hearings 
required to allow challenges to the suspension except in emergency 
situations. Conversely, courts have expanded the student's right to 
representation by legal counsel in limited settings where the student 
faces concurrent criminal charges of a serious nature. In each of these 
cases court have expanded limitations or rights only where the potential 
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for unfair denial of constitutional rights is likely. 
Dixon and those decisions which followed created two major 
distinctions which were crucial to the applicability of due process 
procedures in suspension and expulsion proceedings. The first distinc­
tion, as noted, is that of tax-supported as opposed to privately funded 
colleges and universities. The other significant classification dis­
tinguishes disciplinary dismissals from academic dismissals. Much 
judicial and authoritative thought has been expressed concerning both 
sets of distinctions. 
The Horowitz decision of 1978 was the Supreme Court's opportunity 
to clarify and define the disciplinary/academic dismissal dichotomy 
alluded to in earlier cases but never clearly illustrated. The Court's 
decision, by many accounts, "muddied the waters" as much as it served to 
clarify the differences between the two dismissal actions. What 
Horowitz did accomplish was to distinguish one aspect of the academic 
dismissal issue that was amenable to due process proceedings. The 
decision opened the door for the adjudication of academic dishonesty 
through proceedings similar in nature to disciplinary dismissal proceed­
ings. Where the Court failed, in the opinion of some scholars, was in 
its broad definition of academic performance, subject to academic 
evaluations and minimal judicial review rather than due process consid­
erations and considerable judicial review. 
Legal and educational authorities have generally found academic 
dishonesty incidents well suited for the fact-finding, inquisitorial 
format used in the disciplinary hearing. They support procedural 
protections for the accused where the stigma of dismissal based on 
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academic dishonesty can have a great impact on a student's educational 
and occupational future. Most writers have observed that academic 
misconduct is more difficult to define and verify than disciplinary 
misconduct. Like the courts, numerous experts are cautious about the 
potential for academic misconduct proceedings to usurp the legitimate 
academic evaluation of student performance. As a corollary to that 
point, those who argue for due process adjudication of academic dishon­
esty incidents are forceful in insisting that academicians observe the 
findings and sanctions imposed by the recognized process. 
Another research question posed by this study involves the due 
process policies and procedures practiced in the administration of 
discipline at the major tax-supported institutions in South Carolina. 
The research data reveals that most institutions rely on disciplinary 
systems which offer almost all of the required procedures, as well as 
significant expansions of procedural protections at some institutions. 
Few noticeable omissions are evident from the data reported by each 
school. Important procedures such as notice, hearings with certain 
hearing rights, records of proceedings, right to advisory assistance, 
and appellate review are all present at these schools with few excep­
tions. 
Policies and procedures regarding interim suspension, overlapping 
jurisdiction, and the related topic of mandatory psychiatric withdrawals 
are less consistent with recommendations rendered by courts and knowl-
edgeable writers. In several cases, schools reported limited or no 
experience with these situations, resulting in an absence of written or 
practiced policy and procedures. The larger institutions generally had 
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policies and procedures defined to handle these situations. Interim 
suspension, while a significant due process procedural issue in the 
1960's and 1970's, has been a limited topic of court challenge and 
authoritative comment in more recent years. This may very well account 
for several schools' apparent unfamiliarity or lack of developed proce­
dures with which to process imposition of interim suspension. The same 
rationale appears to hold true for some schools' lack of policies and 
procedures designed to handle mandatory withdrawals. Only in this case, 
recent scholarly review has been offered for an issue which has little 
case law upon which to build, and which has drawn little scholarly 
attention prior to the end of the 1970's. Those schools which do have 
policies and procedures to deal with both interim suspension and psychi­
atric withdrawals have some, but usually not all, of the elements 
suggested by the experts and required in significant court decisions. 
The last research question cited in Chapter I requires a comparison 
to be drawn between the disciplinary policies and procedures of the 
eleven institutions and the collective opinions and recommendations of 
educational authorities, legal scholars, and applicable court decisions. 
Judicial decisions and significant additions to the body of related 
literature do not usually have an immediate impact on institutional 
processes. The time lag between court decisions and corresponding 
institutional change can be great. The institution is most likely to 
adapt its disciplinary process to meet changing judicial and authorita­
tive opinion when it responds to a specific occurrence in a reactive 
way; usually the result of a crisis. It appears that some of the 
schools have not had the experiences or crises necessary to spur 
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development of policies and procedures related to topics such as hearing 
formats (i.e. requests for open or closed, joint or separate hearings), 
imposition of interim suspension, and/or mandatory withdrawals of 
students with mental disorders. This lack of developed policy and 
procedures suggests the potential for judicial review of these undefined 
or imperfectly designed practices. 
Conclusions 
/ 
The research supporting this study, while substantial in some 
respects, is not comprehensive enough to allow for the development of 
absolute, generalized conclusions regarding the status of procedural due 
process in disciplinary systems at tax-supported colleges and 
universities in South Carolina. However, the research findings and 
analyses do allow the following conclusions to be drawn concerning the 
legal aspects of disciplinary policies and procedures at the eleven 
major tax-supported schools: 
1. With a few procedural exceptions, all eleven institutions 
observe minimally mandated due process procedures when conducting 
disciplinary proceedings which may result in suspension or expulsion. 
2. The individual nature of each institution's campus climate is 
reflected in the distinct, varied nature of its disciplinary policies 
and procedures. 
3. Most of the institutions have expanded certain procedures 
beyond the minimal due process mandate of prevailing judicial decisions. 
These expanded procedures are generally consistent with authoritative 
recommendations. 
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4. While each school varies in terms of the comprehensiveness of 
its own disciplinary procedures and policies, no single school appears 
to have addressed all due process procedural considerations to the 
complete satisfaction of prevailing judicial and authoritative opinion. 
However, USC-Columbia comes very close to offering a disciplinary 
process which is consistent with espoused judicial and educational 
standards. USC-Spartanburg also exercises sound disciplinary processes 
and practices consistent with authoritative recommendations. 
5. Issues involving interim suspension, overlapping jurisdiction, 
and mandatory psychiatric withdrawals indicate the most significant 
absence of written and established practices for a large number of 
institutions. 
6. Academic misconduct, specifically defined in the context of 
academic dishonesty, is generally processed in a manner similar to that 
used in adjudicating disciplinary misconduct. Such treatment is consis­
tent with court decisions and educational recommendations. 
7. A lack of practical experience dealing with certain types of 
misconduct situations appears to be a major cause for a corresponding 
lack of written or established policy and procedures regarding issues 
such as interim suspension and mandatory withdrawal of students with 
mental disorders. 
Recommendations 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the status of disciplinary 
policies and procedures at the major tax-supported colleges and 
universities in South Carolina and provide institutional disciplinary 
administrators with current, applicable information and guidelines for 
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the administration of discipline on their campuses. The study results 
and analyses provide the basis for the following recommendations: 
1. All eleven institutions should undertake a thorough review of 
their disciplinary processes in light of current prevailing judicial 
decisions and recent developments reflected in authoritative writings. 
2. Those institutions observing disciplinary practices which have 
not been formally written and approved should undertake such 
formalization of these policies and procedures. 
3. The few institutions which have significant omissions or 
erroneous practices regarding minimally mandated procedures should add 
needed procedures or modify the procedures in question. 
4. Issues which address expansion of procedural due process, such 
as different hearing formats (i.e. open v. closed, joint v. separate), 
should be carefully considered for their applicability to the 
institution's disciplinary process. 
5. Institutions should be proactive in developing practices to 
cover potential disciplinary or related dismissal actions for which the 
institution has no existing policies and little or no practical experi­
ence. 
6. Institutional disciplinary administrators and campus judicial 
authorities should undertake the effort to remain informed of continuing 
developments in case law, authoritative research and expert commentary 
regarding discipline in higher education. 
7. Where possible, institutions should seek to assure that all 
involved parties understand current thinking about academic misconduct 
adjudication, and to ensure that academic misconduct proceedings meet 
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standards offered by court decisions and knowledgeable commentary. 
8. Institutions should consider providing students with one 
specific, comprehensive document which outlines procedures and policies 
covering disciplinary misconduct, academic misconduct, and other related 
issues. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Most studies, no matter how thorough or inclusive, generate other 
issues worthy of further study. Among the possible research directions 
suggested by this study are the following: 
1. A replication of this study could be initiated focusing on the 
status of disciplinary policies and procedures of private colleges and 
universities in South Carolina. 
2. An examination could be conducted of the specific practices 
which govern academic dismissals at each of the eleven institutions, 
with a subsequent comparison made between policy and procedures of both 
academic and disciplinary dismissal proceedings. 
3. Statistical data could be gathered describing the extent and 
content of disciplinary suspension and expulsion proceedings for the 
eleven institutions included in this study. 
4. A replication of this study could be undertaken for tax-
supported colleges and universities in any other state. Where feasible, 
results of that study could be compared with results from this study. 
Some states have system governing boards and administrative procedures 
acts which might significantly influence the overall status of disci­
plinary practices in that state, thus rendering comparisons invalid. 
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June 4, 1987 
Dear Chief Student Affairs Officer: 
My name is Kirk Bragu.e and I am Che Director of Student Development Programs in the 
division of Student Affairs at Clemson University. I am also a doctoral student in 
Education Administration at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. I am 
currently preparing to gather data for my research, and I need your assistance. 
The topic of my dissertation is "Suspension and Expulsion Practice and Policy at 
Major, Tax-Supported Colleges and Universities in South Carolina." This disserta­
tion is being guided by my advisor, Dr. Joseph Bryson, an authority on legal issues 
in education. The goal of my research is to assess the status of disciplinary due 
process procedures and policy for each of the major tax-supported institutions of 
higher education in this state. This study requires me to gather information from 
each of these institutions, including your school. 
I have enclosed my survey instrument for this research. I ask that you give this 
survey to the individual on your campus who is the primary administrator of disci­
plinary programs for that person to complete. 1 have enclosed a self-addressed, 
stamped manilla envelope in which the survey can be returned. In addition, I have 
enclosed a self-addressed, stamped postcard which I ask that you return to me as 
soon as possible. 
It is my hope that this research will be both informative and beneficial to admin­
istrators of discipline at each of the schools included in the study. I intend to 
share significant findings with those individuals who complete the survey at the 
conclusion of my research effort. 
Because there are so few schools (11) included in my study, it is imperative that I 
receive materials back from each institution. My target deadline for the receipt of 
completed surveys is June 26, 1987, but an earlier return will be greatly appreci­
ated. 
Please contact me if there are any further questions. Your cooperation in facil­
itating this research effort is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Kirk A. Brague 
Director of Student Development Programs 
ws 
270 
INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINARY SURVEY 
Dear Respondent: 
Let me take this opportunity to thank you for taking your time and effort to 
complete this survey. The data which you provide me will be very helpful to me in 
my dissertation research effort. I promise to share a summary of my findings with 
you at the conclusion of my activities. I hope you will find both this survey and 
my findings informative and helpful to you as you administer discipline activities 
on your campus. 
My deadline for receipt of completed surveys is FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 1987. I would 
appreciate receiving materials back as soon as possible, but the June 26th deadline 
is crucial to my research. 
Again, thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Kirk A. Brague 
Director of Student Development Programs 
DIRECTIONS: 
Please answer all questions to the best of your ability. Circle all applicable 
answers to the item, unless otherwise noted. If you respond to the choice 'Other', 
please write short, concise answers in the blank space provided (use back of page 
if more space is needed). 
If you are not sure about the meaning of an item, please put a question mark out to 
the side of the item in the margin and proceed to the next item. I will follow-up 
on the item in question at a later date. If the entire question is not applicable 
to your situation, please write a visible 'NA' out to the side of the item in the 
margin. 
Please put the completed survey in the enclosed, self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Please enclose any additional materials which will give me a greater insight into 
the nature of disciplinary due process procedures on your campus (e.g. statements 
in the Catalog or Student Handbook, disciplinary flow-chart, etc.). 
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A. PREHEARING COMMUNICATIONS, INVESTIGATION, AND CONFERENCE 
1. Y N Does your institution provide students with any printed statement or 
document which outlines the judicial policy and procedures of the 
school? If YES, please include a copy with the completed survey. 
2. Y N Is written notice provided to the accused student concerning applicable 
charges for violation of student conduct regulations where the sanctions 
of suspension or expulsion may be applied? 
3. If YES is your answer in #2, please indicate which of the following 
elements are contained in the written notice: 
a. Specific facts and evidence related to the charge(s) brought against the 
student. 
b. A citation of the specific regulation(s) allegedly violated. 
c. Information concerning an administrative prehearing conference. 
d. Information concerning the time and place for a formal disciplinary 
hearing. 
e. Information concerning the format and procedures for a formal hearing. 
f. Copies of related documents (e.g. incident report, witness statements, 
arrest reports, etc.) 
g. Other: 
4. How is the written notice of charges conveyed to the accused student? 
a. Sent by unregistered mail. 
b. Sent by registered or certified mail, receipt requested. 
c. Hand-delivered to address of residence. 
d. Hand-delivered to student at a location other than residence. 
e. Other: 
5. Y N Is information concerning the charges conveyed to the student orally, as 
well as in written form? 
6. Please indicate the frequency to which each of the following elements occur 
during a prehearing conference (please mark N/A in the column next to the 
number of this question if prehearing conferences are not conducted, and 
move to the next item). A - Always G « Generally N » Seldom or Never 
A G N a. The accused student is allowed to plead innocent or guilty to the 
charges. 
A G N b. The student who pleads guilty is then given applicable sanctions. 
A G N c. The accused student is offered the opportunity to request a formal hear­
ing in order to determine innocence or guilt, or to consider 
appropriate sanctions upon entering a guilty plea. 
A G N d. The student is allowed to review all pertinent documents related to the 
charges and the alleged incident. 
A G N e. The student is given an explanation of the disciplinary procedures which 
will be used to adjudicate the charges, and his/her rights during this 
process. 
A G N f. The student is given an explanation of possible recommended sanctions. 
A G N g. The student is allowed to offer personal testimony concerning the inci­
dent and the related charges to the person(s) conducting the conference. 
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B. ELEMENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING 
7. Y N In cases where Che sanctions of suspension or expulsion are applicable to 
a particular incident of misconduct, is the accused student allowed to 
request a hearing to determine guilt or innocence, or to determine 
applicable sanctions? 
8. Who serves as the hearing authority for the purpose of the initial hearing? 
a. A designated Hearing Officer (give title: , ) 
b. A different Hearing Officer designated for each case. 
c. A designated Hearing Board (panel or committee) with permanent standing. 
d. A different Hearing Board designated for each case. 
e. Other: 
9. How many of the following constituencies are represented on the Hearing 
Board? (Skip to next question if you do not have a Hearing Board) Write 
number in blank to represent number from each group on board. 
a. Students. 
b. Administrators. 
c. Faculty. 
d. Non-institutional members. 
e. Other: 
10. Please indicate the frequency with which the following features of a 
hearing are evident as part of your campus's procedures: 
A > = Always G • Generally N = Seldom or Never 
A G N a. The student has the right to be tried apart or with other students 
involved in the same incident. 
A G N b. The institution decides whether the student will be tried apart from 
with other involved parties. 
A G N c. The accused student has the right to decide on an open or closed 
hearing. 
A G N d. The institution decides whether the hearing is open or closed. 
A G N e. The student can be compelled to appear at the hearing. 
A G N f. The student can be compelled to testify against himself/herself. 
A G N S- The institution will proceed with the hearing in the event that the 
accused is absent without cause. 
11 • In what form are records of the hearing proceedings kept? 
a. Written. 
b. Audiotaped. 
c. Stenographed. 
d. Videotaped. 
e. Records of the proceedings are not kept. 
f. Other: 
12. With what frequency are the following activities allowed during the disci 
plinary hearing? A = Always G » Generally N =• Seldom or never 
A G N a. The student may be advised by legal counsel of his/her choosing. 
A G N b. The student may be advised by a third party who is not an attorney. 
A G N c. The student may be represented by legal counsel. 
A G N d. The student (or authorized counsel) may confront adverse witnesses. 
A G N e. The student (or counsel) may present witnesses on the student's behalf. 
A G N f. The student (or counsel) may present evidence. 
A G N g. The institution may be advised by legal counsel. 
A G N h. The institution may be represented by legal counsel. 
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Is the student or the school allowed to "subpoena" witnesses from the 
campus community (e.g. students or employees) to appear and to testify at 
the hearing? 
a. The student may subpoena witnesses. 
b. The school may subpoena witnesses. 
c. Neither party has subpoena power. 
Who determines the acceptability of evidence entered during the hearing? 
a. Hearing Board of Officer. 
b. Third party removed from hearing. 
c. Primary institutional disciplinary administrator. 
d. Other: 
How are the finding of facts, conclusions, and any applicable sanctions 
communicated to the accused student? 
a. Oral decision rendered upon conclusion of the hearing. 
b. Written decision rendered upon conclusion of the hearing. 
c. Written decision rendered after the conclusion of the hearing. 
d. Other: 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Which of the following conditions generally govern appeals of the hearing 
decision? 
a. An internal appellate review is afforded the student upon request, 
regardless of grounds. 
b. The student may request appellate review based on established grounds 
for appeal. 
c. An internal appellate review is automatically initiated upon a finding 
of guilt where suspension or expulsion is recommended. 
d. The institution may request an appellate review based on established 
grounds. 
e. The institution does not have an appeals procedure. 
f. Other: ; i 
If an appeals process exists, who serves as the appellate authority? 
a. There is not an appellate authority. 
b. An appeals officer. 
c. An Appeals Board. 
d. The chief student affairs officer (if not the appeals officer). 
e. The president of the institution (if not the appeals officer). 
f. Other: 
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18. How is the student informed of his/her right to appeal? 
a. Instructions concerning appeals are contained within the notice of 
charges. 
b. Instructions concerning appeals are given during the hearing. 
c. Instructions concerning appeals are given during the prehearing confer­
ence. 
d. Instructions are listed in institutional publications. 
e. Instructions are given with the findings of the hearing. 
f. Other: 
19. If grounds have been established for an appeal at your institution, please 
indicate which of the following represent such grounds: 
a. Procedural defects in the handling of the incident prior to the hearing. 
b. Procedural defects in the hearing. 
c. Issues of proper jurisdiction. 
d. Insufficient evidence and testimony to support the findings. 
e. Harshness or leniency of sanctions imposed on the guilty. 
f. Evidence that the hearing was biased, not fundamentally fair. 
g. The student's desire to appeal to another authority. 
h. Other: 
20. Which of the following actions can take place as the result of an appeal? 
a. The original decision is upheld. 
b. The original decision is reversed. 
c. A new hearing is ordered. 
d. The severity of the sanction is reduced. 
e. The severity of the sanction is increased. 
f. Other: 
D. INTERIM SUSPENSION 
21. Y N Does the institution reserve the right to order an immediate suspension of 
a student prior to the holding of any formal disciplinary hearing? 
22. If YES is given for #20, which of the following reasons may be used to 
justify imposition of an immediate suspension pending further disciplinary 
action? 
a. The immediate danger which the accused poses to self and/or others. 
b. The nature of the alleged offense in question. 
c. The possibility that the continued presence of the accused student 
will substantially disrupt the educational process. 
d. The arrest of the student for violation of specific civil or criminal 
laws (e.g. arson, violent assault, etc.). 
e. Other: 
23. Which of the following conditions apply to the imposition of interim 
suspension? 
a. The student is given notice that an interim suspension is imposed. 
b. The student is afforded the opportunity to appeal the interim 
suspension. 
c. The student is afforded the opportunity for a formal disciplinary 
hearing during or upon conclusion of the interim suspension. 
d. Other: 
E. ISSUES WHERE INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE AND SOCIETAL LAW OVERLAP 
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24. Y N Are the institution's disciplinary procedures affected in any way if the 
accused student is also charged with a violation of civil or criminal law 
for the same incident(s)? 
25. If YES is given for #24, with what frequency do the following activities 
happen as a result of the student being tried both institutionally for 
misconduct and civilly or criminally for violations of law? 
A G N a. The institution does not process the charge(s) until all legal proceed­
ings are completed. 
A G N b. The institution processes the incident, but does not impose any 
sanctions until the legal proceedings are completed. 
A G N c. The student has the right to request that the institutional proceedings 
be initiated prior to the disposition of legal proceedings. 
A G N d. The student has the right to request that the institutional proceedings 
be postponed until after disposition of the legal proceedings. 
A G N e. The institution processes the incident regardless of circumstances. 
26. Does the institution offer or give upon request incident reports, witness 
statements, hearing records or any other related documents to law enforce­
ment or judicial officials, when such material is not part of the legal 
proceedings, or is not subpoenaed? 
a. Always. 
b. Generally. 
c. Seldom. 
d. Never. 
F. ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT 
27. Please identify which of the following statements apply to suspension and 
expulsion for academic misconduct (e.g. cheating, plagiarism, 
inappropriate collaboration, etc.) at your institution: 
a. Academic misconduct is treated procedurally different from student 
disciplinary misconduct. 
b. Academic misconduct is procedurally treated like disciplinary 
misconduct. 
c. Academic misconduct is treated procedurally like failing academic 
performance with regard to suspension or expulsion. 
d. There is no set procedure for handling suspension and expulsion for 
academic misconduct. 
28. If academic misconduct is procedurally processed in a different manner than 
disciplinary misconduct (e.g utilizing a different structure), please 
indicate which elements are present in the process for academic misconduct: 
a. Not applicable; they are treated the same. 
b. A formal notice is given the accused. 
c. The accused is afforded a hearing with due process rights similar to 
those afforded the accused during a disciplinary hearing. 
d. The accused is afforded a hearing which is not comparable to a discipli­
nary hearing. 
e. Each incident is handled in an individual manner, with no set procedure. 
f. An appeals process is present if requested. 
g. Other: 
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G. MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL OF STUDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 
29. Y N Does your institution have a written policy statement and corresponding due 
process procedures which are applicable to instances where a student is 
recommended for mandatory withdrawal for mental disorders? (Please enclose 
a copy of any such statement and procedures.) 
30. Please indicate which of the following policy considerations and due 
process procedures are applied to cases of mandatory withdrawal for 
mental disorders: 
a. The institution has a clear statement concerning the policy to be 
applied in such cases. 
b. The institution must show reasons for pursuing a mandatory withdrawal 
for mental disorder. 
c. The institution will require that standard disciplinary procedures be 
used unless there is a showing of the student's incapacity to respond to 
the charges, or to understand the nature and wrongfulness of the act(s) 
in question. 
d. The institution provides the student with adequate notice (exceptions 
made for "emergencies") that involuntary withdrawal is contemplated. 
e. The institution uses independent evaluation by non-affiliated mental 
health professionals as part of the process. 
f. The institution relies solely on evaluations conducted by mental health 
professionals who are members of the institutional staff. 
g. The student is offered some form of hearing or conference (formal or 
informal) in order to examine the evaluation and discuss the situation. 
h. The institution allows the student to have advisory assistance during 
the hearing or conference. 
i. The institution allows the student to have legal counsel present during 
the hearing or conference. 
j. There is an appeal process available to the student. 
k. Other: 
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